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ABSTRACT
Of the 200 million persons living in South America today, over 30% exist as squatters.
The current uninterrupted 4% per annum growth rate will find an additional 24 million
persons clammoring for these "urbs" by 1980--just 10 years. The rural-urban migration
is irreversible. The city is the social and physical resource of their 20th century.
Amidst land plenty, there is a shortage of urban lands. "Ranchos," "favelas," or
"barriadas" as they are sometimes called, are appearing everywhere: in villages, along
dirt roads and highways, and scattered along the hills overlooking the city.
The squatters possess neither the foresight nor the technical abilities to realize the
future implications that their increasing numbers represent to themselves and to the
cities they invade. Virtually ignored by upper class planners and architects, their
fate may remain largely within their own abilities to assume these functions, however
clandestine they may be. Their rapid growth rate and already uncontrolled settlement
tradition represent the greatest single social problem of their time. If for no other
reason than size, they will not remain unnoticed for long.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a positive direction for increasing both the
quality and quantity of housing for low income families. Although our attention is spe-
cifically related to Colombia, South America, the principles and conditions described
herein are not uncommon throughout Latin America.
Our evaluation of the housing problem is to treat housing as a component of larger
national and regional development. Housing is a multi-purpose utility for the poor.
Besides shelter, it is a vehicle for social mobility, economic security and political
mobilization.
When we see housing in rapidly urbanizing areas, it is a competitive process for urban
survival realized by both legal and illegal strategies. These strategies are capable of
meeting some of the needs of low income families, but not all of them.
Our research draws from a number of case studies to decide if institutional programs are
reasonable solutions to housing problems--incorporating the advantages of both legal and
illegal housing processes.
We have organized our presentation by examining the historical pressures for rapid urbani-
zation throughout Colombia. As a direct consequence of this urbanization, two housing
processes evolved for low income families--a legal institutional process and an illegal
(but popular) process. We review the advantages of each process by comparing four case
studies. From the case studies evolved a new housing process which we have called the
Growth Pole System.
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF COLOMBIA--A SHORT COURSE
1.100 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COLOMBIA
The following short course is provided to orient the reader with the basic historical prece-
dents that have contributed to the growth and development of Colombian cities. Many of the
present day traditions and attitudes are results of events that took place in the transi-
tional period from the Pre-Colombian era to colonialization. It is at this point that we
will begin our presentation.
1.110 PRE-COLOMBIAN PERIOD
Before the arrival of the Spanish in 1530, the indigenous populations lived in dispersed regions
of Colombia: on the north coast, in the highlands that drained into the Magdalena River, in
the Cauca Valley, on the Pacific coast and in the Amazon Basin. Colombia occupied an important
geographic position that was connected by trade routes to Peru, to thelsouth, and Mesoamerica
to the north. Culture, technology, and goods circulated through Colombia as empires prospered
and declined.
The peoples that reached the highest cultural development in Colombia were the local chieftains
of the Tairona of the Sierra Nevada, where Santa Marta was established, and the Muisca of the
Andean highlands, where Bogota developed.
The Tairona culture developed lithic architecture in an urban context that included large public
works, such as temples, agricultural terraces, irrigation, paved roads, and well-planned pat-
terns of domestic architecture. The construction employed flat, dressed, trapizoidal granite
blocks as bases and entries to their round homes. The dwellings were grouped in clusters con-
nected by stone stairs and paved walkways. Only in the Muisca culture is found an economic
system, a social organization, and a religious integration to surpass the achievements of the
Tairona.
In 1537, the first Spanish troops arrived in the highlands and found the Muisca organized into
two loose federations. One was in the area centered around what is now Bogota, and ruled by
the "Zipa," and the other centered around what.is now Tunja and was-ruled by the "Zaque."
The Muisca were an agricultural people who domesticated a variety of highland potatoes. Their
caciques lived in large, well-built houses in planned villages. Religion centered around the
sun; large temples were dedicated to it and to the moon. Trade routes, as with the Tairona,
were important. Salt, emeralds, cloth, fish, and gold passed from region to region. Colombia
achieved the highest quality good-work in the Americas. The principal culture hero "Bochica"
is described as an old bearded man who Jived a holy life and taught people many arts and crafts
before ascending to the sky.
Bochica could not, however, protect the fabled gold. "They took it from the living and from
the dead, by torture and violence, and by looting shrines and graves. The search for gold soon
became a decisive factor in determining the routes of the conquering troops and in the choice
of sites for the establishment of the first Spanish settlements." (1)
1.120 THE PERIOD OF COLONIAL FEUDALISM (1530-1810)
Spanish first landed in what was later to be called Santa Marta in the year 1530. Their im-
mediate history of war characterized their orientation at the time of the discovery of Colombia.
Hard and continuous fighting during eight centuries in the Spanish peninsula had
made the Spaniard a stubborn and enthusiastic soldier, which left a profound
influence on their character and tradition. (2)
The Spanish landing in Colombia merely changed the theater of operations. Between 1530 and
1540, they discovered the three principal valleys of Colombia--the Sabana, the Cauca, and the
Antioquia. In all three regions they sought gold and silver. In the first two regions
nothing was discovered. However, because of the favorable climate and the fertility of the
soil cities were established.
(1) Reichel-Dolmatoff, G., Colombia, pp. 18-19.
(2) Hernao y Arrubla, History of Colombia pp. 1-3. 2
It is necessary to emphasize the well-developed ability of the Spanish for establishing the
basic forms of cities. They recognized the city as a complex system and designed well-
developed plans for such cities as Cartagena. The basic method of land tenure in the early
cities were through the king's decree, allowing each conquerer to occupy an area of land and
to take Indian slaves. Through this process land became the property of individual Spanish
families.
Spain's economic control of the colony followed a mercantilist pattern. Trade was permitted
only with the mother country, on both sales and purchases from the-colony taxes were levied,
greatly burdening the producers in the colony.
Politically the colonies were completely dominated by Spain which meant that the colonies had
no representation in the mother country. Two reasons account for much of the discrimination in
Latin America at that time: first, many of the original immigrant-adventurers were of the
lowest economic and social class in Spain; second, many were suspected to be, in part, of
Indian or slave blood. (It is interesting here to note that after Colombia's independence from
the mother country, the Creole American-born of spanish blood assumed the same role the Spaniard
had had before the independence and looked down on the Mestizos and Indians with a contempt
proportionate to the dubiousness of their own blood claim. (3)
Spanish officials always considered themselves a superior race. The superiority of the Spanish
can best be described as:
An absurd national prejudice according to which they considered work as being
unworthy of a noble and for the plebian. This foolish predisposition was
ruinous in the colonies, for every Spaniard, no matter how humble his origin,
considered himself offended...if he had to work. It was an affront to remind
himself that he had been an artisan in the land of his birth. (4)
(3) Hagen, Evert, The Theory of Social Change, p. 357.
It was through the process of the conquest, and later by the evaluation of Feudalism in the
colonial period, that the elite became possessors of power and with control of tne country's
land became the recipients of a considerable share of the nation's income. In summary:
The society was semi-feudal and patriarchal in nature
The prominent goal was to maintain the status quo
Class relationsnips were based on the belief in the essential superiority
of the elite classes
The elite were oriented towards Europe and attempted to emulate it
Thougn there was a certain amount of movement between peasant and artisan
occupations, tne movement from any occupation to any other was limited
Except for tne conflict between the Spanish and the Creoles, class relation-
ships were fixed
Internal investments in transportation facilities were only provided as a means
of channeling the outflow of raw materials to the Spanish Crown
The urban structure of Colombia was determined first by tne economic motivations
of the Spanish Conquistadores in gold and silver. It led them to discover the
Sabana, Cauca, and Antioquia and secondly by tne natural resources available
in the three regions.
1.130 INDEPENDENCE AND COMMERCIAL CAPITALISM (1820-1900)
Social Goals
The major goal of the native Spaniards before the time of independence was the incorporation
of the new world into the Spanish Empire. Independence from Spain was never in the minds of
the early settlers. A growing friction between the Spanish officials and the native elite
as well as a question of equal rights for a small minority of Spanish-Americans considered
by Spain to be inferior, characterized the events prior to the wars of independence.
European academicians of the Enlightenment, under the authority of the Roman Catholic Church,
proposed to create an independent Ibere-America in which reason would rule from the throne
long occupied by authority and tradition. (5) This move by the Church into the political ad-
ministration of Colombia brought with it a political class whose power was largely determined
by ideological convictions rather than political experience. Their knowledge of government
and politics was academic and once initial independence was obtained, they soon restored the
administrative model of the Spanish.
During the period of 1810-1830 two ill-fated attempts were made at independence. Both failed
as a result of the political inexperience on the part of the Creoles. They failed to attract
and unite the Mestizos and Indians into the struggle since their initial goal was only to
achieve equal rights for the Ibere-Spaniards and not to achieve independence from Spain.
After initial separation took place they simply adopted the models of the Europeans and looked
with contempt on the Mestizos and Indians, as the Spaniards had once looked at them as inferior.
The third attempt at independence was more successful than the previous two, because of the
leadership of Simon Bolivar. As leader of the revolution, Bolivar accomplished the impossible
by uniting the Mestizos and Indians under the leadership of the Creoles.
Following the war of independence Colombia's history was characterized by sporadic periods of
war and peace. Some 70 civil wars, both minor and major, marked the period of 1819 to 1920.
During this time, some 100,000 persons were killed, about 2.5% of the total population. (6)
One of the most impressive facts of studying the Colombian economic history is the gradualness
(5) Ibid., p.214.
(6) Ibid., p.579.
of technological progress. During the eighteenth century little economic change was recorded.
After independence, however, economic activity became more noticeable. Production of unrefined
brown cane sugar, Panela, and the cultivation of coffee soon became the largest national industry.
1.131 THE ROLE OF THE CITIES
The city throughout colonial times was the central point of departure for the settlement of
land. This function is in contrast to the position held by western European cities, for they
represented a movement of economic energies away from extractive pursuits toward those of pro-
cessing and distribution; the Colombian city was the source of energy and organization for the
exploitation of natural resources. (7)
As a second consequence, the towns of Bogota, Medellin, and Cali, plus other
small regional centers became encircled and their common lands absorbed by the
individual holdings pre-empted by first comers. Status was defined by ownership
of land rather than, as in older societies, the relation to the land being a
function of status. This created the expansion of municipal oligarchies and their
power to control much of the land without putting it into full production, a common
practice even today.
Asfaras the spatial structure of urban centers, two broad phases of development have
taken place. First a centrifugal phase in which the towns distributed status and
fortune seekers out to the agricultural hinterlands. The social organization was
often unstable. Political and economic power followed to the rural states. The second
phase saw the appearance of the commercial entrepreneurs (after independence) re-
sulting in an attraction back to the city during the last half of the 19th century.
The process of urbanization up to the beginning of the twentieth century represents
a pressure of population against the ordeals of the social and economic feudal order
rather than against the land itself. (8)
(7) Morse, Richard, Some Characteristics of Latin American Urban History, p. 317.
(8) Ibid., pp. 317-484.
rj .1 aop 0 ""No- --- - - __
In summary:
Society was still semi-feudal and patriarchal in nature. Politically their primary
goal was to fight for ideologies, most of which were coming from Europe
Political power was centered in each region, each one having their own "caudillo"
The location of the colonial town was decided by political and strategic agricultural
considerations. Industrial and commercial objectives were negligible
The pattern of urban form was a nuclear grid plan surrounded by arable field
The latifundia (9) controlled by individual owners originally from an urban back-
ground, became the agency by which rural workers were organized for production (10)
The village community tended to lead a marginal existence, because the land owners
found it economically desirable to move their haciendas to the country and the
villages were therefore partly abandoned during this period
The goals of society after independence were not very much different from colonial
times.
1.140 THE ANTIOQUENOS AND THE APPEARANCE OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CLASS IN COLOMBIA
Foreign investments in Colombia before World War II were almost non-existent. Only after its
own economic growth was firmly implanted did it attract foreign enterprise. (11) In part,
some of this developmental lag is due to the inaccessibility of the Sabana, the Cauca, and
Antioquia. Production till 1900 was largely for local market consumption while large-scale
(9) Definition: Large expanses of land, opposite of minifundia
(10) Mojica, Gillermo, The Economic Development of Colombia, pp. 39-43.
(11) Hagen, Everett, Theory of Social Change, p. 363.
production of cash crops (coffee, sugar) was for export. Within this context, however, there
began to emerge an entrepreneurial class out of the Antioquenos, not from the richer Sabana
society.
The rise of the Antioquenos' enterprises cannot be immediately traced to the usual economic
advantages: greater market, greater access to foreign technologies, or better resources of
capital. The Sabana had the larger population, best land, and therefore the best agricultural
production. The Cauca was second best. Industry first begain in the Sabana. Hagen seems to
feel that the isolation of Antioquia contributed to their self-determined attitude of development.
Hagen says that if Bogotanos with all their favorable endowments were as effective as the
Antioquenos, rapid economic growth would have begun around 1850, instead as it did around 1900.
There are several theories why this cultural and organizational split took place. It is a common
attitude, even today, in Colombia that the Antioquenos were backward and even sociallyinferior to
Bogotanos, perhaps because of their work in mining as opposed to agriculture.
The Antioquenos, however, did not think of themselves as inferior... .They could not
have used the Bogotano as a model for their own behavior, for they probably sensed
their life as unsatisfying and anxiety creating... .On the other hand, their own life
was unsatisfactory, since their values and purpose were not respected by the Bogotanos
and other groups of the society whom they value. Thus they found an alternative channel
of behavioral satisfaction in the adaptation of new techniques in industrial enterprises (12)
1.200 TRENDS IN GROWTH AND URBANIZATION
Colombia is characterized by the following demographic characteristics:
Rapid population growth
Rapid descent of mortality rates
(12) Mojica, Guillermo, The Economic Development of Colombia, p. 48.
IRV
Increasingly younger population
Great movements of population towards the largest urban centers
Rapid formation of a middle class
In this section we will present some of the more important characteristics influencing the
designs of Colombian cities. Although our presentation is directed specifically towards
Colombia, these problems are characteristic of many other Latin American countries.
1.210 INCREASING POPULATIONS
Population growth establishes the magnitude of the demand for shelter for the world's growing
numbers. A look at the populations in different geographic locations and at various stages of
industrialization shousseveral interesting facts related to urban populations. The populations
of Colombia, the United States, Peru, and the United Kingdom present a cross section of modern
and modernizing populations:
COLOMBIA UNITED STATES PERU UNITED KINGDOM
population estimates for
1969 in millions 21.4 203.1 13.2 55.7
birth rate/1000 45 17.4 42 17.5
death rate/1000 11 9.6 11 11.2
current rate of population
growth in % 3.4 1.0 3.1 0.6
child mortality rate/1000,
under one year 80.0 22.1 63 18.8
population under 15 in % 47 30 45 23
per capita gross national
product (US$) 280 3520 320 1620
COLOMBIA UNITED STATES
population illiterate
15 years and older 30-40 0-3 35-40
source (13)
The following charts show the age sex distribution in three areas:
8o
60
20
0 --
BOGOTA UNITED STATES
0-1
JAPAN
Examining these example profiles, we find the following: The profile of Bogota is wide based;
the young predominate. The profile rises through the age classes of 15-59 and 60 and older in
a sharp proportional decline in population. Ehrlich calls this a "pinched" profile. It signifies
highbirth rates with correspondingly high death rates. The profile of the United States is bell-
shaped that results when a population that once had a low birth and death rate undergoes a
(13) Ehrlich, Paul, Population Resources Environment pp. 332-333.
PERU UNITED KINGDOM
subsequent rise in birth rate and begins growing again at a relatively rapid rate. When it
had a low birth rate and death rate the population was more evenly distributed in a narrow profile.
Japan's profile has a narrow base that is indicative of a sharp decrease in birth rate. From the
10-14 age group upward, however, the profile is typical of a modernizing country. In general,
a profile that is more or less an equilateral triangle is characteristic of countries that have
both high birth rate and death rate such as India.
Another significant feature of the age-distribution of a population is the percentage of people
who are economically active in relation to those who are economically dependent. The productive
age group is from 15 to 59 years. The proportion of dependents in modernizing countries is
generally much higher than in the modernized or highly industrialized countries, principally
because a large fraction of the population is under 15 years old.
The high percentage of people under 15 years of age is indicative of the explosive growth poten-
tial of their populations. In most modernizing countries the under 15 group is usually 20-30%.
Thus modernizing countries have.a much greater proportion of preproductive people. As these
young people grow up and move into their reproductive years, the size of the childbearing frac-
tion of the population will increase astronomically. If 10,000 houses per day were built in
Latin America between 1969 and 1979, something on the order of 100 million persons (more than
one-fifth of the expected population) would still be inadequately housed at the end of that time.
1.220 PRESSURES FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT
In 1950, 30% of the Latin American population, (61 million persons), lived in urban centers of
more than 2,000 inhabitants; while 61% (96 million people) lived in rural areas. By 1960,
just 10 years later, these percentages reversed: 46% (95 million persons) were now living in
urban centers and 54% (111 million) were in the rural areas. The urban growth rate for that
decade was 55%, reflecting.an annual rate of nearly 12%. Projections of Latin America's popu-
lation in 1975 will exceed 291 million with an urban rural distribution of 54 and 46% respectively.
A look at the urban distribution will give some idea of the impact that this population growth
has had. Until 1930, Buenos Aires was Latin America's only city of one million. By 1950,
Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Havana, Lima and Santiago were to join it. By 1960,
Bogota, Caracas and Montevideo joined the list. By 1970 there were a total of 16 cities with
populations of one million or more and by 1980 there will be an estimated 26 urban centers on
the list.
When we focus on the development of Colombia's 19,719,000 persons, we find a similar population
growth pattern.
Urban-Rural Population Distribution
Total Pop.
Year (Millions) Urban Rural
1948 9.890 ----- -----
1950 11.273 4.196 6.974
1955 12.969 5.504 7.332
1960 14.901 7.066 7.705
1965 17.165 8.891 8.094
1970 19.719 11.079 8.510
Source: Plan General de Desarrollo, p. 431
Note: Urban is defined as towns of 1500 persons
The following chart illustrates the relative emphasis in city size growth for years 1938, 1951,
1960 and 1965. The most impressive characteristic of population growth is that it was not con-
centrated in just one or two urban centers as was the case for most of the other countries.
Urban Size Distributions by Percentage
Urban Size 1938 -1951 1960 1965
500,000 0.0 14.6 15.2 38.8
100,000-499,000 24.5 24.5 27.6 15.6
20,000-99,000 19.7 19.9 20.2 18.0
1,500-19,000 55.8 41.0 37.0 27.6
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: The Economic Development of Colombia, p. 88
Note that the population percentage in cities of 500,000 or more was not significant until
1965. This late start in large city creation is reflected in the relatively new emphasis that
mass rural'-urban migration has had in the large urban centers. Thus when we rank the urban
centers of 100,000 persons or more, we find that Colombia has the most uniform cross section of
city sizes of any Latin American nation:
1964 Colombia:
Rank of Cities of More than 100,OOO Persons
Total Population % of
City Population Total Country
Santa Marta 104,471 .60
Pasto 112,876 .65
Cienaga 113,143 .65
Monteria 126,329 .72
Armenia 137,222 .78
Palmira 140,889 .81
Ibague 163,661. .94
Cucuta 175,336 1.00
Pereira 188,365 1.08
Manizales 221,916 1.27
Bucaramanga 229,748 1.31
Cartagena 242,085 1.38
Barranquilla 498,301 2.85
Cali 637,929 3.65
Medellin 772,887 4.42
Bogota, D.E. 1,697,311 9.71
5,562,469 31.81
Source: Urbanizacion Y Marginalidad, p. 22, table 9
Wt
With the exception of Medellin and Bogota doubling their population, almost all other ranges
are represented. The rates of change as one goes from Santa Marta to Barranquilla are rela-
tively constant. Once the 500,000 mark is reached there are larger.increments in the popula-
tion until Bogota.
As has been recently observed, Colombia is fortunate in that its urban growth
has occurred in many cities and has not been as concentrated as in Mexico or
Argentina, and therefore the social costs associated with an excessive size,
has not been so grave. However, recently, there have been disturbing indica-
tions that this situation may be changing with the changing emphasis that
makes Bogota the political and financial capitol of the nation, and the most
important manufacturing and commercial center, that generates the high and
difficult rate of growth of 6.8% per year, which indicates that the population
will double each 11 or 12 years, and, together with Cali and Medellin, dis-
allows the (future) possibilities of growth of many small cities. ( 14)
The implication of this for future urban development is that cities are polarizing. There
are those of 500,000 persons that show gradual change while the bulk of migration and urban
center expansion will be felt in cities of two and four times this size. This emphasis in
large urban center development will greatly increase and localize the migration targets which
were previously absorbed in smaller sized and more numerous cities.
1.230 THE URBAN EMPHASIS IN MIGRATION
Migration has played a major role in the development of every -Colombian city. For our brief
historical sketch, we described several cycles that cities have had. Not always have they
been the great attractions they are today. Since we define migration as a physical redistri-
bution of the population, a closer look into some theories of migrant movement in Colombia
will furnish us with the basic sources and orientations that migrants have. We are
(14) Plazas, s., Jorge, Alternativas para el Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota D.E. p. 5.
particularly interested in what kinds of aspirations and skills the migrant has, for this will
give us an idea of specific demands he will make upon the city and most of all upon the housing
market. There are several active theories of migration, these include direct campo (country)
to city patterns, inter-city migration, and intra-city movement.
Migration is essentially the product of social discontent that agricultural laborers
suffer, called "anomily" that is determined by the incompatibility of their goals and
their means. The sociologists have pointed out that of the most important forms for
escaping the mentioned conflict is that of innovation, a mechanism through which
individuals accept the institutionalized goals of the society and conscious of the
impossibility to achieve them by available means, among which migration appears as
the most important. We see that not only is the migratory population young, and
potentially productive, but that also the migratory population is extremely innova-
tive. (15)
1.231 THE "STEPPING STONE" THEORY
There appear to be two predominant patterns to rural-urban migration throughout Colombia, one
of which makes a direct contribution to the squatter problem. This is the "stepping stone"
process by which people move out of rural areas and collect in small nearby towns. The small
townsmen are in turn attracted to the larger urban centers. This incremental process provides
a high degree of urban socialization by the time in-migrants reach the large metropolitan areas.
Because Colombia has such a wide range of intermediate sized cities, there is considerable dif-
fusion in this process. In other countries, such as Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, and
Equador, where there are but one or two major centers, this transitional process is much more
abrupt. This stepping process has profound effects on the basic urban acculturation of the
migrants:
One can make very important conclusions from this observation. One does not refer to
a totally rural population dedicated to agricultural labors. One can.say that much
- more time is required for the move from the country to the county seats than from
(15) Cardona, Ramiro, Las Invasiones de terrenos Urbanos p.. 24. 15
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the small villages to the metropolis. It seems that the "culture shock" that
affects the migrants occurs with most intensity when the former abandons his
land and assimilates into the life of a small village, than when the inhabi-
tants of small villages enter into the great centers. (16)
What appears to be happening to migrants as they leave the land and become urbanites is that
they are forced to toally relinquish their land-based skills. The move into the major centers
is only changing the scale and the level of modernization for something they have already
been prepared for and accustomed to.
1.232 LA VIOLENCIA
La Violencia was a civil war which centered largely in the campo of Colombia for some 25 years.
Initiated by the assassination of Jorge Eliezer Gaitan, a popular political candidate, the
Violencia brought the liberal and conservative factions into open warfare. It has been often
cited as one of the most influential catalysts for rural migration to the cities and is un-
doubtedly a cause of uncontrolled urbanization in the larger cities. Sociologists German Guzman
and Orlando Fals Borda state that over 800,000 people were forced to change residence between
1946 and 1962 because of the violencia, over 60,000 refugees had come into Bogota by 1953, the
most intense period. (17)
Although there is no direct data to prove that these immigrants collected in squatter settle-
ments, John Powelson in an article on the invasion settlements of Cali, suggests that this may
have been the case:
Migration from country to city is a phenomena throughout Latin America. But in
Colombia it is intensified by the violent fighting between conservative and
(16) Ibid., p. 20.
(17) Guzman, German; Orlando Fals Borda and Eduardo Umana Luna, "La Violencia en Colombia,"
V.I., Bogota, Tercer Mundo, 1962, pp. 294-297.
liberal villages, which has seared thousands of country people into the safety of
the city, where the scarcity of houses has caused even slum rents to soar. (18)
There are other reasons for this migration as indicated in a recent study by William Paul
McGreevy which shows that:
Only small percentages of migrants interviewed, even though they might have come
from areas deeply affected by the Violencia, list it as their reason for coming
to the city; the principal direction of'migrants fleeing the Violencia could
well have been from vereda to small town and not, as previously supposed, from small
town to large city. (19)
When 448 migrant families were iqterviewed in Bogota concerning their reasons for coming to the
city, by far the largest response was "to get work." The group samples was from the Central
Nacional Pro-Vivienda's membership, an organizer of squatter invasions. The distributions were
as follows:
Motives for Migrations to Urban Centers
Stated Reason for Move No. %
Health 20 4.5
Work 199 44.4
Violencia 65 14.5
Economic Situation 54 12.1
Military Service 2 .4
Brought to City as Child 44 9.8
Came to Visit and Stayed 23 5.1
For Education of Children 17 3.8
To Study 4 .9
Without Answer 20 4.5
448 100.0%
Source: Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos, p. 36
(18) Powelson, John P., "The Land-Grabbers of Cali," p. 30
(19) McGreevy, William Paul, "Change in Rural Colombia: Population Movement and Strategies
from Change," Berkeley, Latin American Center U.C., mimeo, 1965, pp. 23-25.
1.240 ' PROBLEMS IN "OVER URBANIZATION"
Some of the immediate results of this concentration of growth in urban centers is that of "over
urbanization." In contrast with the developed countries where urbanization accompanies the process
of industrialization, in Colombia urbanization is not accompanied by industrial development of
equal magnitudes. In other words, urbanization is not synonymous with industrialization but in-
dicates an extraordinary rural poverty moving to the city. (20)
The doubling of population in the larger cities every ten years has outdated municipal services
as fast as they have been installed. Complicated by the appearance of squatter settlements, the
directions and logical extensions of infrastructure have often become distorted and unevenly
distributed.
If the people better than anyone know what they want and what they dan do, and they
frequently show a capacity to take best advantage of their available resources,
but don't understand clearly their positions in the city, pretending to live in it
the same life that they lived in the country, the phenomena of "ruralization" of the
city is grave, not only because it annuls the city for what it is, but because it
can never present the advantages the country presents either. Such as, for example,
the condition of overcrowding and the lack of water and sanitary services, that need
not be services ir a rural dwelling, but are required in an urban dwelling. They
can not avoid anti-hygenic conditions. (21)
Rapid urban growth is more the result of economic "push" factors, from the rural countryside,
than from "pull" factors from within the cities. The city has created the illusion of providing
jobs and opportunities for all, however, the benefits from the city in actuality, tend in the
end to be more social than economic and increase the transfer of the rural poverty into the
(20) Cardona, Ramiro, Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos, p. 10.
(21) Rojas, Ernesto, Urbanismo Y Migracion, p. 263.
dity slums. The disparity between manufacturing employment and the degree of urbanization can
best be illustrated by the following estimates for the Car region:
Agriculture 21.0%, manufacturing 21.5% and other 57.8%. The Car region comprises
an area encompassing Bogota in which the total population was 1,604,000 for 1961.
The city proper accounted for 1,300,000 of this. The population of the Car area
in 1961 was 80% urban, since the urban-migration is in excess of the expansion of
employment opportunities in manufacturing, this indicates that migrants must take their
living at unskilled labor-intensive positions. The high percent classified as "others"
accounts for this. (22)
From another point of view, the effects of job and over urbanization can be seen as an over-
saturation of various skill markets. in the lower income sectors, in-migrants find their
greatest competition with others of the same background and level of skills. Their labor
intensive job markets are flooded: street vendors, artisans, manual laborers, etc., abound in
every city. At the other end of the job market, professional administrators, doctors, techni-
cians, and teachers cluster in the cities and saturate their respective areas. Worse yet, the
university system, without sufficient knowledge of the realities of the country, prepares
students for unnecessary roles and denies the areas of greatest national priorities. In our own
field of architecture, it is curious to see almost every university design studio filled with
proposals for office towers, low-density detached residences, cultural buildings such as national
museums, vacation resorts and other projects of both unrealistic demand and cost. In a country
where one-third of the total population is provisionally housed, this is professionalism at its
worst. The greatest indictment comes from those sufficiently educated to both recognize the
problems at hand to contribute solutions and yet do not.
1.250 THE FORMATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
One of the most profound consequences of rapid 20th century urbanization is the appearance of
a significantly sized middle class. The middle class, as of yet, does not fulfill the central
(22) Mojica, Guillermo, The Economic Development of Colombia, p. 91.
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condition for a class, that is, that the members have a common background of experience, for
they represent nearly every economic and cultural background. In general, the middle class is
the group most aware of the existing social and-economic inequalities of their time because as
a newly formed class they are more often confronted by these inequalities than are members of
the lower classes.
In Colombia, the middle class emulates two distinctly different models. On. one hand there
is the nationalistic criollo model which is based on an European ancestry elite. On the other
hand, the consumer-based American model has made a tremendous impact: rapid communications, a
greater foreign and international mobility, and a large influx of American based firms have in-
vaded what once was a strong nationalistic and even provincial aspiration.
For the middle class to deal effectively with the problems and issues that urbanization has
brought, it needs to assume leadership of the popular forces and to direct these forces through
a democratic process. This requires that the middle class identify themselves, through their
cultural background, with the common man. The possibility of their becoming political and
economic activists is strictly dependent upon their ability to produce leadership under the
pressures of the existing oligarchic program. This will be possible if and only if the middle
class can stop emulating upper class values.
In speaking of the problems of developing countries, the United Nations has accused the middle
class of frustrating economic development by indulging in self-protective measures to obtain
increased public employment, inviolable job security and legislative safeguards against compe-
tition. The pressure for these measures was said to have come'from employers, businessmen and
professionals. (23)
The protective competition that this U.N. article refers to is particularly strong in the
area of housing. In many cases the middle class.has forced the invasion of public lands by
squatters because the low-density tradition that the middle class has followed has already
(23) The New York Times, "U.N. Study Warns of Latin Tension," April 7, 1963, p. 24.
squandered much of the valuable inner-city land, leaving only public sites for invasion by the
poor.
One can immediately see political implications in the formation of the middle class. Middle
class values have placed an importance on the democratization of the city offering an alterna-
tive to the ever present Marxist model of socialist radicalism and revolution. As we have
seen, the history of Colombia shows that an enormous price has already been paid for social
change through armed revolution, i.e., the Violencia, 1946-1962. However, it seems that due to
American military assistance programs that armed conflict is a clandestine process in the 20th
century, and as Regis Debray states, the "Cuban model of revolution" will not work again in
Latin America. (24) Hence the formation of a middle class will form an alternative process
for social change.
1.260 IN SUMMARY
Colombia is characterized by rapid population growth, high fertility rates, rapid
decent of mortality rates, an increasingly younger population, great movements of pop-
ulation towards the urban centers, and a formation of a large middle class.
Colombia's greatest urban amenities lie in the fact that there are many intermediate
.sized cities in the 100,000 through 500,000 population range, causing rapid rural to
urban migration and dispersing economic development throughout the entire country.
The principal factor accounting for the rapid growth of cities throughout Colombia is
migration.
Cities are not capable of assimilating the increasing number of in-migrants into the
city.
There exists a ruralization trend in parts of the city (rural in the sense that de-
cidedly rural traditions begin to co-exist in a stable way with patterns both
(24) Debray, Regis, Revolution in Revolution, pp. 50-100. 21
modern and urban).
The process of urbanization in Colombia is accelerating the,process of modernization
of its inhabitants.
Migration patterns indicate that cities are polarizing in size with a decreasing em-
phasis in the number and rates of growth in cities of less than 500,000 persons and
a concentration of populations in cities of 1,000,000 or more.
There are several theories accounting for large city in-migration: 1) The "Stepping
Stone" theory where migration takes place between cities of increasing size and 2)
direct rural urban migration. Migration due to the Violencia has been responsible
in part for the first theory.
High concentrations of migrants in one city have flooded the labor intensive job
markets. This over urbanization is also found in the reluctance of professionals,
etc., to leave the large cities and distribute themselves and their skills throughout
the country.
The high levels of urbanization are reflected in the formation of a large middle class
which has determined that the city will no longer be the exclusive receptacle of a
national elite. The middle class has also been accused of restricting development by
being overly protective and conservative with respect to their new accomplishments.
The in-migrant to the city is creating a new and successful pressure group for social
change.
1.300 BOGOTA
Bogota is the capital of Colombia. It is the industrial and financial center for 10% of
Colombia's 22,000,000 persons. 22
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1.310 HISTORICAL ASPECTS
1.311 COLONIAL PERIOD
Bogota was founded by 1538 by Gonzalo de Quesada and named Santa Fe de Bogota after his birth
place and the southern capital of the Muiscas, Bacata. It became the capital of the vice
royalty of Nueva Granada and soon thereafter one of the centers of Spanish colonial power and
civilization. The original population consisted of the members of the Muisca tribe that the
Spanish met on the savanah of Bogota. In 1812, there were 20,000 inhabitants.
1.312 INDEPENDENCE AND THE INITIATION OF THE REPUBLIC (1812-1880)
In 1811, the city's inhabitants revolted against Spanish rule and established their own. In
1816, the city was re-occupied by Spanish troops under General Pablo Morillo. His regime lasted
until Bolivar's victory at Boyaca forced the remaining Spanish out. Bogota then became the
capital of the new Republic of Gran Colombia that included the territory of what is today
Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, and Colombia. Then the republic was dissolved into its three con-
stituent parts of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nueva Granada (Colombia and Panama). The city was
clustered around what is now the Plaza de Bolivar until 1840 when it initiated its elongated
form with the installation of its first mule drawn street car. In 1861, Colombia officially
came into being and Bogota was its capital. The population from 1812 to 1880 increased from
20,000 to 70,000.
1.313 MODERN PERIOD 1880-1970
Political violence characterized Colombia's entry into the 20th century. Animosity between the
Liberal and Conservative parties culminated in the assassination of the popular Liberal candi-
date Jorge Elizer Gaitan on April 9, 1948. The assassination sparked a period of violence and
guerilla warfare which resulted in the death of 150,000 to 200,000 people. In the "Bogotazo"
alone 100,000 people were killed. A brief period of calm reigned when General Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla proclaimed himself dictator on June 13, 1953. Discontent with the ever increasing
repression of the regime finally caused his overthrow. In 1958, Alberto Lleras Camargo, who
helped engineer the coup, also helped establish the Frente Nacional, a parity system of govern-
mentautomatically alternating the control of the country between the liberal and the conserva-
tive parties.
From 1910 to 1938, Bogota's urban population increase was slow as indicated in the following
chart. After 400 years of existence Bogota had only 330,000 inhabitants. Its population has
multiplied itself 7 times in the last 32 years. It is presently over 2,300,000 inhabitants,
as presented in the following age sex distribution chart. The increased demand for municipal
services, transportation, and housing facilities to accommodate this population increase has
created a wide array of urban problems.
Bogota: Population Growth
Year No. of Persons
3,000
20,000
29,603
70,000
100,000
330,312
648, 000
1,139,058
1,697,911
2,235,000
1.320 ECONOMIC ASPECTS
The estimated income distribution for Bogota is typical of
urban centers in developing countries undergoing rapid
growth and expansion. The bulk of the population earns one
or two times subsistence level incomes. In Bogota, 42.5%
of the population earns less than 11,000 pesos annually
($550 US). Worker and low level bureaucrat incomes account
for 27% of the families, middle income jobs such as shop
owner, highlevel governmental employee, etc., represent
16% of the families, and 14% of the population earns more
than 60,000 pesos per year. (25)
Subsistence level is defined as that amount of money needed
Source: Dane, Bogota to provide shelter, clothing, food and fuel with no margin
for savings. In Bogota, the subsistence level is approximately 800 pesos per month. In 1964,
there were 54.8% of the families that earned 2,000 pesos per month. (26)
(25) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para el Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota D.E., p. 134.
(26) Cardona, Ramiro, Migracion y Darrono Urbano, p. 206. 24
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1812
1851
1880
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1969
BOGOTA : AGE SEX DISTRIBUTION
MALES . AGE .
26,762
35,643
59,405
44,130
56,011
64,497
76,378
78,076
91,645
120,509
142,574
15
TOTAL
60
50
40
30
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
59
49
39
34
29
24
19
14
9
4
5 0 %
791,946
46.7%
POPULATION
FEMALES
0
TOTAL
5 10
FEMALES
15
= 905,365
= 53.3%
= 1,697,311
PERCENTS TAKEN OF TOTAL POPULATION IN 1967
10
MALES =
TOTAL
40,735
44,130
66,195
50,919
62,800
76,378
95,049
06,930
01,838
20,509
39,179
Bogota: Age Sex Distribution for 1964
Total Males Females
% No. Age % No.
8.4 142,574 0- 4 8.2 139,179
7.1 120,509 5- 9 7.1 120,509
5.4 91,654 10-14 6.0 101,838
4.6 78,076 15-19 6.3 106,930
4.5 76,378 20-24 5.6 95,049
3.8 64,497 25-29 4.5 73,378
3.3 56,011 30-34 3.7 62,800
2.6 44,130 35-39 3.0 50,919
3.5 59,405 40-49 3.9 66,195
2.1 35,643 50-60 2.6 44,130
1.4 26,462 61+ 2.4 40,735
46.7% 53.3%
Source: Las Invasions de Terrenos Urbanos, p. 50.
1.330 GEO-POLITICAL ASPECTS
The historic development and importance of Bogota has been outlined in the preceding section.
The rise from colonial capital to international metropolis-has been accompanied by the develop-
ment of essential governmental agencies, such as the statistics centdr,. DANE, national offices
of Public Works, Development, Housing, cultural facilities, such as the Gold Museum, theaters,
educational facilities, hospitals, etc. In 1964, the metropolitan area of Bogota was organized
as a Special District (Distrito Especial), retaining its position as capital of the Republic
of Colombia. The metropolitan area incorporates six surrounding municipalities (Usme, Bosa,
Fontibon, Engativa, Suba, and Usaquen) is closely related to them because of their economic
dependence and geographic location.
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1.340 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PATTERN
The commercial center of Bogota is the geographic as well as the social dividing line. The
remaining colonial houses and new apartment buildings house a variety of economic groups--very
low to upper income levels. It is now becoming fashionable to move back into old colonial
homes that had become rooming houses for rural migrants. The high income groups now occupy
the northern sectors of the city in the barrios Chico, El Retiro, etc. These groups are com-
posed of the least racially mixed population, generally families of Spanish descent and colonies
of foreign diplomats and businessmen. The southern portion of the city is composed of the lower
income and worker groups. The racial composition of these barrios is generally "mestizo," a
mixture of white and Indian populations. There is a small but growing number of mulatto, a
mixture of black and white populations, and zambo, a mixture of black and Indian groups,
population immigrating from the coastal areas to the city. The racial composition of Colombia
in 1963 was 40% mestizo, 30% white, 18% mulatto, 7% Indian, and 7% black. These lower middle
and middle income groups occupy the western and southwestern sectors of the city.
1.350 PHYSICAL PLANNING ORIENTATIONS
The earliest planning concepts that guided the physical development of the city came from the
"Ley de Indias." It stipulated that blocks had a length of 100 "varas," about 80 cm., and that
they were organized around a plaza whose length was to be 1 times its width. The homes were
large and had rooms grouped around ample interior courtyards. As the city grew the blocks lost
their relationship to the "Plaza Mayor" and "The Calle Real" but retained the same basic dimen-
sions. In the early days of the colonial epoch and the first-decades of the period after inde-
pendence these guidelines could function.
Now, however, economic, social, demographic and technical transformations have promoted the
decadence of the old colonial sectors of the city. Houses and lots have been subdivided, high
rise construction has created "volumetric chaos," and blocked the light from the streets, and
a mixed land use has allowed the establishment of repair shops, entertainment centers, and other
commercial ventures. (27)
(27) Posada, Reinaldo, Apuntes Sobre Agrupaciones de Vivienda, p. 3.
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1.351 THE PHYSICAL PLANNING OF BOGOTA FROM 1948 TO 1969
In 1948, the "Plan Piloto" and "Plan Regulador," the most comprehensive urban studies for Bogota,
were begun. These were elaborated by the urbanists Le Corbusier, Jose Luis Sert and Paul Lester
Wiener. The "Plan Piloto" was concluded in 1951 and the "Plan Regulador" in 1953. It was
established that:
a) The urban growth of Bogota had a defined north-south orientation along the existing streets;
to the west development was limited because of the successive locations of railroad and flood
zones. However, in certain sectors, a tendency of the city to grow in this direction existed.
b) The "Plan Piloto" as well as the "Plan Regulador" reinforced the city's form as lineal, and
proposed measures for regulating and controlling the city at its extremes.
c) The plans proposed an extreme separation of the urban functions, especially between residential
and work areas. The only exception to the separation of these functions were the designations of
some commercial strips along major traffic arteries and in civic centers.
d) They recommended the location of a single group of industrial areas placed symmetrically in
relation to the axis of the city and one important business, office, and administrative center.
e) The plans foresaw the formation of a compact city, by using high densities of habitation.
To achieve the densities, the following was proposed; the construction of horizontal units on
small lots, multi-family units, and the application of an urban perimeter of limited extension.
f) The "Plan Piloto" and the "Plan Regulador" have only partial effects today. Unfortunately,
the referred only to the area of the old municipality of Bogota, within which they established a
reduced "urban perimeter" of development, surrounded by an area "non-aldificandi." In the same
period the initiation of numerous barrios took place situated next to the municipal limit.
These barrios were under the jurisdiction of the surrounding municipalities. These authorities
permitted the formation of the so-called "barrios piratas" or barrios "clandestinos.!'
The later proposals of urban zoning, prepared by the District Administration, and the urban
development that has taken place within these guidelines, or in contradiction to them, have
the following outstanding characteristics: -
a) An increasingly larger area in the process of urbanization, and the constant acceptance by
authorities of spontaneous development. The existence of these settlements obligated the city
to begin an extensive program of rehabilitation of barrios. The goal of the city is to provide
basic urban services to the barrios.
b) A tolerance for the growth of the city's low density in barrios to the north. This growth
is acc*ompanied by the formation of an extensive zone of suburbs and difficulties in extending
public service, such as sewage, transportation, etc.
c) A push of the growth of the city to the west and southwest, not counting the existence of
large undeveloped zones outside the market, in a form more semicircular than periods before.
d) An uncontrolled extension of narrow bands along the regional roads, Soacha-Muna, Funza-
Mosquera, and Usaquen-La Care.
e) The search for a greater variety in the location of the industrial and artisan zones of the
city, with proximity to the working class sectors and the regional roads.
f) The centralization of tertiary activities within the city, with the simultaneous appearance
of some new centers; as the official administration center, those of 7 of August, Restrepo,
etc., and the strengthening of the Chapinero, etc.
g) The slow establishment of a system of circulation that emphasizes a mixed mode of transpor-
tation, private automobiles and buses.
h) The appearance of new types of housing developments: large scale developments such as
Ciudad Kennedy, barrios of progressive development, planned or not, and housing programs run
by profit-making entities and others.
i) The utilization of the available natural areas for the location of green zones to counter
an expanding deficit of park areas.
j) An attempt to give flexibility to the association of diverse land uses by the concession of
licenses for special uses. By reserving small zones or islands for commercial, artisan, in-
dustrial, civic centers, into areas previously designated for other uses, such as residential.
"This mix has been effected on occasion with liberality and with looking towards the existing
amenities." (28)
1.360 PRESENT LAND PROBLEMS
Bogota has expanded lineally to the north and the south. Movement to the west has been hindered
by large land holdings and land that is difficult to develop due to the flooding. Growth to
the east has been contained by the slopes of the Andes, spotted now by housing developments.
The areas and densities of Bogota presented chronologically in the following chart indicate the
tendencies of rapid growth in area and declining density.
Bogota: Occupied Area and Population, 1560-1964
Area in Inhabitants
Year Hectares, Inhabitants per Hectare
1560 20
1600 56 - -
1670 129 3,000 23.23
1851 294 29,603 100.69
1938 2,514 330,312 131.40
1958 8,084 1,139,058 140.91
1964 14,615 1,729,_911 118.37
Source: Plazas, J., Alternativas para el Desarrollo
de Bogota D.E., p. 72.
Residential land use and circulation
combined account for 90% of the area
of Bogota with-10% of the land mass
occupied by all the other land uses.
3.361 IAND COMPETITION
Land speculation, urban sprawl, and
rapid demographic growth have created
an intense competition for land avail-
able for housing among the different
economic groups. What was considered
to be marginal land, expensive to
(28) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para el Desarrollo Urbano Bogota D.E., pp. 55-56.
develop, and difficult to maintain and secure, has now become property that offers physical
and locational amenities to the economic groups at the opposite ends of the income scale. The
steep slopes offer amenable views, are located.near employment and commercial centers, and are
relatively inexpensive to buy. Economically marginal populations iely on the local building
tradition to develop dwelling units of natural and permanent construction materials at high
densities that can only be equalled by expensive technical methods appropriate to the high
income groups. Middle income housing produced by individuals, commercially, and by governmental
agencies, is limited by the available economic resources to developing sites that do not require
large investments in site and lot development, but concentrate on the production of a finished
unit. The result is under utilization of the total site because of its steep slope or low swamp
land. In view of the rate of growth of urban populations, land waste is planning suicide. The
differences in the densities of the project Los Laches, built by the municipal housing office of
Bogota, The Caja de la Vivienda Popular, and the invasion barrio, Las Colinas, are immense. Los
Laches has a density of 12.8 families, and Las Colinas has a density of 77.5 families/ha. These
settlements are further illustrated in the third chapter where we have presented them as case
studies.
1.362 POPUlAR BARRIO GROWTH
"In all the regions in development, typical national rates of growth of population are 2% and
3% per year. But the typical rates of population growth for the urban centers actually exceeds
6% per year. In some of these regions the population growth in the barrios or slums, or in the
areas of spontaneous growth is 12% per year, registering numbers as high as 20% per year, that
is a rate of growth that doubles the population of the poorest areas of these cities every five
years." (29)
The land traditionally used by the poor to solve their housing problem is no longer exclusively
theirs. Luxury homes and apartments are now beginning to occupy the steep slopes in Bogota.
The loss of.these locations will force the low income population further south, and along the road
(29) Cardona, Ramiro, Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, p. 189.
to Villavicencio. The distributions of the housing zones is "totally discriminatory." The
north and the south sectors represent social positions and prestige symbols. This social
split is the cause of excessive expansion and demand in the northern sector of the city. The
most beautiful areas of Bogota, near the rivers San Cristobal and San Francisco, have not been
intensely developed.
The lot sizes too, are identified with social strata, since tne city has not
been capable of offering to its inhabitants solutions of diverse densities that
permit them to choose their places as needed in relation to the nearness to work
or the recreation centers, or by reason of the beauty of the landscape... .Densities
of 100, 200, and 350.persons/ha. are indicators that almost always occur in poorly
developed marginal areas, and are the logical consequence of the lack of areas of
public use for roads and for green zones. (30)
Urban expansion,causes a one-sided battle in land use. As the city stretches the metropolitan
area to accommodate the demand for new housing, it moves into high altitude, agriculturally pro-
ductive land that can offer no real competition with the economic opportunities capitalized on
by land speculators, developers and city agencies. "Agriculture can never compete with an urban
use of the land, except, perhaps in the case of vegetables and flowers. The continual growth
of Bogota, with the economic and job opportunities that it will present, carries with it "social
costs" that in the long run have a real economic significance--the costs of transportation, con-
gestion, the increase in the costs of public services, and the irrecupable losses of the very
limited areas of agriculture at 2,500 meters altitude. (31)
(30) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para el Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota, D.E., pp. 21-56.
(31) Ibid., pp. 21-56.
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VCHAPTER 2
THE HOUSING SYSTEMS--LEGAL AND ILLEGAL
2.100 THE LEGAL HOUSING SYSTEM
As we presented in the previous chapter, Bogota has begun the process of formal planning by
creating an administrative program to deal with problems of growth and urban land use. In
this section we describe the legal housing system that is composed of a public (governmental)
and a private (commercial) sector.
2.110 THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
The requirements placed by the government on construction are legal, material, and dimensional.
The possession of title or tenure is the legal access to land. The fact that the developer has
title to his land provides him with the opportunity to solicit financial support in the form of
a home improvement loan or a mortgage loan from either a public or private housing finance in-
stitution. Another legal aspect is the building permit. It is issued after the plans of a pro-
ject have been guaranteed. The choice of building materials to meet health, fire, and building
codes emphasizes the use of permanent materials or industrially produced asbestos cement roofing
material. Other parameters dictating how the lot is to be developed are the constructed and
open areas, and the maximum height of tne building as defined in the zoning code. For buildings
to be considered "legal" they have to fulfill these standards, however, variances do exist.
2.120 HOUSING CAPACITY OF COLOMBIA
In its attempt to solve the increasing housing demand, Colombia has allocated to the activity
of construction 3.5% of the GNP. This su, combined with private investment in construction,
supplies the legal housing market with an increasing number of buildings (housing, office
buildings, commercial establishments, storehouses, industry, educational facilities, and others).
Of the total investment in construction in 1966, 80% went into housing; the next ranking cate-
gory was office buildings, representing 8.5% of the total investment in building. The average
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cost of housing is 385 pesos/m2 and the average cost of the office building is 960 pesos/m2 . (1)
Depending on the individual builder and the socio-economic position of the client, a variety of
building types result: high-rise apartments, walk-up apartments, detached one and two family
houses, one and two family semi-detached houses, row housing, or single family detached houses
(most conmon). The ICT establishes the goal with its slogan "Una casa para cada Colombiano,"
or "A single family detached house for every Colombian."
The proportion of houses and apartments constructed in Bogota in 1966 and the first part of 1967
describes the sprawling, low density tendencies of the city. In 1969, the metropolitan area of
Bogota occupied 16,500 hectares at a density of 118.4 people/ha. In 1977 the projected area for
Bogota will be 26,000 ha., or an increase of 9,500 ha. with a density of 143 people/ha. Of the
total number of dwellings built 84.7% of the money went into homes and 15.3% was invested in
apartments. The potential clientele served by the legal housing system is spatially distributed
in the northern and western sectors of the city. Geographic location also corresponds to the,
socio-economic groups of the highest incomes. The distribution of housing among the different
socio-economic groups has, more or less, remained the same over the last seven years. In 1960
the investment in worker housing was 20% of the total investment. This percentage of worker
housing was in 1966 18.6% and in the first half of 1967 17% of the total investment in housing.
The following chart indicates the housing emphasis according to inivestmenti e s 4%.
2.130 DEMAND
In 1964 Bogota had 168,340 houses for 1,697,000 inhabitants, (approximately 10 persons per
house). Also noted is the existence of 7,446 caves, tents, and huts. An effective public
housing program must meet the needs of the low income in-migrant and seek to anticipate the
increasing needs of new-family formation, which will soon pass in-migration as an urban
(1) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para El Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota D.E., p. 222.
(2) Ibid., p. 222.
HOUSING
OFFICES
COMMERCIAL
WAREHOUSES
INDUSTRY
EDUCATION
RECREATION
OTHERS
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%
HOUSING EMPHASIS IN CONSTRUCTION
TO INVESTMENT
..............
ACCORDING
growth factor. Kingsley Davis maintains that urban in-migration is a temporary source of
increased population, and will diminish as the pressure on the rural population is eased by
improved living conditions and better educational and economic opportunities. When this
occurs urban population increases will be the result of the excess of births over deaths,
through the reduction of infant mortality and increased life expectancy. The housing stock
to serve this population increase will have to be aimed at young married couples who have
little money and who are establishing new households. The requirements for shelter,and a
secure basis from which to plan their future is similar to the squatter.
The 11,000 peso limit ($550 US) established as the minimum income that the legal housing market
can accommodate isolates 42% of the population. Income of families requesting ICT housing are
presented in the following chart. The income range indicates that population lived in marginal
areas or bahareque homes as did 4% or 60,000 people in Bogota in 1964.
1961..Incomes of Families Requesting ICT Housing
Income/Mogith No. of Families %
(in pesos)
- 500. 3,679 13
501- 750 6,993 24.7
751-1000 8,095 28.6
1001-1500 6,263 22.1
1501-2000 2,015 7.1
2001-2500 636 2.2
2501-3000 317 1.1
3000+ 343 1.2
100.0%
Source: Unpublished Report on Juan XXIII, p. 37
Colombia now has approximately 300,000
houses that are considered to be built to
the legal standards, and another 300,000
that are not considered to be so. The
average number of dwelling units built
per year is 40,000 and the growth of
families in urban areas of greater than
10,000 is 60,000 families per year and
hence a deficit of 20,000 units per year.
2.140 THE PUBLIC HOUSING SYSTEM AND ITS AGENCIES
Those responsible for the orientation, the construction and the financing of the dwelling are
the public and private institutions and individuals. In the period 1961 to 1965 their combined
efforts have produced the following number of dwellings:
Housing Production and Deficit for Colombia, 1961-1965
Number of Units Built Units Built End of
Year Families Public Sector Private Sector Total Year
(Thousands) Deficit
1961 47.4 21,400 18,200 39,600 272,700
1962 48.9 20,500 20,000 40,500 281,000
1963 51.1 20,600 22,000 47,500 290,000
1964 53.3 22,700 24,000 46,000 296,000
1965 55.5 28,400 28,000 56,600 272,000
Source: Mojicia, G., The Economic Development of Colombia, p. 92.
2.141 THE PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES
The public sector related to housing is composed of semi-autonomous governmental agencies
involved directly or indirectly in the construction of dwellings. The most important are the
Banco Central Hipotecario (BCH) or the Central Mortgage Bank, and the Instituto de Credito
Territorial (ICT), or the Land Credit Institute, which operate throughout Colombia. The Caja
-de la Vivienda Popular (Caja) or the Popular Housing Bank, operates in the municipal area of
Bogota in the area of barrio rehabilitation and low income housing projects.
THE BCH
The BCH was established in 1932 after two earlier attempts to establish a mortgage bank in
Bogota. Following the depression of 1930, as part of his plans for economic recuperation,
the government of President Enrique Olaya Herrera issued decree #11, which promoted the found-
ing of the BCH. The first director, Julio E. Lleras, was responsible for the basic structure
and organization. The new entity began its program July 1, 1932. Its initial capital was 20
million pesos, and the original subscription of bonds was 11,192,110 pesos, of which 50% xas
given by the Bank of the Republic and the rest by private commercial banks. Mortgage credit was
based on this new fund that was given earlier by the banks. In developing the basic plans of
the national government, decree #687 was issued which stipulated that 80% of the reserves of the
social security program were to be invested in bonds called Va valor constante para seguridad
social, or Consistent value for social security. Of the 80%, 50% was destined for the BCH and
by the end of 1967 it had received 74.5 million pesos. Information presented in BCH publica-
tions states that they have intervened in the construction of 41,857 dwellings in the period of
1960 to 1967. (3)
THE ICT
The Instituto de Credito Terretorial (ICT), created in 1939, is one of the oldest housing
agencies in Latin America. Although starting as a rural housing agency, by 1956 the ICT was
concerned only with urban housing. The period from 1957 to 1961 saw it change from an agency
dependent on directly financed and commercially contracted procedures and a middle class
clientele, to an organization that aimed at worker as well as middle-income housing, built by
self-help and on a contractor basis. The number of houses built with funds administered by the
ICT had grown from 2,945 in 1959 to 31,898 dn 1962, showing a doubling of the total national
production of urban houses. (4)
Public funds are important to the ICT. The public contribution was approximately 600 million
pesos from 1967 to 1970, This sum is almost exactly equal to the funds that are projected to
be produced internally, and an average of projected foreign credits of approximately 180 mil-
lion during the same period. (5)
(3) Cardona, Ramiro, Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, p. 263.
(4) Mangin, William, Revolution of a Governmental Housing Agency, p. 384.
(5) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para el Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota D.E., p. 179. 38
In the period 1960-1967, the ICT produced 105,319 units, for a middle class clientele. (6)
THE CAJA
The Caja was founded in 1964 as a decentralized agency of the Special District of Bogota.
It has two principal functions: 1) housing for the city's employees, and 2) housing for
the large slum population. Three solutions to the problem of very low income housing employed
by the Caja are: 1) the erradication of slums; a system considered to be a useful tool by
the city's administration for clearing land necessary for the development of its projects of
infrastructure; 2) rehabilitation of settlements considered to be below standards; and
3) prevention of the formation of other slum settlements by the implementation of programs
for progressive development of the dwellings, sites and services. The ICT cooperates both
financially and technically with the Caja. The Caja has been responsible for the projects of
Los Loches (488 units), the rehabilitation of the barrio Las Colinas, and Las Lomas (800 units).
(7)
THE BCH AND THE ICT CAPACITIES
The institutional loaning agencies account for 75% of the housing assets. The bank-
ing insitutiins alone, with the BCH as owner of 88% of the banking assets, serves
35% of all the mortgage loans and 47% of all the mortgage loans expedited institutionally
for housing pertains to them. The BCH registered 41.5% of the total amount of the mort-
gage loans given for housing. The other large loan agency is the ICT, whose mortgages
correspond to 23% of the total of the housing assets and 31% of the institutional ac-
tivity. Together, the BCH and the ICT control 72.5% of institutional mortgage finances.
The degree of centralization of both sources of mortgage financing and of investments in
institutions of housing finance is clear. The other institutions loan almost exclu-
sively to persons related to them in one way or another, such as members of cooperative
groups and construction societies, holders of insurance policids, investors in capital
bonds, employees in companies or members and veterans of the armed forces. The total
(6) Cardona, Ramiro, Migracion y Desarrollo Urbanos , p. 263.
(7) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, Tratamiento De Asentamientos Urbanos Subnormales, p. 1.
of their operations, although important, is relatively small. (8)
The ICT is in the position now to be able to guarantee the financing of approximately 35,000
units per year, for the next few years. The units will be destined for a diverse range of in-
come levels under conditions appropriate to the client. Approximately 60% of the volumd of
construction would be of minimum cost or very reduced (from 5,000 to 30,000 pesos), with tne
concession of an elevated subsidy depending on the conditions of the occupant (with rates of
interest from 2 to 8%. The optimistic prediction of 35,000 units annually would be a quanti-
tative "leap over" the construction of the ICT in urban areas of 10,000 units average per
year over the last 10 years, 1960-1969. (9)
2.150 OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN HOUSING
Housing can not be viewed isolated from the pressures and models that promote or frustrate the
goal of decent shelter for all. The responsiveness of financing institutions to the gross
housing demand controls the housing market. Investment in housing is discouraged by inflation
which, at an average of 12% per year, has caused a..lack of incentive to save, stimulated specu-
lative investments in property and pressured the interest rates toward higher levels. If one
has the luck to get a loan from the ICT, he receives a subsidy of up to 70% of the real value
of the loan. Even the client of the BCH, if he is able to finance 50% of the cost of his house,
finds the opportunity to benefit by the lowering of his debt because of inflation, and in spite
of the 17.20% rate of interest charged. It is therefore not unreasonable to describe investment
in financial institutions of housing as one of the worst possible investments. In order to
qualify for the loan, the borrower should be almost in the position to not need the money. (10)
The financial problems are further complicated by the exceptionally low private savings in
Colombia. Many people have incomes that maintain a subsistence level of consumption only.
(8) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para el Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota, D.E.- p. 181.
(9) Cardona, Ramiro, Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, pp. 222-224.
(10) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para el Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota D.E., p. 178.
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The level of subsistence is approximately 800 pesos/month or $40 US. This amount pays for
food, shelter, clothing, and fuel with no remaining income for savings. This definition refers
to the quantitative and not qualitative reach of the subsistence level income. There is a
considerable disparity in income levels of Bogota's population. A small select group receives
an income that maintains a luxurious standard of living and for substantial savings as well.
In an economy such as Colombia's, upper-income groups often assign considerable prestige value
to conspicuous consumption. This propensity seems to be reinforced by what is called "the
demonstrated effect"; people at all levels of income try to emulate standards of consumption in
economically advanced societies. Therefore, in Colombia, mostly due to the United States' con-
sumer model, despite great disparities in income and wealth, the rate of private savings is
very low relative to national income. (11)
Modernization as a national goal affects housing production. Anibal Quijano's definition of
modernization implies the imposition of standards and norms other than those that presently
exist within the capabilities of Colombia.
Modernization is the process of the modification of the society and the culture,
be it by its assimilation of the characteristics of the present society and culture of
the western industrialized countries, or by the incorporation of some of.the fundamental
elements of these industrialized societies and the modification under the influence,
of their own elements, in the development of variations that do not coincide totally
with "Western Modernization." (12)
The attempts at modernizing housing production and programs are frustrated by government's
insistence on achieving a new physical environment by traditional paternalistic means. The
clientele of municipal and national housing agencies is shifting from upper and middle income
groups towards the lower income ranges. Innovations in program orientation promoting self-
help, sites-and-services schemes, and barrio rehabilitation are examples of the reorientation
(11) Mojica, G., The Economic Development of Colombia, p. 64.
(12) Cardona, Ramiro, Urbanizacion y Marginalidad, p. 75. 41
required to accommodate the new clienteleand its particular limitations. Other changes, how-
ever, are needed that deal with tenure, job creation, financing of loans, technical assistance,
public utilities, and community services. Cardona states that the political system has been
building without acknowledging the process of urbanization. The political system has been
structured to consider this phenomenon as negative, maintaining a stereotyped image of what
development and in particular housing should be.
Change varies in rate, in degree, and by promoter according to the political system under which
it is to take place. Political decisions include decisions concerning cost of a dwelling, the
control of land speculation, standards for space, materials, and house type, and allocations
of money and technical facilities to housing. These decisions are based 'on national and indi-
vidual limits in terms of finances, technology, and information and involve the degree of gov-
ernmental ownership of land and the kind of control of entrepreneurial profit motivated construc-
tion. Positions on these issues provide a basis for building a viable housing policy with the
essential tools and resources needed for implementation. The lack of an empirical data base for
low income families and professionals inexperience in the "culture of poverty" must be rectified
if effective policy is ever to be generated. Technical and financial resources must be allocated
to promote better design and development of low income barrios based on barrio demands with the
aim of eliminating traditional casualties caused-.by financial burden and social alienation.
2.151 ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S EFFECTIVENESS IN HOUSING
The need for social and institutional change has been thrust into full view of governments
whose urban centers have centralized and made visual what had been before dispersed rural
poverty. The addition by the public sector to the available housing stock, described above,
has been given a mixed reception. Those operating under the physical and legal restrictions
of the public sector and within the limits of the available financial resources of the ICT
laud their effort as an important proportion of the total construction volume. Others,
however, view the results as a meager realization of the public sector's potential.
It is worth asking if the little energy this is available for solving the housing
problem in a definitive form should be spent on such a minimal percentage,
- I
leaving the rest without solutions. Instead, the same energy could be used
to solve for a considerably greater percentage their housing needs in a more
humble form, creating for a maximum of people at least, a condition that is
tolerable....(This sentiment is substantiated by the fact that) in the period
1960-1967, there had been an increase of 69,244 families, of which 18,396 or 26.5%
had received solutions from the ICT and the BCH. (13)
The traditional demand for houses has been undermined by the new arrivals' need for shelter
that is generally different than the type tnat the legal housing system is geared to provide.
The recently arrived in-migrant is limited financially. This does not allow him to meet the
requirements of securing tenure, to finance construction of his home, to pay the quotas for
the installation and the maintenance ofthe basic public and community services. According to
Pro-Vivienda, the in-migrant's limited education does not allow him to compete on the job
market or take any real advantage of technical and social assistance available to the new
urban citizen, made marginal by the society of which he wishes to become a part.
We feel that the ICT is limited because it tries to be too many things--planner,
financeer, constructor, and collector, competes at time with local institutions
on problems of the same type. Sometimes the ICT does not act because it supposes
that the problems are solved by the local government and institutions. In other
words, the actual policy of the ICT of investing simultaneously in profit making
housing and subsidized housing is only a form of redistributing the wealth, with-
out promoting development. (14)
(13) Cardona, Ramiro, Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, pp. 223-263.
(14) Ibid., p. 263. 43
Colombia Housing Pro jections Until 1977
Budget in % of Total Cost Per
Thousands Housing Number Sq. Mtr. Total Cost Total
of Pesos Construction of Houses in Pesos in Pesos Sq. Mtr.
- 20 4.9 6,755 226 128,345 513,308
20- 50 27.3 37,632 240 1,426,252 5,005,056
50-100 16.2 22,330 309 1,563,240 3,997,428
100-200 10.1 13,923 462 1,966,623 3,146,598
200+ 31.5 43,423 496 3,695,297 5, 514, 721
multi-family 10.0 13,785 669 1,400,556 1,750,695
Total 100.0% 137,850 2402 10, 180, 313 19, 92 7, 878
Source: Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas para el Desarrollo
Note: Cost does not include lot. It is estimated at
de Bogota D.E., p. 92.
1/3 of house cost.
2.152 THE LEGAL COMMERCIAL SECTOR
The private sector of the building industry of Bogota is composed of the architectural, con-
struction, and finance companies, whose major areas of activity are high rise office buildings,
apartment houses, four story walk-up apartments sold on acondominium basis or rented, private
homes, and the sprawling "urbanizaciones" (subdivisions) typical suburban housing projects
in the United States. The expansion of the northern and western sectors of the city by the
development of low density single family homes has pushed the actual metropolitan area beyond
its legal jurisdiction to control the expansion. Basically, the problem of metroplitan areas
consists of the expansion of neighboring urban centers usually of different size and importance
within the same geographic area that is subdivided into various municipal jurisdictions.
This fact affects land use allocation, distribution of public services, allocation of educa-
tional, recreational, assistance, cultural transportation and security facilities. The 70%
of the housing stock produced by the private sector is invested in low risk, high gain ven-
tures that serve the upper middle class and higiier. The "urbanizaciones" advertised in the
newspapers locate the development for the prospective client, as well as present plans of the
room layout and their sizes. "The investment in housing of worker type (less than 50,000
pesos ($2500 US) in 1966) in 1960 was 20% of the total investment in construction. In 1966,
more than 60% of the investment in housing was made in construction whose budget was greater
than 100,000 pesos." (15)
PROJECTED HOUSING TYPES
After a study of the existing housing market, CID proposed five housing types for the city and
established criteria for determining the type and quality of each unit based on the cost of the
dwelling, the income level the unit is designed for, and the ability to acquire the unit.
These types are listed below.
Type A: corresponds to a unit whose price is approximately 30,000 pesos, which is the respon-
sibility in part of some of the programs of the ICT. The average size of these houses is 100m 2
2
and the cost per m for construction is 265 pesos. The 1967 resolution #50 established as a
unit price for this type of construction 250 pesos per m . For this study we have chosen an
average size of 85m2 and a cost per m2 of 270 pesos, that corresponds to a unit whose cost is
approximately 23,000.
Type B: under this type of unit those dwellings of sales price of approximately 61,500 have
been grouped. According to the statistics, the average size of single family units of this
type is 150m 2 and the cost per m2 for construction is 410 pesos; for multifamily units the average
size is 95m2 and unfortunately no reliable data on the costs for this type exists. The amounts
established by the Public Works Department are 350 pesos and 500 per m2 . For this study we have
chosen the average sizes of 110 and 90m2 and unit costs of 400 pesos per m2 for single family
units and 600 pesos per m2 for the multifamily units, that is construction costs of 44,000 and
54,000.
Type C: under this type of unit those dwellings of sales price of approximately 90,000 have
(15) Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para el Desarrollo de Bogota D.E., p. 90. 45
have been grouped. According to the statistics, the average sizes for single and multifamily
units are 185 and 120m2, respectively, and the unit costs for the single family unit if 485
pesos. There is not any reliable data for multifamily buildings. The quantities established
by the Public Works Department are 550 and 760 pesos for single and multifamily units. For
this study we have chosen the average sizes of 125 and 110m2 and unit costs of 500 and 700
pesos per m2 for the single and multifamily units, that is 63,000 and 77,000.
Type D: this type of unit would have a sales price of 138,000 pesos and would correspond to
the units built by the BCH and private initiative. According to the statistics, the average
sizes for single and apartments are 195 and 115m2 and the unit costs are 550 and 480 pesos per
m2 . From the tax rates costs per m2 have been established at 700 pesos for single family units
and 950 for apartments. For this the average sizes of 140 and 180m2 and costs of 700 and 900
pesos have been chosen, that is dwellings whose costs for construction are 98,000 and 117,000.
Type E: in this type of unit are the units whose price is approximately 187,500 pesos. This
type of unit pertains to the socio-economic groups of the highest incomes. But as one can see,
this is not a luxury house, since in this study, as appears further on, the construction of
luxury housing and housing of the poorest classes is not included. The last group, the poorest
classes, should accommodate themselves in the dwellings left by.the working classes of the
highest incomes who, if possible, should receive financing for new homes. The first group,
those of the highest income group, should finance directly their own home. The average size
of this kind of home is 210m2 for a single family unit and 110m2 for apartments, with unit costs
for construction of 600 and 620 pesos per m2 . Costs according to the Public Works Department
established by resolution #50 are 800 and 1,050 pesos for single and multifamily units. For
this study we have chosen units of the average sizes of 160 and 150m2 and costs of 850 and
1,050 pesos for single and multifamily units respectively. (16)
A comparative listing is presented in the following graph.
(16) Ibid., pp. 132-33.
HOUSING TYPES--A COMPARATIVE LISTING
Type of Constructed 2 Construction Lot Total
Housing Class Area Cost/M Cost Cost Cost
Single Family
Single Family
Multi-Family
Single Family
Multi-Family
Single Family
Multi-Family
Single Family
Multi-Family
270
400
600
500
700
700
900
110
90
125
110
140
130
160
150
850
1,950
23,000
44,000
54,000
63,000
77,000
98,000
117,000
136,000
158, 000
10,000 33,000
17,500 61,500
27,000 90,000
40,000 138,000
51,500 187,500
Source: Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas para el Desarrollo
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Urbano de Bogota, D.E., p. 135.
The housing market presented above constituted of dwellings from both the public and the
private sector excludes that portion of the population earning less than .11,000 pesos which is
42.5%. (17)
The low income population coming to the major urban centers of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barran-
quilla, etc., are denied access to the housing market legally. They have established their
own housing methods and these reflect standards and styles and are more responsive to the in-
migrants capacities to finance and build homes. This system conflicts with the legal housing
system and constitutes the "Illegal Housing Market."
2.160 THE LEGAL HOUSING SYSTEM: SUMMARY
1. Governmental controls, both national and local, dictate to a large extent the
quality and standards for housing. The basic concerns are for health and safety.
2. Housing is the most important of the construction areas, accounting for 80% of the
total building activity in Colombia.
3. Single detached houses constitute the bulk of new housing, sprawling in low den-
sities in the north and west sector of Bogota.
4. In-migration will be replaced by the natural growth of the existing inhabitants
as the major source of housing demand.
5. In the period of 1960 to 1967, the BCH has been involved in the production of
41,857 units.
6. In the period of 1960-1967, the ICT has produced 105,319 units that acommodate
a middle class clientele.
7. The Caja has been responsible for the projects of Los Laches (488 units), the
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(17) Ibid., p. 193.
rehabilitation of the barrio Las Colinas, and Las Lomas (800 units).
8. The BCH and the ICT's combined production in housing is 26.5% of the housing market.
9. Obstacles that limit the contribution of governmental housing agencies in solving
the problem of low income group housing are the size of the demand, difficulties
in financing the construction, and the agency viewing the housing demand as a
quantity to produce and not an ongoing process.
10. The private sector sometimes operates outside the controls of the local zoning
board due to jurisdictional problems over contiguous areas under development.
11. The 70% of the housing stock produced by the private sector is invested in low
risk, high gain ventures that serve the upper middle class and higher.
12. The price range of the governmental and private housing markets is 30,000 to
187,500 pesos per unit, this excludes 42.5% of the population.
13. The greatest problems facing the public housing sector are:
1) Difficulty in qualifying for loans
2) Lack of savings on the part of subscribers
3) Decapitalization of the value of loan payments due to inflation
4) A general over-extension of services on the part of institutional housing
agencies
2.200 THE ILLEGAL HOUSING, WHAT IT IS AND WHO SQUATS
2.210 DEFINITION OF SQUATTING
There is no single definition for squatting. Each definition establishes some basis with
which to distinguish what unique and common characteristics squatting has with the "legal
system." When one compares definitions, it seems the differences are not as clear as first
appears. A United Nations bulletin on urban land policies gives the following definition:
Squatting is the appropriation of another's land for one's own use without title or
right. It may occur on either public or private property, since a building generally
becomes part of the landowner's realty the squatter will use materials of little or
no value in the construction of his shelter, or he may move into uninhabited buildings
owned by others. Squatting may take the form of open or furtive mass movements or
of individual operations. It is the illicit consequence of struggle for shelter...
sometimes it is denounced...often it is tolerated for want of a practical alterna-
tive. (18)
As inadequate as this definition is, there are several undeniably true aspects: insecurity or
illegali'ty of tenure, the implicit tone of struggle or hostility, improvised environments,
and a general feeling of uncontrolled settlement tradition.
John Turner, a noted researcher of squatter problems, has offered an alternative definition
which sees squatting as a more positive phenomenon. He uses the term autonomous urban set-
tlements to include squatting traditions.
By "Autonomous Urban Settlements" we mean urban settlement whatever its duration
or expectations may be, that takes place independently of the authorities charged
with the external or institutional controls of local building and planning....
We do not consider the existence of urban settlements to be the problem, but the
fact that they are uncontrolled and that their forms are so often distorted.
"Autonomous Urban Settlements" is the product for dwellings and those supplied by
institutionalized society.... (19)
(18) U.N. Committee on Housing and Town and Country Planning, Urban Land: Problems and
Policies. Bulletin 7, St/SOA/Ser. C/7, 1953, p. 12.
(19) Breese, Gerald, The City in Newly Developing Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Ur-
banization, article by John Turner, Englewood, 1969, pp. 507-530.
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Turner feels the basic.problem of the slums is not how to eradicate them, but how to make them
more livable. The settlement must become a vehicle for social change--and change for the
better. These viewpoints each contribute some fractional portion of an extremely complex series
of determinants making up the total squatting problem.
2.220 AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM--THE MAGNITUDE OF WORLD WIDE SQUATTING
Squatting is not an urban phenomenon alone, nor unique to Colombia. It exists in varying
degrees in most parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America--in fact, wherever there has been a
mass movement of people to cities and insufficient shelter.
There are now some 240,000 squatters units (gececondu) in Turkey. Squatters make
up about 45% of the population of Ankara....They are 21% of Istanbul's population
and 18%. of Izmir's. In 1951, they numbered sixty thousand in Bagdad and twenty thou-
sant in Basra, Iraq. In Karachi, squatters represent about a third of the population.
Squatters account for at least 20% of Manila's population and in Davao squatters have
taken possession of the whole parkway area running from the city hall to the retail
center....In Tunis, the squatters live in caves dug out of hillsides. Around the
edges of Johannesburg, South Africa, sprawl squatter colonies that are a chaos of shacks
and hovels pieced together by the homeless and destitute. In India's larger cities,
squatters can be found hanging on to their provious hovels in old forts or wherever
they can acquire a foot hold... .Almost 150,000 squatters live in Delhi, about 90,000
of whom are on public land.
Urban centers in South America are also experiencing a flood of migrant squatters.
In Venezuela the population of squatters (rural and urban) is more than 65% of the
total population, with a 35% growth rate for Caracas and 50% for Maracaibo. Cali,
Colombia has a squatter population that makes up 30% of the total figure. In Santi-
ago, Chile, squatters represent an estimated 25% of the population... (20)
It would be misleading to create the image that although squatting is a world-wide practice
(20) Abrams, Charles, Man's Strugg le for Shelter in an Urbanizing World, pp. 13-14. 51
it is restricted to large urban centers only. Our survey of ten Colombian cities for the
International Center for Housing (CINVA) in Bogota, indicated that considerable squatter
activity exists in cities of populations of less than 100,000 persons. The pueblo's act as
regional market areas and sometimes transportation exchanges. The'growth of commerical
establishments as well as the accompanying educational and possible work opportunities attract
many. The squatting problem is both world wide and present at every level of urbanization.
2.230 TWO GENERAL TYPOLOGIES OF SQUATTER SETTELEMENTS
Up to this point we have presented some basic definitions of what squatting is. There is now
sufficient evidence that the squatting problem is neither limited to one country nor an isolated
event of few participants. It is necessary for the reader to see who squats and what factors
motivate this process. Accordingly we will present two current systems that classify squatters,
first according to tenure form, and second, as to their forms of development. The reader will
quickly realize that all squatter settlements are not alike and that their needs are quite
distinct from one another. We imply also that there is no one solution to their problems.
The first system is provided by Charles Abrams and was organized in response to a United Nations
request for world survey. It includes several typologies not generally found in Colombia;
however, the system is preserved in its entirety:
The types of squatter tenure are not uniform and may generally be classified as
follows:
Owner Squatter - owns his shack, though not the land; he erects the shack on any plot
he can find. Public lands and those of absentee owners are the most prized. The
owner squatter is the most common variety.
Squatter Tenant - is in the poorest class, does not own or build a shack, but pays
rent to another squatter. Many new in-migrants start as squatter tenants, hoping to
advance to squatter ownership.
Squatter Holdover - is a former tenant who has ceased paying rent and whom the land-
lord fears to evict. c
Squatter Landlord - is usually a squatter of long standing who has rooms or huts to
rent, often at exorbitant profit.
Speculator Squatter - is usually a professional to whom squatting is a sound business
venture. He squats for the tribute he expects the government or the private owner to
grant him sooner or later. He is often the most eloquent in his protests and the
most stubborn in resisting eviction.
Store Squatter or Occupational Squatter - establishes his small lockup store on land
he does not own, and he may do a thriving business without paying rent or taxes.
Sometimes his family sleeps in the shop.
Semi-Squatter - has surreptitiously built his hut on private land and subsequently
comes to terms with the owner. The semi-squatter, strictly speaking, has ceased to
be a squatter and has become a tenant. In constructing his house he usually flaunts
the building codes.
Floating Squatter - lives in an old hulk or junk which is floating or sailed into the
city's harbor. It.serves as the family home and often the workshop. It may be owned
or rented, and the stay may be temporary or permanent.
Squatter "Cooperator" - is part of the group that shares the common foothold and pro-
tects it against intruders, public and private. The members may be from the same
village, family, or tribe or may share a common trade. (21)
The owner squatter and the squatter tenant are by far the most common types; only the floating
squatter is rare to Colombia. From the classifications it is interesting to note that squatting
has strong commercial or entrepreneurial implications. The myths that these slums are "dens
of iniquity" are misleading when viewed as an entire economic system. One can begin to appre-
ciate the legal, political and social consequences that these settlements play. A second
system for classifying squatters comes from John Turner. Turner's work stems from a number of
years of work in the barriadas (Peruvian word for slums) in and around Lima, Peru. His
(21) Ibid.., pp. 21-22. 53
typology matrix ranks levels of physical development against the full range of tenure and pro-
vides a useful tool for clarifying issues related to squatter settlement:
LEVELS OF
PHYSICAL
DEVELOPMENT
inc ip ient
tentative
squatter
PROVISIONAL
TENTATIVE
SQUATTER
nomad TRANSIENT
TENTATIVE
SQUATTER
ITINERANT TENTATIVE
SQUATTER
incomplete
squatter
INCIPIENT
SQUATTER
PROVISIONAL
SQUATTER
trans ient
squatter
ESTABLISHED
SQUATTER
complete
semi-
squatter
INCOMPLETE
SEMI-
SQUATTER
INCIPIENT
SEMI -
SQUATTER
PROVISIONAL
SEMI-
SQUATTER
complete
legal
incomplete
legal
COMPLETE
INCOMPLETE
INCIPIENT
PROVISIONAL
TRANSIENT
SEMI-
SQUATTER
LEGAL
OCCUPANCY
DEGREES OF
SECURITY
OF TENURE (22)
(22) Turner, John,"Uncontrolled Urban Settlements: Problems and Policies," article pub-
lished in City in Newly Developing Countries, p. 508.
This matrix shows those interrelated development and tenure combinations that are most common.
Each level of development is defined: COMPLETE, structures and utilities that meet modern
standards; INCOMPLETE, structures or utilities incomplete but built to modern standards.
INCIPIENT levels are construction of potentially modern standards, while PROVISIONAL indicates
construction of low standards or impermanent materials. The least developed state is the
TRANSIENT; they are temporary and easily removed shelters. This very scale indicates that
the stereotype images of hillside shacks may not give an accurate description of the range of
squatter developments found today.
When cross relating the developmental levels with the levels of tenure, the reader becomes
immediately aware of the possible legal complications. Forms of tenure range from LEGAL
OCCUPANCY with institutionally recognized forms of tenure (freehold, lease, or rental), to
SEMI-SQUATTER states without full recognition of tenure but with some rights. ESTABLISHED
SQUATTERS with de facto and secure possession but without legal status are by far the most
common to Colombia. TENTATIVE SQUATTER occupancy are those without any legal status or guar-
antee of continued tenure. This type is often found where in older barrios there has been
little or no development apparent but sufficient time and resource to do so. The ITINERANT
type has transient occupancy with no intention of permanent tenure. As the matrix indicates,
many intersections do not produce cases that have been encountered. The most important con-
tribution this typology scheme makes is that of reinforcing the correlation between increased
states of tenure and the willingness of squatters to invest in the development of their own
communities. We will further deal witn this correlation when we talk about the developmental
indices of neighborhoods and the problem of creating tenure programs to justify the develop-
ment of the barrio.
2.240 COLOMBIA'S "ZONA DE TUGURIOS"
Tugurios is the Colombian word for slums. Reinaldo Posada states:
The explosive growth of the cities has occurred in a disordered form, without
doubt owing to the lack of a policy of prevention for the peripheral properties.
The influx of the rural poor, who arrive with some- economic means to the city, has
given to land speculators that "urbanize" property in the encircling areas, without
services of any kind and sell to these naive people small lots, layed out in square
blocks formed by straight roads, many times without recognizing the character of
the site. These zones, at times eroded, sterile or prone to flooding, constitute
the cheapest land reserves for the speculator in urban neighborhoods.
There exists also the case of spontaneous groupings of houses that have been organized
without recognizing a rational loting system nor defined roads. These occur in sub-
urban farms or on public lands that are slowly subdivided, at the road crossing where
there are incipient groups of housing and on the slopes of the mountains that suddenly
are seen covered by huts and improvised housing. A common case and perhaps the worst
is the case of the "colonists" or "invaders" that massively take lands of semi-official
and private lands and construct in a night their barrio. The improvization and haste
causes them to form disordered groupings of "ranchos," "favelas," "bohios," or "chozas"
(built from scrap material), that makes difficult the arrival of vehicles and the in-
stallation later of public services. This is how housing settlements are being formed--
without communal services, open space or green areas. (23)
Posada's viewpoint as an architect accurately describes two distinct aspects about the tugurio
formation in Colombia. First, that it has been largely a consequence or urban areas failing to
establish measures of control. A second point is that these settlements are forming rapidly
and are perpetuating a clandestine planning process. What this implies is that the solutions
lie in purely architectural and environmental policies. Let us now look at the three principal
classes of tugurios in Colombia: the casas de inquilinatos, barrio piratas, and the invasion
barrios. Their presentation will demonstrate that no single corrective solution will presolve
their formation.
(23) Posada, Reinaldo, Apuntes Sobre Agrupanciones de Vivienda, p. 122.
2.250 CASAS DE INQUILINATOS
Casas de inquilinatos refer to rented, usually center city, high density rooming houses. In-
quilinatos generally take the form of a very large "casas colniales"that have been subdivided
to accommodate anywhere from four to ten times their original number of occupants with generally
at least one family per room. Characterized by extreme rents, transient tenants and further
complicated by a general overall lack in housing, the casa de inquilinato serves in many cases
as a reception area for new in-migrants seeking employment. They provide central access to the
job market and do not force long term tenure commitments upon their tenants. This is a necessary
prerequisite for housing where spatial mobility is of prime importance in finding work. On the
other hand they are the most abusive in rent structure, overcrowding and in general health con-
ditions. These tugurios can be found in Bogota in areas surrounding Plaza de Espana in center
city and in a number of peripheral sites--Barrio Perseverancia, Las Aguas, and La Concordia.
It is difficult to estimate the percentage of this subsistence level population; however, a
reasonable estimate is somewhere in the area of one fourth the total low income sector housed
in urban center inquilinatos.
2.260 BARRIOS PIRATAS
A second form of tugurio in Colombia centers around a legal restriction for construction. It
is the stated law that the construction of a dwelling can not take place on land without the
basic services of water, light and sewer. Barrios.piratas result from legal owners of land
building without obtaining a permit. These are usually granted upon the presentation to the
housing authorities of a set of drawings indicating both the intended structure as well as
proof that basic services are available. Our case studies include one such settlement, El
Encanto. It must be remembered that the issue here is services, in all cases the owner has
legal title to the property.
Historically, the barrio piratas handled most of Colombia's need for inexpensive housing in
the 1950's. Privately sponsored popular housing associations sold titles to small lots on
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privately held lands requiring minimal long-term payments within financial reach of all but
the poorest. Open land throughout the city was sold in this manner. Being privately owned,
most of it lay outside the effective authority of the planning commission, and had few basic
services.
In 1960, rigid controls were placed on the Asociaciones by the municipal government. This
action came after much of the available private land had already been sold off; however, ac-
cording to the ICT, this practice heralded the beginning of large scale squatting in the
city. (24)
There is another form of the barrios piratas, less wide spread than those already described,
but worth mentioning. Often called "Urban Farmers," these settlements are usually peripheral,
large lot properties, without basic services, in which the owners grow supplementary food either
for their own use or for sale. The urban farmer appears in mid-city locations at times and
receives this name more as an indication of the lot size and agrarian land use. Because of
the large lot sizes, urban farmers often re-subdivide their properties; this accommodates
several additional houses and greatly increases the densities. Such re-use of a lot plays
an important role in the economics of any developing barrio and is a common speculative
practice.
Common areas around Bogota for barrios piratas and urban farmers include the entire southeast
quadrant of the city. The most prevalent areas are Barrios El Encanto, La Victoria, San Miguel,
La Gloria, Altamira, and sections along the road to Villavicencio.
2.270 INVASION BARRIOS
The third and most dynamic from the standpoint of acquisition of housing is that of invasion
barrios. These settlements are those in which people occupy land (generally public) for the
purposes of establishing some form of tenure and creating a shelter. Invasions can take place
either by single individual efforts or through highly organized and pre-planned seizures of
(24) ICT, Seminario Sobre Turgurios, p. 10.
land. Some of the most notable and well organized have been documented by John Turner in his
study of Peruvian barriadas. The high degree of organization whih William Mangin writes about
in Lima--surveying teams that surreptitiously mark out each street and lot with chalk lines and
flags shortly before the invasion is scheduled to take place (25)--is'not common in Colombia.
John Powelson, however, provides us with a description of the invasion of what was to be called
Nueva Colombia, Cali and suggests to what lengths some invasion leaders have gone:
Prior to the invasion in September 1963, the leader of Nueva Colombia had made a care-
ful study of the city's development plan with a group of assistants to determine
which unoccupied lands on the outskirts lay in the path of projected roads into the
city. After the invasion site.was chosen, the word was passed. Inverviews and meet-
ings with families were held and listings were made placing each family to a lot.
Early in the morning the families lined up along invisible streets and were spaced
regularly on lots of about twenty by sixty feet. By night fall all had staked out
their claims and drawn boundaries with string or wire, or by digging a shallow ditch.
When all the lots had been allocated, a short meeting was held at which a few simple
rules were announced. There would be no liquor on the premises, no violence, and all
disputes were to be settled by the governing council (a junta directiva). Law and
order was the responsibility of fifteen men selected as the Brigada de Orden. (26)
It was reported that within a few months upwards of twenty thousand people had crowded into an
area of 136 acres. Nearly all the invaders were from Cali, many had lived with relatives as
Inquilinates. In Bogota, in the southern portion of the city adjacent to several abrupt slopes,
the largest single invasion was established at Las Colinas (The Hills). After having been
driven from the site by the army the first time, a second invasion a month later proved success
ful. Organized by La Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda, more than 1500 persons found housing in
November of 1960. Pro-Vivienda, a chief sponsor of invasions, promoted another large center
(25) Mangin, William, "Squatter Settlements," Scientific American, (217,4) October 1967, p. 23.
(26) Powelson, John P., The Land-Grabbers of Cali, pp. 30-31.
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city invasion on a proposed hospital site. This barrio, Barrio Policarpa, was met with con-
siderable resistance from the police who used tear gas, rifle shots, a bulldozer, and attack
dogs to expel the invaders. One person was killed and the invasion made the headlines of the
news. Since the site was a central location, special plans were made for the invasion. The
invaders secured an adjacent site and prefabricated pole framed houses with stretched construc-
tion tar paper to form walls and the roof. Measuring some ten feet square, only five to ten
men were required to carry and run with it to the site during the invasion. Under the direction
of an alignment man, blocks of houses were literally planked in place before the confrontation
with the police took place. A number of tense moments and the destruction of several houses
brought the leaders into direct negotiation with the authorities. A hopeless relocation program
and an unfavorable press coverage concerning the police action used eventually secured the site
for the invaders. Because Pro-Vivienda has played such an important role in organizing invasions
in Bogota, we have included a description in this report on their activities.
Not all invasions are recent, however, some have been well established fran the late 1940's
and early 50's. One such settlement is Barrio Siloe, a hillside invasion in Cali of over
22,000 persons. This barrio is known as the "Hotel" since 30% of its residents move out each
year and are replaced by new dwellers. The more permanent residents live near the bottom of
the development; and the transients in cardboard and banana leaf huts near the top. (27)
Since this turnover in residents is an important factor in both the economic dynamics of the
barrio and represents a possible vertical mobility for the renters or sellers we will deal more
closely with this aspect later. Suffice it to say that high turnovers in invasion barrios are
common.
According to Colombia law, invasions of land come under a set of codes that relate to "compli-
cation of the process of eviction with the passage of time." From the beginning of an invasion,
involving either public or private land, it is under the jurisdiction of Public Order. The
(27) Eder, Richard, New York Times, February 23, 1963, p. 29.
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invasion continues to be solely a matter of public order for the first thirty days from the
day in which a nuisance or "embarayo de la posesion o de la mera tenecia" is filed (Article
No. 64 of the Police Code of Bogota). If the police do not achieve eviction within this period
the invaders can not be evicted by force unless the authorities have a subpoena from a civil
judge pronounced in a legal process (Decreto No. 992, Article No. 30 from 1930 of the police
agreement no. 15 to law 57, 1905). (28)
Since the legal entanglement requires time in which to secure the necessary subpoenas, many
invasions are impossible to evict because of the well-joiners that are attracted to the in-
vasions successful first days. These well-joiners often double or triple the original invasion
size, creating immense and often unexpected problems of sub-division design.
2.271 INVASION BARRIO FUNCTIONS
The primary function of the invasion barrio is to secure land and create a dwelling shelter.
Whether or not the cultural preoccupation of owning land outweighs the need for shelter, one
fact remains certain--invading is a discovered and popular technique for circumnavigating a
system that has turned its back on in-migrants' needs. According to Turner (29), the frustration
of people's capacity to invest money and work on a house is the main reason for invasions. Even
when migrants can afford it, they are reluctant to buy a long-term mortgaged house because the
title will not be secure for years. Though invasion squatters do not possess legal title to the
land, they are unlikely to be challenged unless the land is very valuable. This is one reason
that well-organized invasions typically select public property and sites that developmental
costs in the normal land market system would be prohibitive.
Those who invade land have a particular importance in the urban development of our
(Colombian) cities, since their spontaneous housing developments constitute approxi-
mately 25% of the settlements of the city, a proportion that is growing since the rate
(28) Cardona, Ramiro, Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos, p. 75.
(29) Turner, John C., "Uncontrolled Urban Settlements: Problems and Policies," unpublished
University of Pittsburg Conference paper, 1966.
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of growth of the city is from 6% to 7% annually, while that of these developments
is from 12% to 15% annually. (30)
The central postulate concerning the creation of invasion barrios is that they are not institu-
tions created to mitigate problems of personal adjustment to the new urban setting, but rather
that these initial problems have been resolved through prior socialization either in the in-
quilinatos or in smaller urban stepping stones. The process of tugurio formation begins when
one recognizes that the existing social, economic, and legal structure will not allow upward
mobility to migrants or already urbanized subsistence level families to fulfill their aspira-
tions and expectations. "The barriadas principally represent a massive expression of a desire
for self-improvement and security as persons seek to move from the inner city slums and the
burden of increased rents to better conditions and the chance for eventual home-ownership in
areas of land which they can appropriate without payment." (31) Although Manaster was speaking
of the Peruvian squatter invasions, the same desire for self-improvement is true in the case of
Colombia. Considerable sacrifice and risks are involved in the invasion process which prove the
urgency of demand. Many families voluntarily suffer more economic depravation than in the slums
to provide costs for transportation, water, and building materials because here at least their
work and suffering will net them or their children a better life in the end.
2.272 THE PROMOTION OF INVASIONS
We include within the description of squatter invasions some comment on their promotion.
Enormous profits can be made in the organization of these squatter invasions. Besides the small
scale land speculator there are organizations who see the invasion as a form of mobilizing
people politically as well as economically through housing issues.
(30) Cardona, Ramiro, Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos, p. 36.
(31) Manaster, Kenneth A., "Squatters in the Cities," unpublished thesis, p. 28.
As a result of our field work (summer 1970) in barrios piratas and invasion sites of Bogota, a
tentative hypothesis was reached explaining the high number of well organized "professional"
invasions and a lack of spontaneous small scale efforts. It is believed that the general
practices of land speculation and the barrios piratas attract many of these economically well
off enough squatters. These persons generally have sufficient urban acculturation and mobility--
steady job perhaps--and they do not consider invasion worth it. They see a guaranteed title as
realizable and therefore buy a legal plot. This leaves the not-so-well-offs without leaders
from their own background. This leadership void is filled by professional invasion organizers
such as Pro-Vivienda. In countries like Peru, there is such a gap between the legal housing
system and the next alternative for housing that squatter invasions organized from within are
more conmon.
From a purely economic standpoint, many land speculators promote invasions of property that they
do not own because for a minimal effort of subdivision layout and community development,
enormous profits are to be made by charging a basic service fee. It is not unreasonable to
claim that when peripheral sites are changing from rural to urban uses invasions are sponsored
in order to create centralized sources of cheap labor at the doorstep of a future industry.
On the other hand, it is clear that in Colombia the more sophisticated organizations, such as
the Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda, have both economic as well as political motivations. Their
basic Marxist philosophy of community development employs housing as a catalyst for ideological
promotion and has played a significant role in providing housing.
2.273 CENTRO, NACIONAL PRO-VIVIENDA
Perhaps the most unique "institutionalization" of the invasion process in Colombia is reflected
in the organization called Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda. To date, their activities represent
more than 35,000 member families. Generally limited to the greater Bogota Metropolitan Region
(which contains 10% of Colombia's total population), their basic service is the organization
of invasions and community development programs. Some of their most notable accomplishments
include the successful invasions of Las Colinas, the expansion of Juan XXIII, and Policarpa,
WE I 1= .11.1121111 11 IN 1 111;14121 lj 111111111 1 1
all in Bogota. (Las Colinas and Juan XXIII will be thoroughly discussed in the next section.)
The first two barrios have been included as case studies in this report. Their goals are best
characterized in their slogans:
We will fight:
- for our home without initial down payment and payment over a long period of time
- against speculation and raises in the rent
- for a democratic urban reform
- for the organization and defense of "inquilinos" (rooming houses)
- for the unity and defense of the homeless in Colombia
- for the unity of action, for the unity and solidarity with the worker's movement
Pro-Vivienda's basic service lies in their ability to organize families who subscribe, through
dues and active participation in their programs, to their technical and organizational services
for acquiring and maintaining housing. In this capacity they are responsible for identifying
invasion sites with high potential for subsequent tenure and the lot subdivision of the new
site. As "urban planners," they designate to what land uses the invasion site will be put, the
locations of streets, lots, public spaces and services. In some cases technical problems are
resolved on a consultant basis outside of Pro-Vivienda. Their degree of organization is re-
flected in the high number of successful invasions centered around public lands; invasions on
private land are exceptions.
It is important to remember the group effort's importance at this early stage. Besides the co-
operation required to initially settle the land such as the building of temporary houses, pro-
viding basic water sources, and establishing roads and pathways, there is the more basic element
of survival of the invasion effort. When confronted by the police (as in the case of Policarpa)
large numbers of well organized invaders generally insure a peaceful confrontation with police
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and local authorities. This also reinforces their "bargaining position" for tenure in the
event there is local resistance to the invasion by neighboring barrios.
In general, however, there is little known about the internal organization of Pro-Vivienda.
The most enlightening source is an open letter from Pro-Vivienda entitled "Some Organizational
Aspects of the Barrio Policarpa Salavarrieta," (32) which discusses the use of barrio commis-
sions to administer cultural activities, hygiene, educational needs, bario protection, and
maintenance. This also indicates that they recognize that housing is only one necessary part
of forming a new community. It is our feeling that Pro-Vivienda is providing a very worth-
while service and that labels such as "communist" are attempts by the governmental housing
authorities to minimize their value as a productive group. To provide the reader with some
comparative basis for judging their effectiveness in low cost housing, the following chart
illustrates the total family incomes of 495 interviewed Pro-Vivienda subscribers.
Pro-Vivienda: Membership Income
Dues/Month
(in Pesos) No. of Persons
1- 50 2 0.4
50- 100 5 1.0
100- 200 24 4.8
200- 300 33 6.6
300- 500 111 22.8
500- 800 103
800-1,300 69 13.9
1,300-2,000 11 2.2
2,000-3,000 3 .6
no response 61 12.3
not working 73 14.7
495 100.0%.
Note that the highest income percentages center
around 500 pesos per month. This is half of what
the average ICT subscriber pays each month for
housing alone. One can easily see the attraction
of Pro-Vivienda.
In our opinion, Pro-Vivienda has recognized both
the financial limits of the highest housing demand
and that housing, although it initiates develop-
ment, is but one of the wide range of services
required. The Pro-Vivienda system overcomes many
barrio frustrations by providing a local power
structure. Besides the "committee's" task of re-
solving problems, they focus on and direct com-
plaints within the barrio. In Policarpa there is
full knowledge of the system (who is responsible
Source: Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos,
p. 20, Table 7
(32) Cardona, Ramiro, Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos, p. 40.
for what) and a direct access to those responsible for action. Also helpful is that
there are no social class barriers between the user and the service group, a problem that
many barrio members have when they deal with the "corbatas" (bureaucrats, characterized by
their white shirts and ties). We will return to the Pro-ViviendA example of development
when we discuss possible models for large scale low income community development.
2.280 SOME CONSEQUENCES OF SQUATTING
2.281 SHELTER, A PHYSICAL PLACE
A primary drive of any squatter is the securing of an inexpensive shelter; for the shelter
will become a place in which to consolidate both his family with its extended relationships
and his possessions. There must be sufficient space or land in which to create a dwelling.
This may mean, as the case studies will show, literally carving out a small plot from the
mountainside or filling in an entire swamp.
Economically speaking the shelter represents a number of resources to a squatter family.
Because it is their single most expensive possession, and consumer of energy and time, it
serves to focus the family's attention economically for some years to come. The financial
commitment in this respect is stabilizing and progress is made on a pay-and-do-when-you-
can basis.
The investment in the shelter, if met with-a sufficient level of tenure, can establish the house
as a source of income. Many families rent out portions of their house. This may also play
an important role in determining which spaces will be built first. Court areas, roofs, and
unused lot space may all be potential rentable areas. Because the house represents long
term expense, it acts as a forced savings program. Those that establish small businesses
insure further their own security and continued development. A small shop or store nets
income from space that can double as living quarters by night and store by day.
An important aspect of a squatter's house is that is represents a totally self-determined
environment. In a sense it is a "non plan" in which an optimal house is created expressing
the character of its occupants in the uses to which spaces are put, room sizes, and design
(finishes, and the materials used). In this respect, squatter housing offers a positive
solution to real housing needs. Often government programs attempt to create housing for
low income families, they often frustrate and kill the owner-occupant's involvement by com-
peting with skills that the squatter already has. The squatter is quite capable of generating
his own house design for he knows the relationships and priorities he wants to establish.
While talking about the problems of development in the villas miserias of Buenos Aires, L.
Wilson points out:
It is not the discomfort of the physical situation of the people of the
villas (the villas miserias of Buenos Aires) feel most bitterly. It is
the humiliation of being denied the opportunity of doing for themselves
what they are quite able to do. (33)
In some areas the squatter may not have the technical skill nor experience to do what he
wants, but he is capable of finding others who do. In this sense he acts as a general con-
tractor. The use of indigenous material greatly increases the probability of success of his
self-help program because the squatter deals with materials and techniques which are readily
available and with which he may have some familiarity. A structure conceived in these terms
remains alive forever for it can be continuously changed as requirements dictate.
2.282 TENURE, SECURITY OF OWNERSHIP.
Closely linked with the shelter are the problems of securing tenure. Tenure is the greatest
concern to a squatter for it regulates the future commitment that he as a home builder will
make. Tenure is that legal or de facto security that will justify initiating or continuing
investments of time and money in the house. There has always been a direct correlation between
these two.
(33) Wilson, L.A., Voice of the Villas Socio-Economic Analysis of the Residents of Villas
in Parque Almirante Brown, p.
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As we pointed out in the historical evaluation of cities in Colombia, there has always been
a cultural preoccupation with holding title to the land. The land was the source and main-
tenance of power. This tradition also is prevalent today where a title insures ownership and
acts as a status symbol. The value of ownership is that it acts as'a vehicle for social mo-
bility by resale and renting of commercial establishments, and thus adds a new dimension to
housing capabilities. Whereas for middle class residents, class movement is dependent upon
education, for the squatter the sale of his house or at least having prepared the way for his
sons and daughters to improve their social class.
The failures of the official projects based on the construction of dwelling units,
and the success of the "Barriadas" show that the in-migration to improve and to invest
in the surrounding development is proportional to the social security that these set-
tlements offer to their occupants and not as assumed in the popular housing policies
to the standards of physical comfort. (34)
2.283 LOCATION
Location serves two important needs. First it is important to secure a location that will
provide inexpensive access to the job market for all family members. Because the cost of
commuting regulates the number who can work at any time, it is imperative to secure locations
that minimize these expenses. In Bogota, the urban sprawl and characteristic low densities,
is making the job market inaccessible. The foothills of the moun-tains offer some of the last
remaining convenient sites.
Location also plays an important role in securing basic services. If sites are too far out,
water must.be bought from vendors, electricity may be bought locally instead of pirated, and
public transit lines may not extend to the developing area.
(34) Rojas, Ernesto,'rbanismo y Migracion," article from Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano,
p. 189.
68
i ____ I - .. - - - Z- _V71"p; - - . n - N
The actual situation contradicts the above criteria for locational choice because lack of
control of land speculation isolates large segments located near job sources and main line
utility access. The high density low income barrios of blue collar workers are located away
from job sources and work sites, increasing the problems of transportation and providing
public services.
2.290 SUMMARY--ATTITUDES TOWARDS SQUATTERS
If squatting is seen as a problem solving process, one of getting inexpensive housing, we must
ask what other problems are created by this process in terms of their effect upon the city that
are most detrimental in the long run. The answer to this question depends on the specific case
in question; however, by and large, they resolve more problems than they create. Our survey
of 15 squatter settlements in 10 Colombian cities indicates that since most squatting has taken
place on non-agricultural land, has been limited to marginal properties (very steep hills or
swamp land), they have been more of an asset to the city than a detriment. The problem arises
when their settlements have not reserved sufficient space for communal facilities or have created
such an illogical distribution of densities and a random spatial array of houses on the site
that the installation of future services is permanently prevented.
Many of the most likely invasion sites in Bogota are in the steep foothills; site protection
problems become enormous. Squatters begin cutting and filling these slopes to prepare a plot
large enough to accommodate a house. Besides the reshaping of the contours, the disturbed
soil and stripped vegetation accelerates erosion. In many cases the site erodes faster than
the squatter community is able to invest in protective infrastructure, such as retaining walls,
pavement and stairway, that over time they create unrepairable problems. Some of this having
ecological repercussions as well. Our experiences in Barrio Las Colinas, Bogota, will give
a particular example of how interrelated these problems become. Barrio Las Colinas, for in-
stance, must relocate 119 families who have built under a major power line. Since this was
not considered when the barrio was designed, there will be enormous relocation problems be-
cause the site has already expanded to its limits. Many of the relocatees will be asked to
relinquish central sites under the wires for sites at the top of the hill. Their lower slope
neighborhoods which have already been developed with water readily available, stairways in-
stalled and homes established must be relocated. Who will repay them for their efforts?
Consider this situation from a political point of view. These 119 families could be unified
to protect their own interest and form a voting block in the barrio affairs to prevent their
eviction. Since the municipality has established formal technical services with the field of-
fice of the La Caja de la Vivienda Popular, the city could insist that no further monies be
allocated the barrio until an easement is created. It's not hard to see the battle grounds
being formed already. Fortunately these families have agreed to relocation in a neighboring
barrio called Las Lomas; however, many other barrios do not offer such easy options.
It must be pointed out that the barrios have many techniques for coercing members to adhere
to the barrio's rules. In Las Colinas, families that became problemmatical had their water
rights taken away. The expense and labor involved in circumnavigating this is usually more than
any single family can take, so it is very effective.
Coastal invasions provide still further examples of the pitfalls of promoting clandestine plan-
ning practices. In Cartagena for instance there are literally thousands of squatters who have
invaded the tidal basin areas and built upon land that is at sea level. These areas are con-
stantly threatened by flooding not to mention the impossible task of providing sanitary
drainage.
Criticisms launched against squatter settlements do not attack their purpose so much as their
processes for development. For example, Jacques Mosseri, Director of the Center for Planning
and Urbanization at the University of Los Andes, Bogota, in referring to the self-help housing
process used in all the squatter settlements, says:
Auto-construction (self-help housing), as a system to generate work, solves nothing
either. It is only a method for salvaging the best part of a bad situation with-
out improving it. It is one of the answers that the people themselves give owing
to the bad situation and the duty of the state is not to stimulate it and direct it,
but to improve the general situation: Self-help is a disguised employment. The
time, the energy and the money that the individual spends in building his home
(badly constructed, because he is not a builder, and even though he learns in the
process this new capacity will be lost if he does not continue to dedicate himself
to it), he should dedicate himself to learning some trade to better be able with his
income to pay a qualified worker--creating at the same time a new source of work--
and he has assured not only a house but also a constant source of income. (35)
Mosseri's hypothesis overlooks two very important factors. Firstly, most squatters have con-
siderable experience in construction and are in many cases employed as construction laborers.
Secondly, Mosseri ignores the whole economics of the house. It's not a matter of just outright
buying a shelter, the slower self-help method allows the squatter to invest when he can and
not commit himself to the regular payments of the ICT or private developer housing. The most
important aspect of self-help is the significant cost saved in labor and in the use of local
technologies and materials. This helps to stabilize and create barrio level economics, whereas
contracting to outside groups does not bring a cash flow into the barrio in terms of wages.
We feel that Mosseri's observations have not included the demonstrated success that self-help
has brought to Bogota's own squatter settlements. Las Colinas has an extremely high level of
development. Three story brick houses with cantilevering second floors are common. The main
point here is that building a house is not just an attempt to create a shelter, it is also an
elastic investment program.
The repercussions of clandestine planning can be seen in their effect upon the city.
The location of nearly all squatter communities is presently unrelated to the
plans for future growth of urban centers. These communities often spring up
over night on land that has been reserved for future use as parks, recreation
areas, roads, and public facilities. As a result, squatter communities often
block the rational extension of the city and warp the direction of its growth,
(35) Mosseri, Jacques, "La Vivienda Come Factor del Desarrollo Urbano: Hacia una Nueva Poli-
tica de Vivienda," article in Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, p. 265. 71
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leaving many areas unserved by needed amenities and services. (36)
For example, Barrio Policarpa was an intended hospital site. Even as well-organized as this
invasion was, such an oversight is unnecessary.
In the preceeding sections of the illegal housing system, we have pointed out some of the
more important problems and issues that the growing tugurios represent. We wish to summarize
here some of the most important:
Squatting is defined as some form of illegal tenure. Descriptions of the
building, public services, etc., are indications of the poverty level and the
degree of community. Although an insecure tenure may precipitate these low
levels of development they, in themselves, are not grounds for classifying a
development as squatter.
Squatting is a world-wide practice and problem, prevalent in every country in
the world, varying in degree only. It may account for up to one half the total
housing stock in some cities.
Squatting is not limited to great metropolitan areas. .It is a common practice in
small towns and villages.
The growth of tugurios is a result of the lack of urban policy concerning their
control and growth and the inability of institutions to promote programs that
realize the magnitude and limits of their clients.
Colombia has three basic forms of tugurios: the casas de inquilinos, the barrios
piratas, and the invasion barrios. Each serves a distinctly different function
in the housing system and must be dealt with in its service-context to its users.
Land invasions of public properties and subsequent barrio growth are by far the
largest and most successful, in terms of securing shelter. They are generally
(36) Mitchell, Neal B., Squatter Housing: Criteria for Development, Directions for Policy,
p. 11.
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large in membership, well-organized and launched against public properties. Invasions
of private properties are exceptions.
Invasions are promoted by land speculators and politicians for profit and ideological
motivations. The most complete models for both housing and community development
have been established by politically motivated groups such as Centro Nacional Pro-
Vivienda. Their success is due in part to their making housing of prime developmental
concern in a much larger program of community mobilization.
Invasions- are acts against the Public Order. If not successfully removed from the
land within 30 days of the first complaint, it becomes a legal eviction process
handled by the civil courts. Evictions are an exception, however, there have been
cases where police action has brought invaders to open armed conflict: i.e.
Policarpa.
The formation of invasions is not a process of urbanizing rural in-migrants or of
training for the lower classes for urban life, but they are composed of stable families
leaving the center city rental slums and is therefore a process of consolidation.
The invasion process must solve to some degree three separate but related problems:
identification of a site that will allow for housing; identification of a site that
will secure either de facto or legal tenure; and identification of a site must satisfy
the locational demands of job market and services. The degree of invasion organization
and planning determines their success in solving these three areas.
In addition to securing shelter, squatting has many commercial, entrepreneurial, and
political motivations. It is part of a much broader social-economic process and must
be considered in its context.
The acquisition of a house is but one function of squatting. The house is a vehicle
for social and economic mobility. Its development is a consolidation of family and
property.
Attitudes differ considerably concerning squatting practices. There is no national
policy toward them. Each city creates its own.
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Squatting creates two types of problems. In the first instance they often do not
perceive the implications that their increasing numbers represent to themselves and
to the cities they invade. Secondly, since squatting takes place outside the normal
planning process, they often create impossible situations from the point of services
and the logical extension of the city.
Case studies indicate that the squatter settlement is a place for potential leaders
to assume community development. In this capacity their experience is a substitute
for formal training and allows them at least some representation in urban politics.
CONCLUSION:
Squatting represents at least a transitional solution to the problem of supplying
low cost housing.
CHAPTER 3
FOUR CASE STUDIES--A CROSS SECTION OF INSTITUTIONALIZED HOUSING
3.000 FOUR CASE STUDIES=-A CROSS SECTION OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
In the beginning of this report, we have presented to the reader background material to view
Colombia's, and more specifically Bogota's, growth. In the second chapter we examined tue
two-part housing system--its legal and illegal aspects. We will now present four detailed
case studies of barrios in Bogota, each of which represents an increasing level of governmental
assistance. By presenting a cross section of empirical data on specific topics, we will compare
the relative merits of each developmental process.
3.100 THE CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY
3.110 INTENDED USE
We are concerned with answering tne following questions:
What are the essential differences in environmental quality that increased levels
of institutionalization provide?
What areas of community development are best served by local barrio level adminis-
tration and whicn can be better handled through some governmental process?
What are the relative merits of long-term development and short-term modernization?
What consistency is there between the established legal standards for building and
the practiced tradition?
What are the implications of a mis-match in the two building standards?
What measures can be taken to incorporate the popular building tradition into
an orderly process in order to increase the quality and quantity of nousing?
Implicit in the above questions are several facts that will reappear throughout tnis section.
First, there seems to be a lack of empirical data about low-income housing. This is particu-
larly true for illegal settlements. As we mentioned earlier, invasion barrios and barrio
piratas account for up to one third the total urban area of most Colombian cities. This is
a large sector and the city must assume the responsibility of creating logical extensions of
municipal services. An inadequate appreciation of barrio needs and capacities can (and often
has) undermine tne most elaborate of "plans"; recall the results of "Plan Piloto" and "Plan
Regulado." We see our responsibilities as two-fold: first, to establish wnat housing and
community development processes successfully operate, legally or illegally, and under what
circumstances; second, to suggest wnat developmental forms can be adapted and/or created to
order and make more successful tne tremendous housing demands of the lower income sectors.
3.120 CRITERIA FOR BARRIO SELECTION
There were essentially five criteria for the selection of our four case study barrios:
That the barrios selected be representative of a cross section of institutional
support
That there exist for eacn barrio some nistorical data concerning population, initial
barrio organization, etc.
That the barrio is not a significant source of basic employment, that is to say that
the city itself provides significant new monies into the barrio economy
That the barrio be located on a sloped site in wnich the grade is of significant
degree so as to create a restraint upon building form and barrio layout.
The first criteria limited our field of choice significantly for one of our main purposes in
the case study methodology is to compare housing and community development procedures wnile
varying the level of institutional control. It is here that we can establish the relative
merits of eacn. The second constraint is merely a practical limitation on our data. Our
study was limited to barrio families earning from subsistence to tnree times subsistence
level incomes. These incomes are typical of the highest demand sector and they include tech-
nological and administrative restrictions of interest to us.
Our reasons for selecting barrios which do not provide all, or most of, tneir basic employment
was a spatial consideration. It was considered that the importance of location is felt most
significantly where daily expenses occur in commuting to and from work. We were furthermore
interested in the future of open lands adjacent to the city in which existed reasonable.access
to basic employment sources. It is a fact that the low income settlements compete witn each
other in securing labor intensive jobs and insecurity and competition in the job market nas
a great deal to do with the home and community development process. If barrios were their own
.source of significant employment they would not reflect completely a spatial economic dependence
upon tne cities.
The last item of criteria deals with a condition most typical in Bogota and other cities.
Steep central sites are natural targets for squatters because they are sites that can not be
economically brougnt into the normal land market. These sloped sites have often acted as
delimiters for the cities' growth and offer those squatters who can overcome the physical prob-
lems of building a site usually very near job centers. Our interest in sloped sites is more
than passive for we consider their impositions upon tne home builder and the community de-
signer to be extremely important. The slope forces problems upon its inhabitant that must be
dealt with in a semi-ordered sequence and with varying levels of communal cooperation. Slopes
that have nad a reasonable influence on barrio design are generally in the 30 to 50% range.
In much the same way that housing acts as a unifier in invasion planning, the slope unifies
the communities' efforts in community development in the early years of settlement.
3.130 CASE STUDY DATA STRUCTURE
Recognizing both the limited sources of data concerning the housing types we were most
interested in and realizing that what data has been compiled is often intended for socio-
logical or political purposes, we created a structure more useful to physical planning and tne
administration of programs concerning it. For simplicity and accuracy, we have divided our
information into physical, socio-political, and economic determinants. Each of tnese areas
were in turn subdivided again into more specific data areas. Appendix C presents an outline
of the entire structure used tnrougnout each case study.
The physical determinant was divided into the following sections:
Physical location
Historical retrospect
Site plan
Site analysis
Dwelling unit description
Sponsoring agency retrospect
The socio-political and economic determinants were divided as follows:
Basic demography
Community organization
Programs of tenure
3.140 THE SELECTED BARRIOS
Three barrios were selected on the bases of tne criteria listed above. A fourth was added
in the process of developing the first three for it was felt that this barrio in particular
might suggest an alternative process for developing sloped sites. The barrios selected were
Juan XXIII, Las Colinas, Los Laches, and El Encanto. These locational descriptions are pro-
vided in the introductions to each case study; they are collected here to immediately orientate
the reader:
JUAN XXIII
Juan XXIII is a small, old squatter settlement located on a steep hillock originally
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owned by the military in the north sector of the city. The barrio is economically
isolated, situated in a middle and upper income area that has grown around it as the
city expanded north. The settlement is well-defined by roads that form a triangle
around it. The major entry is Calle 65, that continues on to form one of the barrio's
boundaries. It changes from a concrete to a dirt surface at the limit of an encroach-
ing middle class development. The site is situated between Carreras (streets that run
north and south) 3A and 2A, and Calles (streets that run east and west) 64 and 65.
The barrio, composed principally of small lots situated on slopes of 51% average grade,
occupy a site of 1.4 hectares of land approximately 6 kilometers from the center of
the city. For all intents and purposes Juan XXIII has received no governmental support
for they have settled on military property. They will act as one extreme when comparing
varying- degrees of governmental support.
LAS COLINAS
Las Colinas is a large, ten year old squatter settlement located on the steep slopes of
a reentrant valley in the southern sector of the city. The land was originally owned
by Hospital San Carlos. It is a barrio economically integrated into the southern half
of the city, a sector composed of the lowest income groups. The major entry is Calle
34 south. The barrio is bounded by the development "Gustavo Restrepo" to the north at
Calle 34; to the west, the Avenida Caracas; to the east the property of Hospital San
Carlos; and to the south the Barrio Resurrection. The settlement is composed of lots
of 80 to 90 meters square situated on slopes of an average of 45% and occupies a 12.16
hectare site 5 kilometers from the center of the city. This barrio has had institutional
assistance only after their invasion. It will serve as an intermediate level of govern-
mental support.
LOS LACRES
Los Laches is a large low-income housing project built by the Colombian housing agency,
La Caja de la Vivienda Popular (Caja). The development is situated on extremely steep
slopes in the south-east sector of Bogota. The site was partially settled by a squatter
settlement of dubious fame before the Caja began to redevelop the site. Los Laches is
economically integrated into the surrounding worker barrios'. The major points of entry
are: Calle 6A which becomes Diagonal 4B and 5A as it winds through the barrio. The
barrio itself is bounded by the circumferentialroad to Villavicencio on its south and
east, to the north by El Rocio, and to the west by El Guavio. The project is composed
of 86 meter square lots and is on an intermediate slope of 10 to 20%. The entire barrio
is 1.'6 kilometers from the city and offers a central location to its residents. Los
Laches is completely institutionalized project and will serve as an opposite extreme
to barrio Juan XXIII,.
EL ENCANTO
El Encanto, an extension of barrio San Isidro, is a small linear development located in
the southern sector of the city on a site whose slope at the base is flat and dramatically
increases until it is almost vertical. The land was developed by its owners as a "barrio
pirata," or lots sold to occupants without services. It is economically well integrated
with the surrounding worker barrios. Principal entry in through the only spine road 6A.
Natural slope boundaries define the east and western sides and the Barrio San Isidro to
the north. Lot sizes are generally 128 meters square, the barrio itself is approximately
4 kilometers from the center of the city.
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JUAN XXIII
3.200 INTRODUCTION
Juan XXIII is a small, old squatter settlement located on a steep hillock, originally owned by
the military, in the north sector of the city. The barrio is economically located, situated in
a middle and upper income area that has grown around it as the city expanded north. The settle-
ment is well-defined by roads that form a triangle around it. The major entry is Calle 65,
that continues on to form one of the barrio's boundaries. It changes .from a concrete to a dirt
surface at the limit of an encroaching middle class development. The site is situated between
carreras (streets that run north and south) 3A and 2A, and calles (streets that run east and west)
6A and 65. The barrio, composed principally of small lots situated on slopes of 51% (1)
average grade, occupies a site of 1.4 hectares of land approximately 6 kilmeters from the center
of the city.
3.210 HISTORY
Juan XXIII was settled in 1953 by invasion. Its population is growing by accretion, and its
development, initially in the areas of La Planicie and La Lema, can be characterized as follows:
Two thirds of the houses had only one room at the time of the invasion. Only 9% of
the houses are in the same condition as the initial construction. That is, approxi-
mately twice the houses have a room and kitchen and five (5) times more houses with
two rooms have appeared if one compares them with their state in the first stage.
Two recent invasions, in 1969, have occupied the land remaining within the triangular site.
The newly constructed units are located adjacent to the paved road that leads to the Colegio,
situated directly behind the barrio. Provisional houses, built quickly to stake out claims,
are being replaced by dwellings of permanent materials.
(1) Goethert, Reinhard,'eference Data: Juan XXIII and the Development Area," Civa/MIT,
Cambridge, 1969, p. 15. 81
3.220 THE LOCALITY (See following photo essay)
A. Map locating barrio in city
B. Site in surrounding area
C. Site plan
3.230 THE INHABITANTS
The population of Juan XXIII, in 1967 of''737 persons, with its wide based age;'sex pyramid
(see Age-Sex distribution chart) is typical of low income urban populations in develop'ing
countries; Characteristics of the pyramid include 1) the small percentage (2.3%) of persons
over the age of 61 and therefore out of the range considered to be economically active.
2) the large percentage (44.5%) considered productive, of which more than half are women whose
work is occasional if at all (2).
The 124 families surveyed in 1967, each.with his own lot, occupy three-quarters of the 1.4 hectare
site. This produces densities of 89 dwellings per hectare and 551.8 people per hectare. Since
that time two groups of approximately 15 to 20 families each have occupied what remained of the
site. The population estimated for 1970 is 154 families composed of. 917 persons.
3.240 SITE ANALYSIS
The site of Juan XXIII is situated at an altitude that runs from 2660 to 2685. There is little
vegetation to naturally control the drainage and run-off from the slopes whose average inclination
is 51%. As a consequence, there exists a serious problem of erosion. The run-off flows freely
through the site, particularly down the public stairs that pass through the barrio. Climatically,
Juan XXIII is typical of Bogota, having an average temperature of 14 degrees centigrade; 191.4
days per year of rain; and 936.9 milimeters of rain per year. (3)
(2) Cardona, Ramiro, "Las Invasiones de Terrenos Urbanos, Elements .para un Diagnostino," Tercer
Mundo, Bogota, p. 50.
(3) Goethert, Reinhard, "Reference Data: Juan XXIII and the Development Arqa," Civa/MIT,
Cambridge, 1969, p. 12. 82
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JUAN XXIII : AGE SEX DISTRIBUTION
MALES . AGE.
10
17
13
19
23
22
30
38
55
71
75
60
50 69
40 49
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
39
34
29
24
19
14
9
4
FEMALES
7
18
27
17
23
23
28
30
42
65
84
10
MALES =
TOTAL
0 % 0
373 TOTAL
50.6%
POPULATION 737
5 10
FEMALES
PERCENTS TAKEN OF TOTA. POPULATION IN 1967
15
TOTAL
15
364
49.4%
Juan XXIII: Age Sex Distribution for 1967
Total Males Total Females
% No. Age % No.
10.2 75 0- 4 11.4 84
9.6 71 5- 9 8.8 65
7.5 55 10-14 5.7 42
5.2 38 15-19 4.1 30
4.1 30 20-24 3.8 28
3.0 22 25-29 3.1 23
3.1 23 30-34 3.1 23
2.6 19 35-39 2.3 17
1.8 13 40-49 3.7 27
2.3 17 50-60 2.4 18
1.3 10 60+ .9 7
50.7% 49.3%
.. Source: Ascofame Report #19
Access to the barrio is principally through the Calle 65. The settlement can be approached
through Carrera IA, and Calles 59, 60, 62 and 64 also. The possibilities of growth and expansion
of the barrio are controlled-more by the social pressure of the surrounding middle and upper
class barrios than by a lack of physical space on which to expand. The undeveloped land to the
south is gently sloped; land to the north is steeply sloped. The military, the owner of the
land to the north, is openly hostile to the community and does not consider expansion onto
their property to be in their interests.
3.241 LAND USE
The land use pattern of Juan XXIII responds organically to community felt needs, supplying over
time a wider range of community facilities as the community clarified the status of the barrio's
existence. The following graph shows the approximate land use distribution established to date.
Land Use Distribution, Juan XXIII: 1970
Land Use Area (S-q. Mts.) %
Circulation 4,300 30.7
Community Space 1,400 10.0
Commercial 600 4.3
Residential 7,700 55.0
Total 14,000 100.0%
Source:. Author's Field Survey, 1970
The growth of commercial facilities, in the form of shops functioning in the homes, and of com-
munity space, in the form of day-care centers, consumer cooperatives, and education and health
facilities, has been accretive. Of the present population, 22.8% arrived before 1960 and own
50% of the stores. The attention focused on the barrio because of its proximity to tne upper
middle class neighborhoods has resulted in the variety of facilities in the barrio.
These facilities were installed without training the barrio's residents to maintain them. Many
of the activities and services have ceased to function, indicating general unwillingness, lack
of interest, or inability to make them work. Certain redundancies in available community
facilities have been simplified: for example, the consumer cooperative no longer functions; it
operated at the expense of the traditional, though limited, market that takes place in a vacant
field adjacent to the barrio. Walkways most frequently used have been maintained; others have
been 'abandoned. Funds that might have been used in site protection schemes were diverted to the
other projects initiated in the barrio by the priest and foreign groups.
3.242 CIRCULATION
The following graphic description of the component parts of the circulation system illustrates
both topographical and dimensional characteristics of the barrio:
1. Streets
a. to the north, the dirt-surfaced road has a slope of 19% average
A
A
b. to the southwest, the dirt-surfaced road has a slope of 12%
A
ers
SECTION AA
c. to the east, the con'rete surfaced road has a slope of 7-20%
SECTION A-A
2. Pedestrian Ways
a. the pedestrian ways that pass through the barrio have a maximum slope of
51%, minimum slope of 23%, and an average of 32%. (4)
The surface of the patns is generally dirt. Public stairs are carved from the
hill, although some areas are concreted or bricked, especially private stairs
that lead to the dwelling.
COMMENT:
The effect of developing the vehicular and pedestrian circulation systems would be a great aid
in site protection. Site protection is a critical problem.
3.243 INFRASTRUCTURE
The infrastructure, meaning light, water, sewage, telephone, and community space and facilities,
has been solved by ad hoc and "pork barrel" methods. Electric power, pirated from nearby power
(4) Ibid., p. 15.
lines meant to serve the secondary school located behind the barrio, reaches 73.4% of the
dwellings. Water has been made available by tapping into the city's aqueduct network. There
were 44.3% of the units that have a tap inside; and 24.% have water outside the dwelling;
31.2% of the units have no water and either borrow or buy their daily supply. The sewage
line installed as a community project serves 58% of the units. It dumps its waste in a vacant
lot adjacent to the barrio. There are 10% of the units that have a latrine on their lot and
31% of the houses have no sanitary facility at all. (5)
The surrounding open fields alleviate some of the problems of discarding the concentration of
waste. Services such as telephones do not exist in the barrio. Other community services do
exist, however, they do not function any. longer and the structure has not been reallocated to
any other function. The barrio has some permanent facilities, such as a day care center, a
community center, a beer-case repair workshop, a health center and an under-construction school
of two classrootis'to accommodate 50 students, and a tejo court on an adjacent site. Open space
within the triangular site is limited to a plaza around which cluster the day care center, police
station, and the school. The surrounding slopes are used by the children to play on. The paths
and small stores that sell beer and soft drinks provide spaces for leisure conversation among
the residents of the barrio. There is no garbage collection service.
3.250 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DESCRIPTION
3.251 INCOME
The range of income in 1967 as presented below.did not pass 700.00 pesos/mth.
Juan XXIII: Total Family Incomes in 1967
Incomes in Pesos %
0-400 58.6
400-600 20.7
600+ 20.7
100.0%
Source: Reference Data: Juan XXIII and the Develop-
ment Area, p. 39 88
(5) Ibid., p. 27.
[77, 77
For the same year, the family head averaged 339.00, the range was:
Juan XXIII: Incomes of Family Heads 1967
Income in Pesos %
0-200 25.3
200-300 26.1
300-400 32.4
400+ 16.2
100.0%
Source: Reference Data: Juan XXIII and the
Development Area, p. 39.
These charts indicate that only 20% of the wage earners in Juan XXIII had incomes high enough
to meet the costs of food, clothing and shelter. In all cases, savings were impossible. The
economically active segment of the population was 42.1% including temporary and permanent em-
ployment. The occupations held by those working include artisan, construction worker, street
vendor, re-seller of scrap collected from the streets (bottles, paper), domestic work, mechanics
and workers at the beer crate repair shop within the barrio. These labor intensive jobs are
highly competitive and require a great deal of personal mobility to maintain them.
3.252 EDUCATION
The general level of education in Juan XXIII is shown in the following breakdown:
Juan XXIII: Education 1967
Years and Type %
None 16.0
1-2 yrs. 19.2
3-4 yrs. 42.2
Finished Primary 18.4
1-6 yrs. Secondary 2.4
Vocational Training (SENA) 1.6
100.0% 89
Source: Reference Data: Juan XXIII and the
Development Area, p. 40.
Although this chart indicates that 42.2% of the barrio has had from 3 to 4 years primary edu-
cation, the effective level of literacy is extremely low.
3.253 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
The community organization of Juan XXIII is described in Ramiro Cardona's study of the barrio:
The leader of the barrio is the priest of the Dominican order Domingo Effio; ordained
in Peru, he began to work with the community nine years ago (1958). All the work
that has been done there is directed by him, with'the help of a body of volunteers.
The worker priest, as they call him, has achieved an awakening in the inhabitants of
Juan XXIII, a conscience of cooperation and, at the same time, has spread the respon-
sibility of the community to the point of establishing a service of vigilantes for
the barrio.
The maximum authority in the barrio is a junta composed of some of the inhabitants
who work under the orientation of the priest.
The foundation, "Paz en la Tiera," formed in its greater part by people who live in
the neighboring-residential barrios work in favor of the improvement of the barrio
.since 1966. This or-ganization was conceived by the priest who, since two and one-
half years ago, awoke an intent in the more economically stable families of the sector
towards the problems of the population of this marginal zone. Through this interest
he has achieved the implementation of many communal works... .It is important also to
note that the results achieved to the moment have been supported by Colombian and
American social workers, powerful business as Bavaria, Croydon, Cementos Samper, Ponque
Ramo, Silka Ltda., Central de Mezclas and the economic support of the protestant
c'ommunity in the neighborhood. With all the explained above, the marginal community
that initially was born, in actuality is found incorporated in the social structure,
with a great sense of its works and a slow evolution that from the chaos and the
passivity has achieved the establishment within a quite acceptable level of conscience
of mutual cooperation. (6)
(6) Cardona,'Ramiro; Juan XXIII, ASCOFANEy Bulletin No. 19, Bogota, 1968, p. 4. 90
Cardona's positive description of the barrio organization is no longer valid. Plagucd by inter-
vention of foreign and Colombian private and governmental agencies, promised a multitude of
things by politicians, and studied by national and foreign students investigating urban and
social problems, the barrio wants to be left alone to work out its own problems. (7)
A barrio improvement program proposed by the Caja was refused. Pro-Viviendo has collaborated
with tne barrio junta by helping to plan two small invasions to occupy the land that has re-
mained after the initial invasion. The priest, after some problems over the disappearance of
barrio money, and pressures exerted by foreign and national groups, has left the barrio. The
consumer cooperative no longer is functioning due to lack of funds, lack of interest, and lack
of leadership necessary to sustain the operation. The priest and foreign groups did not want
to encourage or allow community control of barrio programs, so barrio residents were not trained
to ashume responsibility for a project's initiation. Paternalism is the bane of community re-
sponsibility. It worked against development; the goal voiced by the contributing groups.
Senor 'Velasquez, a Peruvian living in the barrio, has assumed a position of leadership and re-
sponsibility. He orients a junta still within the old paternalistic pattern, but now leader-
ship and orientation are derived from barrio level.
3.254 TENURE
Tenure is still a problem that plagues the community. As an invasion barrio the inhabitants
still have no legal claim to the land until after twenty years of occupation the land becomes
the property of tne occupant. Barrio residents, however, are under tne impression that after
five years the land becomes the possession of the occupant. The threat of eviction retards
growth and only because eviction is politically disastrous have the residents survived tne
repeated attempts to clear them out. This was one of the principal reasons for rejecting the
Caja's program that would have legalized the barrio having the resident buy his lot. The
community thinks they have the right to their lots and therefore own them; the government
does not.
(7) Conversation with barrio residents.
--A
3.260 THE IELLING UNIT
3.261 THE FAMILY
The social and physical components of the barrio are described in terms of the family groups
or those who eat out of the same pot, and in terms of the dwellings. The typical social unit
is a nuclear family, that is, parents (mother and father) and siblings whose average size is
6.2 persons. (8)
In Juan XXIII, family types are:
Juan XXIII: Family Structure Types
Relationships o of Familes
Nuclear, Father, Mother and Children 55.7
Father and Children 1.6
Mother and Children 11.3
Children Only .8
Other Types .6
100.0%
Source: Cardona, Ramiro, Las Invasiones de Terrenos
Urbanos, p. 53.
Note: 124 Total families in the barrio
57.3% of the families are headed by the father, U.30% by the mother, and 31.40% by other
persons (aunts, stepmothers, etc.).
3.262 THE IMELLING
The 124 dwellings are characterized by a survey of 58 of the units:
(8) Goethert, Reinhard, "Reference Data: Juan XXIII and the Development Area," CINVA/MIT
Cambridge, 1969, p. 37.
"Z*041
Juan XXIII: Permanence of Dwellings 1967
Condition - % of Structures
Permanent Materials 2.7
Partly Permanent 12.4
Major Part Not Permanent 48.7
Not Permanent at any Level 36.3
100.0%
Source: Cardona, Ramiro, "Las Invasiones de Terrenos
Urbanos, " p. 73.
Even though Juan XXIII is the least secure tenure of the cases we will present, more than half
of the families are complete nuclear units.
OPEN AREA/LOT
Juan XIII: Lot and Constructed Areas 1967
Lot Size Constructed 7 of
(Sq. Mts.) % of Houses Area (Sq. Mts.) Houses
0-15 28.8 0-10 26.6
15-24 21.2 10-19 38.5
25-39 - 26.9 20-29 18.4
40+ 23.1 30+ 16.5
100.0% 100.0%
Average Lot Size 32.3 Sq. Mts. Average Constructed Area
21.7 Sq. Mts.
Source: Cardona, Ramiro, "Las Invasiones 'de Terrenos
Urbanos," p. 75.
AREA/PERSONS
3.5m2 of constructed area
ROOMS AND ROOMS SIZES
Juan XXIII: Dwelling Descriptions 1967
% of Dwellings with
Room Types Types of Rooms
One Room W/O Kitchen 8.6
One Room W/ Kitchen 56.9
Two Rooms 8.6
More Than Two Rooms 25.9
100.0%
Source: Goethert, Reinhard, "Reference Data: Juan
XXIII and the Development Area," p. 25.
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
Roof: Asbestos cement sheets, tin sheets, metal scrap, asphalt paper
(weighted extensively with stones, wood, etc., or secured with nails)
Floor: Earth, cement, wood
Walls: Bamboo, mud packed bamboo slats, asphalt paper, cement blocks, brick
Wall Surface Plaster of cement and mud, exposed bamboo, blocks, wood slats
Finishes:
Doors: Wood, metal
Foundations: Stone, wood, fill
The high percentage of buildings made with non-permanent materials can be directly correlated
with the lack of tenure and unwillingness to invest in an uncertain situation. There has been
an increase in permanent structures since 1967. Some of the buildings of durable materials are
community facilities such as the day-care center and the clinic.
3.263 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
The plan established in 1953 by the invasion oriented the lots parallel to the contours in
linear blocks that climb the hill. Cut and fill is the most common system used to establish
the base on which the houses were built. However, stilt construction techniques were also
used. In general, the lots were very small; the houses covering a great part of the lot
(if not all) were built by the occupants or in groups. Outside support helped: finance the
community facilities.
Conversations with the residents indicate that they consider "the hill" as a single block
that is well defined by the three streets that surround it. The level summit, location of
the day care center and other community facilities, is the focal point. From this point
walkways penetrate the housing areas and connect the upper and lower sectors. The paths,
.cut into the slope, are steep and although they appear to be labyrinthian, are very logical.
The turns and switchbacks facilitate vertical movement.
The barrio has been territorially contained because hostile neighbors have built fences around
the vacant land adjacent to the barrio. These neighbors have also encouraged and instigated
governmental harrassment and threats of eviction. The Collegio says it allows the "poor
children" to attend their primary school, but excludes them from the secondary school by
financial requirements of tuition, uniforms, etc., that barrio families can not afford.
The majority of improvements and modifications in the barrio are related to the construction
of the house.
MODIFICATIONS
The construction of the house has been classified in various stages:
a. The first consistsof the arrival at the site and situating the family in a room
made of scrap or non-permanent material such as beams of wood, walls made of
sheets of bamboo, and roofs with scrap metal or at times protected with asphalt
paper.
b. The second stage consists of enlarging the house, constructing other rooms and
perhaps a kitchen accompanied by improvements in the construction of the first
stage, such as covering the walls of mud-packed bamboo with a coating of cement.
c. The third stage consists of constructing a house of durable materials (bought
secondhand). These materials are generally products of demolished buildings.
COST
The cost incurred by the barrio is mostly for the materials bought for improvement and expan-
sion of dwelling units. For those who contract local construction workers the pay scale is:
12 pesos/day for a laborer
25 pesos/day for a foreman.
Construction materials available at 1970 prices are:
1. Brick
2. Split Bamboo
3. Cement
4. Corrugated Tin
5. Asbestos Cement
6. Cement Blocks
7. Clay Tile Block
350 pesos/1000 bricks-8x12 x25
8 pesos/1 foot diameter roll, 4-5 feet long
22 pesos/50 kilo bag
75 pesos/1.8x90 cm. sheet
28 pesos/1.8x90 cm. sheet
2000 pesos/1000 blocks, 10x20x40 cm
1200 pesos/1000 blocks, 1Ox8x25 cm
1600 pesos/1000 blocks, 40x8x25 cm
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LAS COLINAS
3.300 INTRODUCTION
Las Colinas is a large, ten year old squatter settlement located on the steep slopes of a re-
entrant valley in the southern sector of the city. The land was originally owned by the San
Carlos Hospital. It is a barrio economically integrated into the southern half of the city,
a sector composed of lowest and low income groups. The major entry is Calle 34 south, which
is the principal and paved road of the barrio as well. The barrio is bounded by the develop-
ment "Gustavo Restrepo" to the north at Calle 34; to the westi the Avenida Caracas; to the east
the property of the San Carlos Hospital; and to the south the Barrio "Resurrecion." The settle-
ment, composed of lots of 80 to 90m2 , situated on slopes of 45% average slope, (9) occupies a
site of 12.16 hectares of land approximately 5 kilometers from the center of the city.
3.310 HISTORY
Las Colinas was settled in November of 1960 by a well coordinated invasion organized by La
Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda. (The National Center for Housing, Pro-Vivienda.) A first at-
tempt was expulsed by the army but not the second that took place one month later. Its'
development, also well planned and administered by Pro-Vivienda, can be characterized as
follows:
The majority of the inhabitants of Las Colinas established their claim from
1963-1964, although there was a considerable increase from 1965 to 1967 which
tells us that before arriving at Las Colinas they arrived at another place in
Bogota. (10)
The population continues to grow. When the Caja de la Vivienda Popular (the Caja) arrived in
1968 to begin a program of barrio improvement, site protection, and infrastructure installa-
tion, "there was only one vehicular dirt road without any maintenance and pedestrian ways
(9) Florey, Victor M., Dr.,"Plan de Habilitacion Urbana Barrio, 'Las Colinas,"' ASCOFAME,
Bogota, 1969, p. 12
(10) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, an unpublished study of Las Colinas, 1968. 07
equally uncared for. There was potable water from 42 community water faucets of rationed
service and a school of 12 classrooms constructed by the District Administration. There are
940 substandard units constructed in most part of provisional materials." (11)
3.320 THE LOCALITY
A. Map locating barrio in city
B. Site in surrounding area
C. Site Plan
3.330 THE INHABITANTS
The population of Las Colinas in 1967 was 6,236. (12) As shown in the Age-Sex Distribution
Chart, it has grown dramatically, as indicated in the following chart:
Las Colinas: Age Sex Distribution for 1967
Total Males Total Females
/ No. Age % No.
9.6 600 0- 4 9.6 596
10.5 652 5- 9 10.2 642
7.8 490 10-14 8.2 506
5.0 351 15-19 5.2 326
2.6 167 20-24 3.2 198
2.1 134 25-29 2.0 125
2.5 160 30-34 3.0 186
3.5 211 35-39 3.2 191
2.2 125 40-44 1.9 120
1.4 90 45-49 1.3 78
1.1 67 50-54 .8 49
.4 25 55-59 .5 31
.8 50 60+ 1.4 87
50.5% 49.5%
Source: ASCOFAME Report #19
98
(11) ibid.
(12) Andrade, Gabriel. L., Habil itacion de un Barrio de Invasion en Bogota. Las Colinas in
Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, Ramiro Cardona (ed.), ASCOFAME, Bogota, 1969, p. 243.
LAS COLINAS : AGE SEX DISTRIBUTION
MALES a AGE
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15
TOTAL
15
3,188
51.2%
According to the 1967 data the population between 15 and 60 years of age is 41.46%; those
under 15 years of age are 55.8% of the populat.ion; and those over 60 years old are 1.58% of
the population. This distribution is typical of low income settlements. The economically
active segment is responsible for three other persons than himself.
The barrio contained 940 families in 1967, each with his own lot. This number will be re-
duced to 821 families, a number established by the Caja. The 119 units to be eradicated are
built under high tension lines and considered unsafe. (13)
The densities produced by the 1967 data are 77.5 dwellings/ha. and 512 people/ha. The dwelling
unit density established by the Caja is 67.4 dwellings/ha. The estimated population for 1970
has grown to 10,000 people. It can be attributed to natural increase and to the rental of
newly constructed rooms added to a dwelling to help pay for the construction of a home of
permanent materials.
3.340 SITE ANALYSIS
The site of Las Colinas is situated at an altitude that ranges from 2595 to 2670. A heavy mat
of grass grows from the solid packed base that has helped to absorb much of the rain and con-
trol the drainage. This is especially important since Las Colinas has slopes up to 75% grade
and a 45% average. (14)
This cover has been disturbed and in places destroyed by construction allowing the runoff to
mud-coat stairs and streets. Erosion will not be a serious problem, however, for the high
priority of site protection has established programs of retaining walls and public stairs now
(13) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, "Tratamiento de Asentamientos Urbanos Subnormales, una
Experiencia, Barrio" Las Colinas, Caja de la Vivienda Popular, Bogota, 1969, p. 10.
(14) Florey, Victor M., Dr.,"Habilitacion de un Barrio de Invasion en Bogota, Las Colinas,"
in Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, Ramiro Cardona (ed.) ASCOFAME* Bogota, 1969, p. 228.
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under construction. Climatically, Las Colinas is typical of Bogota having an average tempera-
ture of 14 C. Access to Las Colinas from the Avenida Caracas at Calle 34 and by pedestrian
ways that pass through the barrio Resurrection. The possibilities of growth and expansion
will be in the densities achieved as the dwellings increase in height. The only available
land onto which the barrio may expand is where it abutts with the hospital lands; however, it
has not spilled over from pressures of accretive growth, indicating the strength of the
police power being exercised to control the barrio's expansion east.
3.341 LAND USE
The land use pattern of Las Colinas has been influenced by three groups: 1) it was established
by Pro-Vivienda, 2) then changed by private initiative supplying an expanding range of shops
and of services, 3) then changed again by a governmental barrio improvement program that is
promoting a site protection project and home improvements. Represented in the following graph
in approximate terms is the land use distribution to date:
Las Colinas: Land Use Distribution 1968
Area
Land Use (Sq. Mts.) %
Circulation- 24,500 21.4
Community Space 12,500 9.1
Commercial ------ ---
Residential 84,600 60.5
Total 121,600 100.0%
Source:
Commercial activities take place in homes and
from stalls or tables set up at the entrAnce
of the barrio and along the principal street.
A wide range of services and merchandise is
offered daily to the barrio's inhabitants.
Daily, 52.80% of the community use the facili-
ties for their market needs. (15)
Other community facilities are proposed and
under construction by the Caja. The barrio's
acceptance of the Caja and its program is
(15) Andrade, Gabriel L., Habilitacion de un Barrio de Invasion en Bogota, Las Colinas, in
Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, Ramiro Cardona (ed.), ASCOFAME, Bogota, 1969, p. 243.
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being rewarded by a considerable investment in conunity facilities and site protection as
public stairs and retaining walls. Circulation within the barrio has begun to be redistributed,
as the public stairs built of permanent materials replace abandoned stairs carved into the
earth. The steeper inclines had been abandoned due to rain and neglect.
The legally and physically secure site facilitates development and maintenance of pedestrian
and vehicular circulation. Development is encouraged by financial programs offered by the
Caja.
3.342 CIRCULATION
The following graphic descriptions of the component parts of the circulation system illustrates
both topographical and dimensional characteristics of the barrio:
1) Streets
a. the principal street is concrete surfaced
and has a 0-5% slope
Section AA
102
-00 WAW*ft4&*-oq'-
a. the secondary streets are dirt surfaced
Section AA
2) Pedestrian ways
a. for horizontal circulational the streets serve as pedestrian ways
b. for vertical circulation the pedestrian way is a public stair built of brick
/~
Section A-A
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COMMENT
The program of building pedestrian and vehicular circulation ways of permanent materials now
under construction is a major factor of site protection that is needed due to the slope and
the erosive effect of the rain.
3.343 INFRASTRUCTURE
Las Colinas has resolved its problem of infrastructure through its own resources, politically
motivated projects, and programs of the Caja. As part of the program initiated by the Caja,
electric power lines were built along the paved principal road to serve the houses fronting
the street. Current has been pirated from the main line by a spectacularly chaotic web of
clandestine wires spreading over the barrio. There is 74.10% of the barrio which has elec-
tricity installed in the houses. (16)
In an attempt to win favor with the community and gain support in the coming elections, the
municipal government installed 42 public faucets in 1968. The faucets serve 93.43% of the
barrio. (17) A sewer system linked to the citywide network did not exist before the Caja
arrived. A sewage system was installed by the Caja in 1969 as the first part of a barrio
improvement program. Before that 63% of the units had an outside latrine and 17% had septic
tanks. (18)
The inhabitants are served by four public telephones located conveniently at the school.
The community is expand .ng its facilities. Including the facilities now under construction
and programmed by the Caja there is an eighteen (18) classroom school now functioning, a
(16) Ibid., p. 241.
(17) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, an unpublished study of Las Colinas, 1968.
(18) Andrade, Gabriel L., Habilitacion de un Barrio de Invasion en Bogota. Las Colinas
in Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano Ramiro Cardona (ed), ASCOFAME, Bogota, 1969, p. 241.
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twenty four (24) classroom school to be ready in late 1970, a "centro de integracion communal"
that will be a health daycare and adult education center upon completion, a caf4 and social
gathering place, an artisan instruction center and a large multipurpose room, a basketball,
volleyball, and tejo court. There is now an inadequate garbage collection and medical service.
Open spaces within the barrio, other than those associated with the school complex, are limited
to the tejo court and private terraces, public stairs and streets. The fact of the slope
helps to relieve the crowded feeling in areas of similar densities but built on flat sites.
The Caja's plan calls for the eradication of the 112 units under the high tension lines, thus
creating a large open space that has to date been described as a "green zone." No plans for
the area's development have been presented.
COMMENT
The area under the high tension lines, if it continues to have no plan for its use and main-
tenance will become a huge dump.
3.350 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DESCRIPTION
3.351 INCOME
The Income Distribution Chart shows the economic capabilities of the barrio's inhabitants.
According to 1967 data, the segment of the population economically active (21-55 years old)
is 40%, of which 14.59% have permanent work; 9.2% have temporary work; 14.43% are occupied in
non-productive activities as house-wife; 20% are students; and 2.52% are unemployed. (19)
The approximate distribution of funds is the following: food--50%; housing--20%; clothing--
10%; miscellaneous--20%. The average family income is $600 pesos/family. (20) Those
(19) ibid., p. 245.
(20) Ibid., p. 246.
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Las Colinas: Income Distribution 1967
Income/Month
(in Pesos) No. of Families %
0- 200 37 4.8
200- 400 153 19.8
400- 600 212 27.5
600- 800 109 14.0
800-1,000 112 14.5
1,000-1,200 53 6.8
1,200-1,400 25 3.2
1,400-1,600 19 2.4
1,600-1,800 9 1.6
1,800-2,000 18 2.3
2,000+ 25 3.1
Total 772 100.0%
Source: Micracion
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y Desarrollo Urbano, p.
Note: Subsistence level income is 600/mo.
working are either self-employed or employed
by someone as musicians, brick layers, shoe-
makers, merchints, street vendors, or un-
skilled laborers.
3.352 EDUCATION
The general level of education in Las Colinas
is relatively high. There are 13.95% of the
population who know neither how to read or
write; that is 7.81% of the men and 13.20% of
the women older than 7 years old are illiter-
ate. Of those 21-55 years, 9.8% are illiter-
ate; and of those 7-15, 8.21% are illiterate,
of which the percentage of illiterate women
is approximately double the number of men. (21)
The definition of just what exactly is a
literate person is not clear. To be function-
ally literate is one defintion. It means that
a person can sign his name, but no more.
3.353 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
The residents of Las Colinas were first organized for their invasion by the Centro Nacional
Pro-Vivienda (Pro-Vivienda). The leaders of the barrio after the invasion were members of
Pro-Vivienda. The organization collected three pesos as monthly dues and payments on the
800.00 pesos charged for the lot by the Pro-Vivienda organizers. The community, tired of
paying, became dissatisfied with their leaders. The municipal government, to gain favor and
(21) Ibid., p. 244.
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votes in the area became involved in the barrio's politics. They initiated an official group,
the Junta de Accion Communal, encouraging the dissident group to split from the original or-
ganization and join it. The barrio was thereby divided into three components--the small,
well organized Pro-Vivienda group, the much larger but less organized Junta de Accion Com-
munal, and the large indifferent group that represented the majority of the population.
This was the situation until the Caja arrived in 1968. Following the recommendation of the
Centro Colombiano de la Construccion's report, a new organization was imposed on the barrio
by the Caja that chose to ignore those groups already existing. The orientation of the new
organization was to organize the barrio spatially by sector, not socially according to famil-
ial group or cultural ties. The Caja named sector leaders who were not necessarily the same
as the barrio leaders. The result was to further complicate an already confused situation by
alienating the barrio leaders and causing a vacuum at the community level in leadership. The
barrio still lacks the leadership to unify its fragmented structure.
Funding agencies and other groups that worked in the barrio and are presently involved in the
barrio's development are:
A. 1. In Caja de la Vivienda Popular--those responsible for execution of the plan.
2. El Centro Colombiano de la Contruccion--Assessor in the technical and social
field.
3. El Departamento Administrativo de Flaneacion Distrital.
4. La Universidad de la Salle, with 4 students in their last year and a supervision
of field work in community action projects.
5. La Associacion Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina ASCOFAME, with a representa-
tive in the field of health.
6. Las Dependencias y Entidades Distritales when a function or operation fall within
their jurisdiction.
B. The agencies next to become involved:
1. Sena. Teaching Basic skills
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2. In Superintendencia Bancaria - COOPS.
3. El Centro Marista de Accion Social
4. El Instituto de Capacitacion para el Trabajo
5. Caritas Nacional
6. PAO. Working through the world food plan
7. Empresa Comunitaria de la Estradita
8. Brigada de Institutos Militares. With labor for the construction of relocation
shelters in an area different than the Barrio Las Colinas for the 119 families that
have to move from under the high tension wires.
3.354 TENURE
The problem of tenure in Las Colinas is being resolved as a part of the program sponsored by
the Caja. Families are purchasing their claimed lot under a program of supervised credit.
The acceptance by the barrio of such a credit program is met, however, with considerable re-
sistance. "In the legal aspects, besides that which has been mentioned about the settling,
the problems of the situation in general, it seems appropriate to mention 90% of the families
want to obtain title to their lot, but 100% reject the idea of buying what for so long had been
considered theirs." (22) It is perhaps the 10% who did not want to obtain title to their
land who are still holding out against the Caja's program.
3.360 THE DWELLING UNIT
3.361 THE FAMILY
The social and physical units that compose the barrio are described in terms of family and by.
dwelling. A typical social unit is a nuclear family with an average size of 7 persons. In
Las Colinas, 87.66% of the families are composed of father, mother, and children (a number
considerably higher than that of Juan XXIII). 73.26% of the heads of families are men and 24%
(22) Florey, Victor M., Dr., "Plan de Habilitacion Urbana Barrio, Las Colinas," ASCOFAME,
Bogota, 1969, p. 14. 108
are women. The civil status of the population older than 15 is:
Las Colinas: Civil Status 1967
Status %
Free Union 6.23
Widows 5.12
Separated 1.76
Married 60.07
Bachelors 27.67
Source: Migracion y Desarrollo
Urbano, p. 243
3.362 THE DWELLING
The range of dwelling unit types existing in the 940 units are classified and presented
according to the rancho, its dimensions and elements, and the unit, built of permanent
materials financed and proposed by the Caja.
Element
lot size
constructed area/lot
open area/lot
area/person of
constructed area
Rancho
6xl5m. approx. 90m 2, for
32% of the units
20m2 average for 605 of
the units
502 approx.
1I and more
5-10m 2
3-5m2
0-3m2
1.63%
12.16%
35.95%
44.26%
Ca ja
7x14m. approx. 80-90m2
60-65 m2
10-20M2
2
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element
rooms and rooms sizes
rancho
only one room
two rooms
three rooms
four rooms
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
asbestos cement
paper or cardboard
tin sheets
scrap metal
earth
wood
cement
bamboo
bahareque
wood
scrap tin and wood
brick
wood shutters -
wood and metal bars
metal frames with
glass panes
wood
metal
26%
20%
17%
14%
55%
35%
10%
35%
29%
16%
9%
5%
asbestos cement
concrete slabs
cement
brick
cement tile
brick
cement blocks
metal frames
with glass panes
metal
(23) Andrade, Gabriel L.,"Habilitacion de un Barrio de Invasion en Bogota. Las -Colinas,"
.in Migracion y Desarrollo Urbano, Ramiro Cardona (ed.), ASCOFAME, Bogota, 1969, pp. 239-241.
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Caja
61.59%
28.00%
7.61%
2.28 .
liv. -din.
bedrooms
bath
terrace
4x4m
3x3.5m
2x2m
1.5x3m
roof
floor
walls
(23)
windows
doors
element rancho Caja
foundations wood 41% stone
fill 24%
stone 11%
earth 9.5%
bamboo 8.0% (24)
There is a great deal of activity going into building dwellings of permanent materials.
3.363 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
The plan established in 1960 by Pro-Vivienda was of blocks parallel to the contours, subdivided
into lots 6x15m.; approximately 32% of the lots are of this dimension. The dwellings were
constructed by individual families who contracted builders, or by "mingas"--groups made up of
members of different families. The program established by the Caja defines responsibility
for particular improvement and the developer of those improvements, promoted in the barrio.
"The position of the Caja and its program is the following.
1. The projects should adjust themselves to the minimum standards required and
respect, as much as possible, the existing structures.
2. In the situation of a high density population, the projects will have to be
accomplished in a manner that allows the normal rhythm of the barrio's activities
to continue, that is to accomplish the equivalent of a delicate operation without
anesthesia.
3. To establish sales price of the land it was necessary to utilize a system that
permits the differentiation between lots according to their ease of access and
location."
(24) Ibid., p. 241. 111
3.364 THE CAJA'S PROGRAM
The following description of the Caja's program was translated from a technical bulletin on
Las Colinas. We retain, as nearly as possible, their language and self-image:
"1. The specific sources of work were established considering the nature of the
actions of the different aspects of the plan in the following manner:
a. In policy making: Administrative (at the level of fixing the objectives and
problems--The Director). Establishment of priorites of action. Establish-
ment of systems of work. Arrangement for equipment. Establishment of standards
and controls.
b. In the legal-administrative aspect: (at levels lower than the Director).
Pricing the lots and the dwelling units. Establishing title to the land,
arranging loans, rehabilitating the roads.
c. In the physical aspects: (at levels lower than the Director). Pricing the
lots and the dwelling units.
c. In the physical aspects. 1. (Projects produced by contract)
a. paving the principal roads
b. construction of the sewage system
c. construction of the water system. Construction of the electric system.
Installation of public telephones.
d. enlarging the school
e. construction of a Centro de Integracion, fixing up green zones.
2. (Projects to be built by the Caja in collaboration with the community)
a. fixing up of secondary roads
b. fixing up pedestrian ways and public stairs
c. relocation of dwelling units in the way of stairs, streets or power lines
d. relocation of families 112
e. construction of sanitary units
3. (Projects accomplished by the community with assessing by the Caja and physical
improvement to the dwelling unit and lot.)
d. In the social aspects
Development of the community through strengthening the sense of community.
Cooperatives, employment office, various social aids.
Classification and the resulting treatment of groups and cases. Classifica-
tion and the resulting treatment of structures and motivation of groups for
the community efforts and to improve the physical situation of the barrio." (25)
MODIFICATIONS OF THE BARRIO
The majority of improvements effected in the community before the intervention of the Caja
were effected by the brave, who proceeded to begin building a permanent structure without the
security of tenure. The rancho was used as dormitory and storehouse. Around it, as time and
money permitted, a structure of brick rose. When the unit was completed the rancho was des-
troyed carefully to be able to utilize the still useful parts as windows, doors, roofing ma-
terial, etc. The process is common and functions well, taking best advantage of the families'
available resources. The process was, however, short circuited by the Caja's program of barrio
improvements. The program, proposed by the Centro Colombiano de la Construcion under contract
of the Caja, outlining a rigid set of priorities and procedures. The priorities were 1) at
the family level the construction of a sanitary and kitchen unit, and 2) at the community level,
the construction of services and pedestrian and vehicular circulation as part of a site pro-
tection program. The Caja backed the construction program with a financial scheme that was
offered to thos who wished to take advantage of it. The residents preferred, however, to build
their dwellings but were in agreement as to the need for site protection. One family demon-
strated the more pressing need of an adequate shelter by moving into their bath kitchen unit
upon completion. The Caja's architect in charge of the project, German Ruiz, initiated a much
more flexible program of loans and technical aid for the dwelling unit as well as the sanitary
(25) Florey, M. Victor, Dr., "Plan de Habilitacion Urbana Barrio, Las Colinas," ASCOFAME,
Bogota, pp. 7-8. 113
unit. A service was established to help the residents interpret their ideas of what they
wanted for this house with architectural plans that local contractors or a family would build.
The construction of public stairs is being built by barrio labor following plans designed by
the Caja. There is a great deal of work happening in the barrio supported by financial and
technical services that enourage community participation.
COSTS
The project costs to the community are for the lot, installation of services, construction
materials, labor and intereston loans sponsored by the Caja. Prices established by the Caja
for lots, including the paved street and services for that lot, are:
a. for the lots that are the highest up the slope and furthest from the main
2
circulation are priced at 45.50 pesos as the maximum price per m .
b. for the lots that are most central and closest to the main circulation are
priced at 45.50 pesos as the maximum price per m2.
c. the other lots fall between these prices per m2.
The installation costs for services from the main line to the unit are 63 pesos for light and
2,000 pesos for water. There is no charge for the sewage connection.
Construction materials are available at the following prices for 1970:
pesos
1. brick, 8x12 x25cm. 350/1000 bricks
2. split bamboo roll, 1 ft. diameterx4-5
feet long 8/roll
3. cement, 50 kilo bag 22/bag
4. corrugated tin, 1.8x.90m sheet 75/sheet
5. asbestos cement 1.8x.90m sheet 28/sheet
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,
6. cement block, lOx2Ox4Ocm.
7. Clay tile block, lOx8x25cm. 1,200/1000 blocks
increasing to 40x8x25cm. increasing to
1,600/1000 blocks
Labor is calculated by the Caja as 20% of the loan of the dwellings. The terms of payment
for the loan supervised by the Caja are established according to capacity to pay. The factor
that allows flexibility in the payment schemes is time. Loans are also made in two parts, the
second part contingent upon the termination of the project built with the first loan. The
ceiling on loans has been raised recently to accommodate more ambitious projects undertaken
by the residents.
The value of the average loan for the first stage is 6,000 pesos with 8 years of amortization.
It is for the projects of the sanitary unit, the infrastructure and site protection and the
lot. The second stage of the loan for the progressive development of the dwelling unit is
9,000 pesos with 8 years to amortize the loan. (26)
The previously established ceiling of 15,000 pesos has been raised to 17,500 with monthly
quotas fixed according to financial capacity. Caja monthly loan quotas residents for 1970
2 Programs
loan in pesos (1 peso=$.06 US) quota/mo. for 10 yr. quota/mo. for 20 yr.
6,000 ----- 73
12, 000 133.22 85.97
15,000 ----- 111.00
17,500 194.28 125.37
Interest on the loan is 6% due to use of monies borrowed by the Caja from the ICT, the national
housing agency.
(26) Ibid., p. 11. 115
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LOS LACHES
3.400 INTRODUCTION
Los Laches is a large low-income housing project built by the Caja de la Vivienda Popular,
(Caja). The development is situated on steep slopes in the southeast sector of the city.
The site was partially settled by a squatter settlement of dubious fame before the Caja began
to redevelop it. Los Laches is economically integrated into the surrounding worker barrios.
The major entry is Calle 6A, which becomes Diagonal 4B and 5 as it winds through the barrio
as the principal street. The site is bounded by the circumferential road to Villavicencia to
the south and east; to the north, El Rocio; and to the west, El Guavio. The project is com-
2posed of lots 5x17.3m. or 86.5m2. It is situated on slopes of 10-20% average grade that leaves
the vast majority of the steep site vacant. Los Laches occupies a site of 38.8 hectares of land
approximately 1.6 kilometers from the center of the city.
3.410 HISTORY
Los Laches was settled initially by invasion. Its population grew by accretion to about 190
families. The condition of the barrio was described in the report sponsored by the Caja.
The construction (of the dwellings) consists of a room made of boards and sheets
of scrap metal and paper cartons. These rooms serve as bedroom, kitchen, and wash-
room, etc.
The occupations of these people are newspaper and lottery ticket seller, brickmason,
shoemaker; only six persons of the community work in the District, many are petty
thieves; this is deduced from the fact of the lack of employment. They live without
any sanitary provisions and free union dominates as the civil state. (27)
(27) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, unpublished, "Informe de las Actividades desarrollad as
por estudiantes de trabajo Social de la Universidad Nacional en practicas, en el Barrio
'Los Laches' durante los anos de 1967-1968.
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The Caja began its program of eradicating the old barrio and- constructing a new development
of 500 units in 1962. The construction of the units and the installation of services is com-
plete.
3.420 THE LOCALITY
a. Map locating the barrio in the city.
b. Site in surrounding area
c. Site plan
3.430 THE INHABITANTS
The population of Los Laches in 1968 was 3,220, as shown in the Age-Sex Distribution chart;
it is characterized by under employed and low income permanently employed urban populations. (28)
The economically dependent segment of the population includes those under 15 years old and
those over 60 years who make up 59% and 1.26% of the population respectively. The economically
active segment of the population is 39.59%, of which more than half are women
The barrio is composed of 488 families, (29) each with his own lot. The densities that result
from the 1968 data are 12.8 dwellings/ha. and 90.2 persons/ha. The estimated population in
1970 of 3,600 is attributed to natural increase and the limited construction of additional rooms.
3.440 SITE ANALYSIS
The site of Los Laches is situated at an altitude that ranges from 2,756m. at the Carrera 9AE
to 2,874m. at the circumferential road (a difference of 118 meters). Before the project was
initiated the site was covered with eucalyptus trees. These were subsequently cut down
(28) ibid.
(29) Ibid. 117
LOS LACHES : AGE SEX DISTRIBUTION
MALES , AGE ,
22
56
98
94
68
III
191
219
70
60
50
40
30
20
15
10
5
0
69
59
49
39
29
19
14
9
4
FEMALES
2
12
15
48
98
130
83
101
178
261
15 10 5 0 0 0 5 10
TOTAL MALES = 1,555 TOTAL FEMALES
= 48.3%
TOTAL POPULATION = 3,220
PERCENTS TAKEN OF TOTAL POPULATION IN 1968
15
1,670
51.7%
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because of the difficulties in laying out the barrio. A heavy mat of grass still covers the
extremely steep slopes of the ravines that form the major portion of the site. The grass in
the areas whose slope is 10-20% grade has been stripped away and little site protection work
has been done to control the erosion. There is a system of canals that pass through the ravines
collecting the runoff from the hills. The canals do not, however, collect the water from the
streets. The climate of Los Laches is cooler than the center of the town, and there is an
almost continual mist.
Access to Los Laches is principally through Calle 6A that becomes Diagonal 4B and Diagonal 5
as it winds through the barrio as the principal street, as well as accessible by the Carrera
10 and 9AE, through the barrio San Cristobal, Choache, Calle 5 and 9. There is access by
municipal bus, Fontibon - Engativa, that arrives at the central plaza. Possibilities for
growth and expansion are good. Some 500 units are planned for a zone to the northwest of the
present barrio. (30)
3.441 IAND USE
The land use pattern designed by the Caja is presented in the following chart:
m2  %
Residential 44,807.00 11.53
Circulation 20,520.00 5.28
Community Space 16, 700.00 4.39
Commercial ---- ---
Of the total area of the site, 388,309.00m2 or 38.8 ha., only 21.20% or 82,127.00m2 is developed,
leaving 78.8% or 306,182.00m2 of the site undeveloped. (31)
(30) Ibid.
(31) Ibid.
119
The priorities of physical and special needs of the community are reflected in the maintenance
of the existing facilities. The option of substitution and initiation of other facilities
work as corrective factors on the orientation provided by barrio governmental planning groups.
The community has exercised its options of developing facilities other than those that the Caja
has provided. Commercial activity, not included in the Caja's land use plan, abounds in the
barrio. Small shops occupy rooms designed as living rooms, and from a growing number of stalls
in the central plaza, people sell everyday items and prepared foods. There are also more
specialized enterprises such as a bakery, a construction materials store, etc. Shopping for
items not available in the barrio is done in the center, a 7-12 minute bus ride to the San
Victorino market or a 10 minute walk to the market in the neighboring barrio, Egipto. Recrea-
tion space has also been developed by the addition of three "tejo" courts.
The inappropriate amount and scale of the circulation has been altered by selective mainten-
ance. According to use and available economic resources certain paths and streets receive the
necessary care and attention to keep them serviceable. The other areas suffer neglect and
eventually change use, usually to a dump, or abandoned space. Maintenance of the dwelling and
its modifications will be described later, but it suffices to say that this has received the
majority of attention given to the barrio at the expense of its overall development.
3.442 CIRCULATION
The following graphic descriptions of the component parts of the circulation system illustrate
topographical and dimensional characteristics of the barrio.
1. Streets
a. The principal road is surfaced in asphalt.
A
A
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SECTION A-A
2. Pedestrian Ways
a. The pedestrian ways occur in the space allocated between dwellings that
may be a street as well. The families have developed their own sidewalk form.
A
Section AA
b. There are two runs of public stairs of approximately 8 risers each for
the entire development.
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COMMENT
The Caja's preoccupation with the dwelling unit has left the development of the internal circu-
lation to the efforts of the community. The physical results vary from well conceived stairs
sidewalk arrangements to unit/street relationships crudely solved, if at all. Pedestrian and
vehicular rights-of-way exist that allow for future development in a site protection program.
None as yet has been proposed or implemented. There is the need to revise the circulation
plan in a more sensitive solution to the terrain. One vehicular road is sufficient if it fol-
lows the contours and maintains a slope that allows the buses and other service vehicles to
climb the hill.
There is a tremendous lack of pedestrian infrastructure such as stairs, sidewalks, and flat
rest areas. The need for public spaces at the level of the block and the community is great.
An opportunity was lost to use the deep ravines that had no possibility of urbanizing as parks
and recreation spaces. The lack of the provision for adequate schools clearly shows that the
Caja's priority is the dwelling unit.
3.443 INFRASTRUCTURE
The infrastructure provided in the project developed by the Caja is restricted to a traditional
definition of infrastructure--limiting it to the services of light, water, sewage, and public
telephones. These facilities are connected to the dwellings when a family pays the installa-
tion fees for that particular service. It is considered that 100% of the barrio have these
services, but in fact, that is not the case. There exists a cluster oi provisional houses
serviced by a public faucet away from their development. The cluster has no light or sewage
facility. Community service and space are not well provided for. of the 12,000m
2 of parks
provided for in the land use plan, one sees very little developed. Of the sites that could
be part of the provided recreation space, there is a small sloped, fenced off area of swings
and a merry-go-round, but it is locked except on Sunday. The community has provided a few
tejo courts, creating the only real flat sites used for recreation in the barrio. There is
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a large, flat site that could be developed. At present, this site is used as a bus stop.
There are a few stalls that sell groceries and prepare food,'there is an open air structure
constructed by Accion Communal that fronts on this site and telephone service. An overall
plan is needed for this space. There is no primary school. That age group of students must
attend classes in the neighboring barrios. A secondary school has classes up to the third
year and functions on a split-day session. There is also a health center and a co-op drug-
store, and a church.
COMMENT
Regarding the health facilities, there are persons who do not use them because of the five peso
charge and the obligation to buy medicine there. An alternative is to bus to the center to a
clinic operated by a political party that charges 3 pesos and distributes medicine free. (32)
The garbage collection service is not very effective nor consistent in its arrivals. The open
slopes of the ravines have been utilized as dump areas.
3.450 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DESCRIPTION
3.451 INCOME
The incomes of the inhabitants of the barrio ranged between 200 and 1,000 pesos/month. 11.33%
of those employed earn 1,000 pesos or more. The family head earns up to 600 pesos/month. The
segment of the population economically active is 20.67%; of those employed, 49.8% are working
in temporary capacities and 41.68% working permanently as domestics, employees in small offices
and shops, construction workers, neighborhood enterprises such as bakers, cooks, shop-keepers,
policemen, professional soldiers, etc. (33)
(32) Conversation with barrio residents.
(33) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, unpublished, "Informe de las Actividades desarroll ad as
por estudiantes de trabajo Social de la Universidad Nacional en practicas, en el Barrio
'Los Laches' durante los anos de 1967-68."
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3.452 EDUCATION
The level of education is high. There are an estimated 68% of the school-aged population en-
rolled in primary school.
3.453 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
The organization existing in the barrio was first based on the special concept of "manzanas"
or blocks. The blocks were organized into committees with a block president who serves as
liaison between the block and the agency. Each block was organized to construct the units
they would eventually live in. Blocks instead of lots were assigned, and upon completion the
units were awarded by a lottery system.
3.454 TENURE
Tenure is not a legal probelm in Los Laches, it is an economic one. Entry into the barrio and
access to a lot was accomplished through a process of selection from applications of potential
occupants. Applications were received after a public announcement of the proposed project.
They were then judged according to socio-economic criteria, on the orientation of the project,
and on the political connections of the applicant. The monthly quota can become a burden if
a family is only temporarily employed or earns a subsistence wage that has no emergency funds
available. Unpaid installments can cause eviction or the sale of the dwelling. Resident turn-
over is a problem due to economic pressures brought to bear on marginally employed reisdents. (34)
3.460 THE DWELLING UNIT
The social and physical components of the barrio are described in terms of family groups and
dwellings defined in the preceeding case studies.
(34) Conversation with barrio residents.
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3.461 THE FAMILY
The average size of a typical family is 6.6 persons/nucleated family. 87.33% of the families
have a male at the head and 12.64% of the families have a female as head.
THE DWELLING
The stock plan for the 488 units built has the following characteristics:
element dimension
lot size 5 x 17.30m., 86.50m2
constructed area/lot 5 x 9m. approx., 44.50m2 or 51.4% of the lot
open area/lot 42.00m2 or 48.6% of the lot
area/person 6.7m2 of constructed area
rooms and room size living room--2.57x5.35m-13.75m2
dining
bedroom(s) 2.43x2.68-6.5m2
master bedroom 3.23x2.60m-8.4m2
bath 1.32x1.48m-1.95m2
kitchen 1. 75x2. 17m-3. 8m2
wash area 1.99xl.75m-1.9m2
terrace 1.75x.66m-1.15m2
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
element material
roof asbestos cement sheets, wood beams, optional
dropped ceiling of pressed wood panels
floor cement, wood, cement tile
walls brick, cement block
125
wall surface finishes exposed brick, cement plaster
windows painted metal frames, glass panes
doors metal (sometimes painted)
foundations stone, cement
The barrio units are 98% permanent materials. (35)
3.462 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
The plan established in 1968 was designed and developed by combining efforts of the future oc-
cupants, the army used as a labor force, and private contractors. What one can say of the site
plan, from the point of view of the Caja, is that the lack of direction has caused problems with
the construction of the houses and the laying out of the blocks. As noted earlier, the dense
growth of eucalyptus trees until cut down made surveying difficult. The project architect
stated that the site plan was significantly changed by the construction foremen at the site
without the Caja's consent or knowledge. The project's development was accomplished by various
groups responsible for a particular part of the program as follows:
a. A compulsory ten hours/week was the time the community had to work, or, usually the
weekend. The efforts were aimed at the building of foundations, floors and the roof.
b. During the week, soldiers of the Colombian army worked on the same construction as
the community, that is, the foundations, the floors, and the roof.
c. The Caja contracted brick layers to build the walls. (36)
(35) Caja de la Vivienda Popular, unpublished, "Informe de las Actividades desarroll ad as por
estudiantes de trabajo Social de la Universidad Nacional en practicas, en el Barrio 'Los
Laches,' durante los anos de 1967-1968."
(36) Conversation with architect of Caja.
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MODIFICATIONS
The majority of improvements and modifications are concentrated in the development of the house.
Design and development of the pedestrian circulation was the responsibility of the community.
The variety of individual solutions to house fronts, front yards and sidewalks represents the
majority of construction activity in the barrio. Examples are: one continuous sidewalk that
runs the length of the block; wooden stairs that climb to the units; gardens that are at the
level of the floor built on fill, well built and maintained; simple dirt terraces contained by
roughstone foundations, etc.
Few of the units spaces have been modified. Of the few that have modifications, the chances
have been the addition of a second floor, the form of the roof, and the sometimes exotically
painted doors and windows.
The modifications of the patio are generally the construction of new rooms of one or two floors;
paving the patio surface with cement or cement tile; and provisions built for keeping and breed-
ing animals.
COSTS
The project costs to the community are for the lot, installation of services, construction
materials, labor and the interst on loans sponsored by the Caja. The lots, uniformly sized,
are uniformly priced too. The cost of the 5 x 17.30m. lot is 2,800 pesos. The installation
costs for services from the main line built by the governmental agencies are 63 pesos for light,
and 2,000 pesos for water. There is no charge for the sewage connection.
The approximate cost breakdown of the unit is the following:
element cost in pesos
walls 3,000
roof 2,900 at 165 pesos/m
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cost in pesos
windows
bath fixtures
floor
1,000
500
12350
14,000 total
Costs for circulation, that is, paved streets, paths and brick stairs is 40 pesos/m 2, including
labor and materials. The contract signed for the construction of the brick walls between the
Caja and the brick layer was 9 x 500 pesos/unit.
The terms of payment for the loan supervised by the Caja range from 60-120 pesos/month with no
initial quota required. The interest un money loaned by the Caja is 4%. For the majority of
the project the Caja is the financing agency as well as directing the work. Their money has
run out and the (ICT) assumed responsibility. The interest rate charged by the ICT is 6%.
There is a problem, however, with the payments. It is that many of the families are behind on
their monthly installments. The law says that after three months of not paying the family can
be evicted from the house. This has not yet occurred.
(37) Conversation with Architect of ICT at Cinva.
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element
doors 500
(37)
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EL ENCANTO
3.500 INTRODUCTION
El Encanto, an extension of the barrio San Isidro, is a smalllinear development located in the
southern sector of the city on a site whose slope at its base is almost flat and then dramatically
increases until it is almost vertical. The land was developed by its owners as a "barrio pirata."
It is economically integrated with the surrounding worker barrios. The settlement is a well-
defined development of rectalinear lots fronting onto the extension of Carrera 6A, the major
entry. The site is situated between Carreras 6A and 7A and Calle 35. It is bounded by the barrio
San Isidro to the north; to the east and west by private open land; and to the south by the
natural barrier of the almost vertical slopes. The barrio, composed of lots whose average size
is 8x16 or 12&n2 situated on slopes of 40% average grade, occupies a site of 1.27 hectares of
land, approximately 4 kilometers from the center of the city. (38)
3.510 HISTORY
El Encanto began its development in 1955 with the first lot being sold on the more level slope
-nearest to the Barrio San Isidro. Its population was housed for the past 8 years in units built
of provisional, natural and scrap materials. The occupants have been actively constructing
dwellings of permanent materials and of substantial size. The original plan was a straight
line extension of the Carrera 6A. The lots were back to back and stepped up the slope, parallel
to it. The plan has, however, been modified. The extension of 6A has been re-routed at the base
of the development to pass between the.lots, in order that both lots front on the street. (39)
3.520 THE LOCALITY
a. Map locating barrio in the city
b. Site in surrounding area
c. Site plan
(38) From planning office plans.
(39) From municipal plot plan. 129
3.530 THE INHABITANTS
The population of El Encanto in 1970 was an estimated 494 persons and has an Age-Sex distribu-
tion typical of under-employed and low-income permanently employed urban populations. The barrio
is composed of (an estimated) 76 families each with his own lot. There are 94 lots (our count);
86 from map; leaving 17 lots vacant of which one has been converted to a tejo court. The densi-
ties that result from the estimated data are 74 dwelling units/ha. including the vacant lots,
and 389 persons/ha., a figure derived from the present actual number of inhabitants.
3.540 SITE ANALYSIS
El Encanto is situated at an altitude that ranges from 2660 at the base of the barrio to 2745
(a difference of 85 meters). The site, devoid of trees, is covered by a thick mat of grass which
helps control the rain run-off, in the areas adjacent to the street and criss-crossed pedestrian
path of the upper slope. The areas of circulation are dirt-surfaced; erosion is a problem. The
slope ranges from 8% grade at the base of the development to almost perpendicular at the upper
slopes with an average of 40%. The climate of El Encanto is typical of Bogota. With an average
temperature of 14 degrees centigrade. The strip developed barrio is bounded on the east and
west by private vacant land; to the north by the Barrio San Isidro, and to the south by the
natural boundary of the steep, almost perpendicular slope. The principal access to the barrio
is through the Barrio San Isidro, on the extension of the Carrera 6A. Bus service to the nearby
San Isidro is good, being served by the 20 de Julio and Usaquen buses. The possibilities of
expansion are excellent.
3.541 LAND USE
The land use pattern of El1 Encanto established by the developer is presented in the following
graph:
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2
m%
residential 9,728.00 75
circulation 3,040.00 25
community space
commercial
Total 12,768.00 100%
1.276 hectares
The efforts of the community to influence the land use pattern within the guidelines established
have been to open a few small stores in their homes. Community space allocations, totally lack-
ing in the developer's plan, now appear in the form of a tejo court. The open areas adjacent
to the developed help alleviate the lack of large spaces for recreation. Other community facili-
ties are found in San Isidro.
Maintenance of the streets and paths is good. The lack of available funds for site protection
schemes has limited the infrastructure to earth surfaces that require repairing and attention,
which they receive. There does exist an awareness of the need for the community's investment
to maintain the circulation as well as the need for home construction. (40)
3.542 CIRCULATION
The following graphic description of the component parts of the circulation system illustrate
topographical and dimensional characteristics of the barrio:
1. Streets
a. The dirt surfaced road runs up 3/4 of the development. At the base of the
barrio, the slope is 18% and gradually increases to 40% at the road's end.
(40) Interview with barrio residents. 131
SECTION A-A
2. Pedestrian ways
a. The remaining 1/4 of the barrio is served by a criss-crossed ramp and stair
system carved in the earth.
COMMENT
Of the 10 meter wide right of way, a 6 meter strip is utilized for vehicular traffic. The
adjacent grass covered areas are being channelized for sewage and rain run-off canals.
3.543 INFRASTRUCTURE
El Encanto, developed as a "barrio pirata," and tnerefore without any provision for basic ser-
vices, has solved its infrastructure problem. The entire barrio is provided with light pirated
from the power lines of Barrio San Isidro. An estimated 80-90% of the barrio has water installed
on their lot. The aqueduct was built through an Accion Communal project. A sewage system,
built with 200 8" tubes donated by "Tubos Moore" serves an area that reached 1/3 the distance up
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the hill. Where the tubes stop an open ditch continues up the barrio collecting waste and rain
run-off from the upper slopes. Tne barrio dumps the collected waste and run-off into the open
ditch that is to be eventually connected to the city sewage system. There is one telephone in
a small shop occupying the living room of a house.
The provision of community space and facilities was totally lacking in the original plan. An
unsold lot that lies on the right of way of the city aqueduct has been converted into a "tejo"
court. For the other facilities of schools, clinics, and recreation space the barrio depends
completely on Barrio San Isidro.
3.550 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DESCRIPTION
3.551 INCOME
The average income of the inhabitants of El Encanto is an estimated 600 pesos per montn. An
estimated 30% of the population is economically active, permanently or temporarily employed.
Those self-employed or employed by someone work as night watchmen, construction workers, sales-
men, small shop keepers, etc.
3.553 COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
El Encanto is an extension of the Barrio San Isidro and dependent upon it in many ways. The
residents of the barrio send their children to schools in San Isidro, patronize the shops in San
Isidro, utilize the recreation facilities of San Isidro, and have representation of the Junta
de Accion Communal of San Isidro as a committee. A work committee has been in charge of the
projects undertaken by the barrio, as the sewage system. The overdependence on the San Isidro
junta inhibits other project organization and initiation. The committee is constituted of the
more interested community members but until they form their own junta and accept responsibility
for program development and initiation they will remain much the same as they are now.
3.554 TENURE
Tenure in El Encanto is accomplished by the sale of land by the developer to the community
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members. The majority of the barrio members have title to their land. Those who do not have
their written title have not received it due to legal action'taken by one of the developers
against the other. The written title, however, is considered a formality and in the apparent
atmosphere of security the community is investing time and money in building tneir homes of
permanent materials and the community services.
3.560 THE DWELLING UNIT
The characteristics of the social and physical components of El Encanto are described in terms
of family groups and in terms of dwellings. (See previous case studies)
3.561 THE FAMILY
The typical social unit is a nuclear family of approximately 5-6 persons.
3.562 THE DWELLING
The characteristics of the 76 dwellings are:
Component Dimens ion
lot size average size 8x16 meters: 12&n 2 in area
constructed area 65m 2 (one case study only)
open area 63m2
area/person 9m2
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CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
Component Material
roof asbestos cement sheets, wood beams, tin sheets,
metal scrap, clay tile
floor cement, wood, earth
walls brick, concrete block, mud-filled bamboo slats
(Bareque)
wall surface finishes cement plaster, exposed brick, stabilized earth
plaster, mud plaster mixed with dung
windows metal frames with glass panes, wood frames and
shutters
doors metal, wood, interior use of curtains or other as
a divider
3.563 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
The plan establisned in 1955 by tne developer was a strip-development of a road climbing the
slope perpendicular to the contours. The lots, parallel to the contours, front the road on
both sides. Originally, the road was to have been on the east side of the development as a
straight line extension of the Carrera 6A and the lots back to back, one set fronting onto the
road and the other onto the adjacent vacant land. Lots were sold to the residents without
services by the developer. The family then built its first house of natural and scrap materials.
MODIFICATIONS
The improvemens and modifications effected in the barrio are most evident in the housing. The
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progressively developing barrio displays a variety of stages of construction. The stages range
from open and vacant lots to beginning preparation by extensive cut, to level tne site. The
majority are in the state of changing from perishable materials of construction to partially
constructed units of permanent materials, and then to completed one and multilevel single family
units built of permanent.materials.
COSTS
The major costs have been incurred in buying the lot and building materials. Ten years ago
according to frontage and location, lot. costs were from $500 to $2500 pesos per lot. Now lots
are from 6,000 -7,000 pesos per lot of 5 meter width; and 10,000 - 15,000 per lot of 8 meter
width. The installation of infrastructure has been investigated by the barrio's work committee.
The estimates are considered prohibitive. The utility company's program has been rejected.
Installation costs quoted were:
a. 500 pesos/family for electrical installation with a monthly metered charge.
b. 2,360 pesos/family for installation of the aqueduct and sewer lines. (41)
Construction materials follow the costs outlined in the list appearing in the Juan XXIII case
study.
(41) Figures quoted to the barrio by a representative of the utility company.
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3.600 SUMMARY
It has been established that 40% of the population of Bogota has been denied access to the housing
market because of high costs and various legal restrictions. Marginal and low-income settlements
have a nomogeneous character different from barrios of other socio-economic status. The short,
sharp pointed, widebased population pyramid of an economically marginal barrio indicates a
large school-aged population (0-15) as more than 50% of the total population. The economic
effects of this type of population distribution are most obvious in the percentage of the eco-
nomically active members of the population. It is generally accepted that approximately 30% of
the population must earn enough to support themselves and the 70% of the population dependent
upon them. The competition is intense for funds available for other than the necessities of
food, clothing and snelter.
We have presented the legal and illegal efforts made by governmental agencies and individuals to
supply shelter to the population group described above. Our analysis of the four settlements
establishes specific factors that contribute or retard a barrio's social and physical develop-
ment, as well as the essential differences in environmental quality that result from increased
levels of institutionalization. The four principal factors that promote barrio development are
security of tenure, technical assistance, community responsibility and contribution to barrio
development, and the effect of time on development.
Squatting is defined as an illegal process. The process is perpetuated by tne myth that pos-
session of land for five years guarantees ownership. It was necessary to examine the legal re-
quirements for building and the established building tradition because the legal system is partly
responsible for the promotion of squatting.
Various forms of squatter settlements were discussed. El Encanto is an example of the barrio
pirata, the popular housing process that deviates least from the legal standards and codes.
Development occurs on a purchased lot that lacks the basic services of water, light, sewage,
etc. The formal planning authorities completely ignore the speculator's role in planning by
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declaring this scheme illegal. Barrios piratas are a valid metnod for settling low-income fami-
lies in an ordered pattern that allows for the future development of infrastructure. By main-
taining the requirements for services many legal property owners are forced to develop their
houses with the knowledge of the official planning agencies and outside the financial and tech-
nical schemes that facilitate low-income housing.
Another form of illegal settlement is one established by the invasion of public or semi-private
land. Las Colinas and Juan XXIII are examples of this type of development. The lack of a posi-
tive national policy for dealing with invasion barrios and barrios piratas has further compli-
cated the situation. The municipalities are constantly threatened with land seizures, witn un-
anticipated demands for public services, and in many cases with the blockage of scheduled and
necessary projects. By not recognizing the quantity and specific demands of this housing sector,
the legal system has threatened the overall health, safety and welfare of the city.
From a financial point of view it is interesting to note that by not acknowledging squatter
settlements, the city is not incorporating these generally marginal sites into the tax structure.
In Bogota vacant land is minimally taxed. Even thougn occupied by homes, and in many cases
partially served by municipal services, without legal teflure no taxes can be realized.
The legal system refined still further this alienation of popular settlements. Considering the
problem of building materials, the standards in many cases permit financing permanent material
structures only, sucn as cement, brick, metal roofing, etc. Natural and local materials are
prohibited even though they are part of tne local building tradition and are within the economic
reacn of most families. For the hot tropical regions such as the north coast of Colombia, the
"legal" materials are beyond the economic means of most families and a unit built of wood or
bamboo may also be more habitable.
The rate of development of a dwelling unit and the basic services of electricity, water and
sewage depends on tenure. The lack of tenure plagues barrio development because of the inhabi-
tants' insecure claim to the land. Juan XXIII is an example of this situation. The quality of
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community life and development is very low. As a popular solution to the housing problem, it
has only solved the locational problem to any satisfactory degree. The shelter and the open
spaces, as well as the infrastructure have been minimally solved. Even though they have re-
ceived considerable attention from "do good" groups promoting partially fulfilled projects and
a lack of a strong central barrio authority the level of development and the quality of the
environment is low.
In contrast, the program now being carried out in Las Colinas under a guaranteed title and
materials loan program is producing a successful site protection and dwelling unit construction
scheme. Here community efforts are directed by a barrio based agency representative and tne
community. A family is able to secure loans for house improvements and at the same time pay
into a collective fund which maintains the public spaces, stairs and infrastructure. The infra-
ptructure has in effect become the personal property of each family. Higher densities accelerate
public investments because most people are served by the addition of the simplest facilities.
The rate of development depends on family initiative in availing themselves of the agency's
services. This avoids the problem of maintaining monthly quotas that can prove to be a burden
for a low-income family with an unsteady income.
Failure to pay can jeopardize legal acquisition of land. However, once tenure is secure, develop-
ment can be promoted or retarded by community organization and flexibile construction programs
supported by financial institutions. A barrio can be organized spatially by block, or socially
by family or cultural group--the choice depending on whether organization is before or after a
community's establishment. Established barrios tend to be socially organized due to charismatic
figures or family ties for leadership. This leadership must be respected if a barrio program
is to be successful. Groups created by random selection tend to be more successful when associ-
ated with a new program.
The establishment of tenure produces a secure atmosphere that encourages a family to invest in
construction of their dwelling and site protection schemes. The case studies illustrated the
need for technical assistance from an agency or other outside source, in planning, project
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implementation, materials distribution and financing, and maintenance of the barrio. A con-
figuration of lots that allows tne progressive construction of community facilities is not of
prime importance in establishing a barrio by invasion. Invasion barrios generally fail to
anticipate the residential support services, easements for utilities open space, space require-
ments for motorized circulation, parking, etc. A central housing agency is better prepared
through its technical, organizational and financial capabilities to establish new development
locations, to administer and organize materials distribution and construction, to solve problems
of retaining walls, water and sewer system design and construction, and pedestrian and vehicular
circulation. The elements can be constructed by contractual arrangements and/or barrio parti-
cipation.
The governmental agencies play another important role. Their city scale view of a barrio or
potential site places it with otner barrios competing for attention. Their larger scale view
facilitates logical extension of services according to the pressures the barrio will encounter
to expand. Perhaps the official agency's major asset lies in its ability to mobilize large
suns of money. In economies that suffer from inflation and agencies that suffer from decapi-
talization, large and rapid movements of money can realize a considerable savings on materials
by issuing small short-term loans.
The case studies indicate that barrio level programs should make available various loan schemes
for home improvement in the form of materials. The availability of materials coupled with
technical assistance insures barrio support of an improvement program as in Las Colinas. Where
the level of institutionalization is detrimental is when potential residents of a new development
are socially and economically segregated through pre-screening, or when a family is committed to
long-term payments for a house they could have built larger for a similar amount, or when the
community is left without control of communal spaces.
The financial liabilities and socio-political risks of projects that depend on the recovery of
capital from people with low or uncertain incomes automatically imposes a demand upon those
responsible for the careful screening of the prospective "beneficiaries."
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The resultant social groups are stratified either way: if screened on the
basis of economic capacity, they are narrowly lower-middle class; if on the
basis of need, they are narrowly lower class. (42)
In either case they are dependent upon technical assistance administered by an agency to solve
large scale site and construction prOblems. Efforts are wasted in the duplication of tasks
that the barrio resident is capable of doing.
Within a barrio there are latent and active planning, administrative, and technical capabilities
besides the resource of labor that is traditionally attributed to be the barrio's contribution
to development. Squatter settlements make marginal sites more productive by increased densities.
Los Laches (the agency scheme) utilized only 20% of the land to build on. The remaining 80%
will be maintained only by conscious effort and constant expense. Las Colinas, established on
similar slope conditions by squatting, has six times the density of Los Laches. Along with the
increase in density there is an increase in site maintenance. In Los Laches erosion in many
areas is threatening the stability of the houses as well as the streets and sidewalks.
The different types of barrio organizations have been mentioned. From the point of view of an
agency, the juntas could greatly alleviate the administrative burden by assuming the responsi-
bility for local activities, logistical problems, and organizational problems. Such activities
could be the coordination and collection of community funds, infrastructure projects, barrio
census, law enforcement, materials distribution for house construction, etc. For any project to
succeed the agency must recognize that a barrio organization comprises a decision and policy
making structure that can express community priorities for development, represent the barrio in
legal problems, qualify for public funds, and enter into contractual relationships as a single
entity. A barrio organization offers a continuity beyond that of its individual members and
contributes to the stability of barrio action and administration.
(42) Turner, John, Barrios and Channels for Housing Development in Modernizing Countries.
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The junta meetings offer the community member the opportunity to voice his opinion and be assured
that at least his remark will be heard and judged among peers rather than having the need to
contend with class distinctions (which inevitably result when dealing with municipal authorities).
People are aware of and have access to the channels of decision and responsibility. The way of
doing something is de-mystified.
An untapped resource provided by barrio organizations is the collection of basic data concern-
ing the members of the barrio. This data can serve the barrio by establishing an empirical
basis for making decisions. It can also serve the interests of the city by creating a data
base where none existed before on a group that represents at least one-third of the urbanizing
force in the city.
One of the more significant effects that barrio level administrative groups have had is the cre-
ation of home based political training grounds. For many potential leaders, this experience is
a substitute for a formal education. It affords for many barrios their first voice in the
affairs of the city.
The effect of the limited money allocated to barrio development has resulted in effective proce-
dures for creating a tolerable living situation. Selective maintenance of the existing facili-
ties and the option of substitution and/or initiation of other facilities or plans, work as
corrective factors on the orientation provided by governmental planning groups. The lack of
commercial, educational, recreational, and other facilities is compensated for by individual
and community initiative. Simplifications of redundancies as too wide and too many walkways,
too many similar small shops and enterprises, are accomplished by selective maintenance and
patronage.
Perhaps the most important contribution the community can make to its own development and
where it has demonstrated its greatest capabilities is in the construction of houses. It is
interesting to note that when dwellings from each barrio are compared, the standards of construc-
tion and the habitable space per person is considerably higher in Las Colinas than in Los
Laches. The comparison indicates that under favorable conditions of outside support the family
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produces a higher quality dwelling over time than a housing agency does with its instant develop-
ment schemes. The instant project emphasizes material standards more than space standards.
Building a home is less of an economic- burden if the family is in control of its rate of growth.
The motives and priorities of a planning group proposing action are related to time closely.
Short versus long term schemes produce different sets of goals and methods of achieving those
goals. The following chart lists the orientations of housing projects relative to the time
committed to them for implementation.
CONSEQUENCES OF TIME LIMITATIONS
SHORT TERM LONG TERM
Product oriented Service oriented
Access to product through
"palanca" or personal favor
Project initiation highly
susceptible to over political-
ization "Pork Barreling"
Work scheduling important to promote
and maintain continuity
Can effectively use stockpiled
materials
Feedback from user difficult
Contractual relations between
individuals and agency
Requires sustained contact over long periods
to insure continuity
Developmental costs are the result of a barrio's
capabilities to create and maintain
Alternative investment to purchase of consumer
durables
Less economic burden but more costly due to
inflation
Problem of bookkeeping and project continuity
Problem of small vested interest groups within
barrio promoting their interest
Voluntary commitment among peers
In many cases housing is nothing more than a token gesture to create imagibility for one
political order or another. As in Los Laches, the emphasis was on the building of the
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dwelling, leaving site development and circulation to chance. The "imaginable" unit was
completed.
In a society that does not possess or mobilize the necessary material resources to build cam-
plete modern minimal standard units for all who need them, each family must wait its turn.
Generally this is a very long wait. The squatter's method of occupying his plot as soon as he
obtains possession, living initially in any sort of shelter he can manage, allows his family
to improve its living conditions and become far more independent at a much earlier and a more
active stage of life. (43)
The case studies have served to identify what factors are crucial to barrio development. We
believe that the form and sequence of development of the barrios suggest a model for effective
urbanization of large sloped areas.
(43) Ibid. 144
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THE GROWTH POLE SYSTEM FOR URBANIZATION
4.100 THE GROWTH POLE SYSTEM FOR URBANIZATION
In this chapter we will present an alternative solution to the legal housing process to
bring the immense energies of the self help process into an orderly and secure program for
obtaining housing. Our concern is not with improving the efficiency of the existing legal
housing institutions, but with incorporating positive attributes of the squatting and self
help processes into a legally planned framework.
The Growth Pole System is an administrative and financial planning technique intended for
a housing agency. It intends to develop large tracts of land for housing by providing an
overall subdivision plan with a minimum set of services. The self help process then con-
structs the physical housing. The Growth Pole System does not provide physical housing.
It does provide vacant lots in a pre-established subdivision plan. The Growth Pole System
insures the legal tenure of home builders by selling lots with title. By providing an
overall subdivision plan that considers infrastructure, open space and public facilities,
the home builder is assured that his efforts to build a house will not be frustrated by a
lack of overall barrio planning or legal security.
In its simplest form the Growth Pole System is a system for controlling the sequence and
pattern by which land is settled for housing. There are two physical elements to the system.
The first is the overall subdivision plan for a minimum 1000 families. This includes lots,
street layouts, reserved areas for schools, parks and other land uses. The second element
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is selected areas within this plan that receive full and complete development, excluding
of course the building of houses. These fully developed areas are called poles. They con-
tain full water, sewer and electrical services and street paving. A pole may be a single
block fully serviced, several blocks in a line or a grouping of blocks creating an area.
The function of the poles is to attract home builders to specific sites--these sites are
the poles. This clusters and concentrates the efforts of self helpers in beginning their
homes. The poles are also the points at which services from the adjacent barrios are
extended into the newly developing area.
From the standpoint of developing a large tract of land, the use of spaced out poles can
promote home building without the huge initial expenditures of capital and time that total
sites ,and services schemes generally require. Full services can take place through a joint
home builder and agency effort.
For the potential home builder, the Growth Pole System offers the advantage of acquiring
legal title to a lot that is a part of a larger overall -development program. He is assured
that provisions will be made for necessary utilities, if his lot isn't already served. He
is further able to get the same benefits as the barrios piratas, but in a legal framework
insuring tenure, long term technical assistance and material loans to begin home construction.
The Growth Pole System is made economically possible by the sale of lots, the elimination
of institutional house construction programs, and the introduction of a labor market created
by the residents themselves into community development. The Growth Pole administering
agency (after the land has been fully subdivided and settled) is responsible for insuring
the stability and continuity of services to building families.
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For municipal public works agencies, the Growth Pole System offers a framework for in-
creasing health and safety standards, as well as a rational means of bringing vacant land
into residential land use. This has a direct cost benefit to the city in terms of the land
tax structures and in anticipating future public services expenses.
The Growth Pole System considers several things about low income housing: that there are
limited public resources available for providing housing to the increasing number of low
income families, and that there already exists a popular housing process, namely invasions
to acquire land and self help construction to acquire shelter. By incorporating the building
tradition of self help to the framework, lower initial development costs are realized for
both home builders and municipal agencies. The Growth Pole System offers wide variations
in subdivision layout and the possibilities of selling parcels to provide developers within
an overall plan for development. The Growth Pole System recognizes that if development
takes place within a framework that does not compete with skills and services that the
client is capable of providing himself, then he is far more willing to invest his non-
monetary resources in overall community development.
4.110 REQUIREMENTS AND DEFINING CRITERIA OF THE GROWTH POLE SYSTEM
In this chapter we are concerned with translating the housing problems presented in the
previous chapters into architectural and planning terms. The case studies have established
four minimum requirements that any program for low income housing must satisfy. They are:
1. The necessity to foster housing processes that develop over long periods of time
(10 to.30 years) rather than short term total design and build solutions. The
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case studies clearly show that attempts to shorten the development time of
housing cannot be done within the economic limits of the clients or the
governmental agency.
2. Any process for providing housing, self help or total design build must allow
for guaranteed legal tenure as part of the normal administration of the develop-
ment. The differences in development rates with and without guaranteed tenure
have already been compared in Barrios Juan XXIII and Las Colinas.
3. Housing agencies must be in a position to provide technical assistance to self-
help barrio groups in matters of
- overall subdivision and infrastructure design
- contractual management of land titles, loan services
4. That any attempt to provide low cost housing must recognize the inherent cost
savings to tne client of self help house construction. This tradition is already
well established; attempts to compete with it by institutionalized housing
construction will do so only at a high cost to the client.
4.120 OTHER LIMITS AND ASSUMPTIONS
4.121 SOCIO-ECONOMIC
Family income is the most significant consideration in providing solutions for housing.
We are seeking solutions for families with subsistence incomes to three times this value
(600 to 1800 pesos/mth. 1970) as characteristic incomes. Subsistence level income is that
amount of money required to provide minimum food, shelter and clothing with no remainder
for savings. This value, of course, adjusts with inflation.
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A second socio-economic consideration requires that housing solutions urbanize a minimum
planned area to support a population sufficient to require a primary scnool. This is a
minimum of 1000 families. The building of a primary school along with the installation
of sewers are the two largest barrio expenses. Both of them require sudden and rapid in-
vestments of cash and manpower.
4.122 PHYSICAL RESOURCES
Our Growth Pole System considers only sloped sites. There are several reasons for this
limit. In Bogota, sloped sites are the most favorable ones for squatter settlements because
they are located near employment centers. They are also the least expensive sites in terms
of the normal land market; however, they require special design attention in site layout
and sequencing.
In order to minimize the costs in providing for low income housing, we will consider only
sites that are immediately adjacent to existing urbanization and infrastructure. Growth
Pole sites are to be served by extending existing adjacent services. This restriction
eliminates the high developmental pressures that peripheral sloped sites have for invasions
and accreative growth, and lowers the initial costs of developing a subdivision by eliminating
costly well digging, septic drain fields, and electrical generation. This savings can be
passed on to the low income family by lower lot prices.
There is another practical reason for concentrating planning efforts to tne peripheral
sites. These sites represent the most likely places for increasing the city size. Bogota
has decreased in overall density for the past 20 years. This means the additional growth
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is occurring on the edges at lower densities than the core c-ity. A housing program to
help control this expansion allows the city to logically extend its service commitments
and to control the overall form of the city.
As a part of the physical resources we wish to further require that all residential support
facilities be considered as part of the housing process. This means that not only are the
1000 houses to be considered, but also all their vequired land uses, streets, parking, open
space public facilities and infrastructure. Often these support facilities occupy more
land than the area alloted to housing.
4.123 LEGAL STIPULATIONS
Under existing law, no housing units may be built on land without certain public services.
It is necessary to point out that in long term developmental programs there may arise cases
where land has been urbanized without the full measure of infrastructure, especially sewers.
We are assuming in our Growth Pole System that this law can be repealed.
4.130 SUMMARY
The following characteristics define our Growtn Pole System:
. The Growth Pole System is an administrative and financial planning technique
for housing agencies to improve the quality and quantity of housing to the
lowest income sectors
. The Growth Pole System does not provide physical housing, it does provide vacant
lots within an overall plan for self help home builders
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. There are two physical planning elements to the Growth Pole System. The overall
subdivision plan and selected areas that receive full utilities.. The latter is
called a pole.
. Pole areas are points for attacning the new site to adjacent utilities, the
effect is to cluster initial growth and to minimize the cost in time and capital
to develop an area.
For the housing agency, the Growth Pole System offers:
* an effective and low cost method of bringing vacant land into residential use
* a systematic process for encouraging long term development of low income housing
. an administrative framework for providing to self help home builders
subdivision layout
materials loans
house plan services
. a means of bringing the clandestine squatter process into a legal and orderly
process for housing
. an orderly means of extending municipal services to newly urbanizing areas
. a means of improving the quality of. nousing by efficient.subdivision design and
standards for open space, public facilities, etc.
For the home builder the Growth Pole System offers:
. low priced lots within an overall subdivision 151
. guaranteed tenure
. technical services
. materials loans
. house plan services
. provisions for infrastructure
. adjacent locations to existing development and job sources
Growth Pole System limits and assumptions:
. Families with incomes from subsistence to three times subsistence level
. A minimum subdivision size of 1000 families
. Subdivision plans that recognize the full range of residential support facilities
in addition to the dwelling lots themselves .
. Sloped sites adjacent to existing settlements with infrastructure
- That the existing laws prohibiting construction upon land without full services
be repealed
4.200 GROWTH POLE SERVICES AND FUNCTIONS
Growth Pole services and functions are of two types: short term development initiation
and long term technical and financial assistance. The first short term function is the
identification of potential housing sites. This includes identifying and purchasing sites
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adjacent to existing infrastructure adequate in size to provide for both housing and support
facilities. The expense of extending basic infrastructure and public transportation are
primary considerations. Our survey of possible sites indicates that there are a large
number available that satisfy our stated criteria. See Figure 1.
The second short term activity is to define an overall subdivision scheme for a given site.
This plan should account for all reserved public lands, define the lot parcels, and consider
circulation.
The most important considerations at the time of site selection deal with possible future
development of the city into the site region. Highway locations, public open areas, and
future coimmitments of infrastructure are of primary concern. Once a site has been selected,
the initial Growth Pole locations are determined. Possible extensions of existing infra-
structure determine to a great extent the pole locations. At this time an overall circula-
tion plan can be determined for both pedestriansand automobiles.
In most cases the adjacent developed areas will dictate the number and directions of main
roads. Within these limitations, different for each site, the lotting system is determined.
For sloped sites in particular the lot area, proportions and orientations with respect to
tne contours are of considerable consequence to the home builder and must be studied in de-
tail. The lot size determines its initial cost and the number of floors the perspective
builder must nmake to satisfy his space requirements. The proportions control the types of
house plans he is able to make as well as how many lots can be served for any given run of
infrastructure. The lot orientation with respect to the slope determines the amount of site
work necessary to make a plot level for tne house. To a great extent this controls the
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amount of time it will take to begin the actual house construction.
In addition to these short term programs, tne Growth Pole agency must be in a position to
provide long term services, most important of which include technical services and control
over the development sequence. Long term technical services include installation and
maintenance of infrastructure. Although all lots are initially served by water and elec-
tricity, the installation of sewers, site protection devices and the paving of streets
must be managed by the barrio itself. By having already established a total infrastructure
plan, the agency can make construction materials and equipment available as tne barrio
organizes its labor force and needs tnese things.
Almost synonomous with the tecnnical services provided is that of controlling the sequence
of development. This is accomplished by regulating the sale of lots to individual home
builders and the sale of larger parcels to private developers. On sloped sites there is
a direct relationship between the degree of slope and the developmental costs for house con-
struction and infrastructure. As slopes increase, it becomes more important to protect tne
soil from erosion as it is being cut and filled. The more slope, the more money needed for
retaining walls, stairs and pavement. Costs are reflected in another way. Because of the
geometry of sloped sites, infrastructure running parallel to the contours is often serving
only a single row of houses making it only half as efficient as one serving two rows of
nouses on either side. Staging is therefore important to control builder and community
expenses.
There are distinct advantages to controlling the sequence of development in terms of the
sales prices of the lots. Lots that were initially at mid-pole locations without full
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services gain in value as services are extended to them. In many cases the development
agency can use the price mechanism of spot development to create funds for high cash outlay
projects such as infrastructure of school building.
4.210 SUMMARY
. Growth Pole services and functions are of two types: short term site selection
and purchasing and long term technical and financial assistance
. Short term services include the complete site planning, the reservation of
public spaces, roads, and public facilities. The poles are small areas witnin
this plan that receive full and complete services.
. Long term services include administering legal titles, controlling the sequence
of development, supplying self help groups with infrastructure materials and
plans, and home building materials loans.
4.300 EL ENCANTO--AN EXAMPLE OF THE GROWTH POLE SYSTEM
4.310 THE OVERALL PATTERN FOR DEVELOPMENT
The Growth Pole System works through two physical planning elements:
1. A defined overall subdivision plan with a defined lotting pattern and reseryed
areas for infrastructure and community facilities
2. Full services to specific areas called tne poles with a controlled sequence
of selling lots at the poles and into the inter-pole areas.
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Refering to the El Encanto case study, we can demonstrate the necessary steps for development
through the Growth Pole System. As tne case study indicated, El Encanto is a strip develop-
ment extending from Barrio San Isidro. Utilities have already been extended into El Encanto:
all lots have water and electricity; however only the lower portion north of the surface
mine service road has sewering.
Considering the barrio itself as one pole (a row of blocks witn full services), a second pole
consisting of a road is extended from Carrerra 9 to a point about 350 meters up the slope.
This second pole is to receive full services of water, electricity, paving and sufficient
sewering to serve the pole areas as well as serve the future inter-pole area. This could
be an oversizing of the pipes only. Figures 2a and 2b indicate the barrio's initial layout
and the introduction of the second pole road. The same infrastructure provisions are made
for a transverse, lower slope road connecting the two poles. The area between the pole
roads is about 15 hectares. This area is sufficient to create a minimum of 1000 lots
dimensioned 8 x 16 meters with 4 hectares additional area for community buildings, open
space and circulation. Figure 2b also indicates the location of the eventual school and
recreation field. Figures 2c and 2d show advanced stages of the plan. Although a total
subdivision plan is prepared from the offset, Figures 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d represent the most
likely sequence for implementing tne plan. Figures 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d provide a more de-
tailed view of the lotting with respect to the El Encanto pole..
4.320 POLE AND TRANSVERSE ROAD LOCATION
There are three things which control the location of the poles and transverse roads:
1. The overall dimensions and proportions of the site
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STAGE
Figure
LOWER SLOPE TRANSVERSE
ROAD, PRIMARY POLES2a
Figure 3a
STAGE 2
Figure 2b
Figure 3b
STAGE 3 INFILL OF LOWER SLOPE
Figure 2c
Figure 3c
Figure 2d
Figure 3d
BARRIO EL ENCANTO
OF GROWTH POLE DEVELOPMENTSTAGES
Figure 5
E ZONE FOR GROWTH POLE APPLICATION 2750m. IS MAXIMUM ALTITUDE;(DETERMIMED BY AQUEDUCT CAPACITY)
2. The possible service extension points from the adjacent barrios
3. Walking accessibility to the school and market areas.
Case studies have indicated that the maximum distance is about 400 meters. This means that
the absolute maximum inter-pole spacing cannot exceed 800 meters for access to a mid-pole
school or market. Even at 800 meters, residents at the extreme ends of the pole roads are
beyond tne 400 meter limit. The El Encanto area however, does not offer any overall pole
location problems.
Location of the transverse pole road is controlled by three similar factors. First, the
extension of any existing road networks tnat will provide continuity of circulation from
the adjacent areas.
A second locational criteria reflects the higher rates at which the lower sloped areas are
developed. The lower slopes will be the first lotted and sold and the first to receive full
services after tne pole and transverse road areas. A third criteria is the degree of slope
and the financial advantage in lower locations, because grading, b6rming and paving costs
are less there. Infrastructure costs associated with the road, storm and sanitary drains
are also correspondingly cheaper in tnese areas.
4.330 COMMITTED LOT PARCELS
At the same time that the pole and transverse roads are established all lots immediately
adjacent to them are parceled. Since 8 x 16 meter lotting has already been established on
the lower and intermediate slopes of El Encanto, we have elected to continue this custom.
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The block lengtns are also established. Subdivision regulations prohibit any lot from being
further than 100 meters from the nearest intersection. This places a 200 meter limit on
all blocks.
4.340 SCHOOL AND OPEN SPACE LOCATIONS
From case studies and a survey of primary school area requirements, we have established
that an adequate classroom building, adjacent service areas, and parking can be provided
in a one hectare parcel. A corresponding recreation area serving 5000 students requires the
same area. From the standpoint of reducing tne school building expense and equalizing
accessibility to everyone, the most advantageous sites are those midway between the poles
and on the flattest sites available. Since substantial cost reductions can be realized in
school designs that minimize the need for multi-story construction, stairs or elevators,
and also cut and fill work, rectangular designs with the longest axis parallel to the
contours produce the best results. The recreation field on the other hand needs only a
sufficiently flat area for a soccer or football field. *Figure 3 suggests a location for
both the playfield and school building site.
4.350 GROWTH POLE INITIATION SUMMARY
Poles are established by extending streets and utilities from adjacent barrios
. Pole location reflects the practicality of extending adjacent services, overall
site proportions, inter-pole area sufficient for 1000 lots with primary school..
and playfield and walking distances to scnool and markets
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. Transverse roads reflect the extensions of any existing routes parallel to the
contours, with best potential for developing the lower slopes first due to
lesser cost of berming, grading, and paving on a lower sloped area.
. School area and recreation field location are adjusted to the site's topography.
Mid-pole locations for tne school are most favorable. Site proportions that
orientate the long building axis parallel to the contours reduce the need for
stairs and elevators. Recreation fields utilizing the least sloping areas for
soccer or football fields are of primary interest.
. Lotting is established along the pole strips and transverse road. Parallels
are retained for future pedestrian and auto circulation. Area for play fields,
day care centers, etc., are also reserved at this time.
4.400 CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING GROWTH POLE FORMS
Thus far we have presented wnat functions tne Growtn Pole System is to serve. We have also
demonstrated its use in a specific case, laarrio El Encanto. However, we have not yet
dealt with specific criteria for creating an overall subdivision plan.
4.410 GROWTH POLE LOCATIONS AND INTER-POLE DISTANCES
The greatest advantage to the use of growth poles is that large areas of land can be developed
to high design standards without highly detailed design plans. The degree of success of tne
Growth Pole System depends on how far apart tne full serviced poles can be and still maintain
some barrio development relation between them. To give specific estimates of their potential
influence is impossible; however, there are some empirical development restrictions that
suggest treir maximum spacing.
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For each of the barrios surveyed in our case s-tudies, the single most important community
investment made was for the construction of a primary school and a community facility or
recreation area. These developments consolidate the barrio by establishing formal institu-
tions that associate a particular neighborhood with those of the developed city. One of our
initial goals in the growth pole process is to establish a means of creating balanced and
self contained communities. Many planning schemes in practice today leave their residents
in tenuous positions if the plan cannot be completed due to some unforeseen circumstance.
We have attempted to minimize the effects of such uncertain planning practices by reserving
enough space before the site is occupied and distributing lots in such a way that enough
space will be available for the anticipated population. We consider the maximum inter-pole
population to range from 5,000 to 7,000 persons or about 1,000 families.
Our case studies have indicated that their average density has been from 500 to 600 persons
per hectare. The area required to house 1000 families is from 10 to 12 hectares or 100,000
to 120,000 sq. meters of land. Adequate primary school facilities and an associated play
area occupy an additional 20,000 sq. meters. The minimal availability of automobiles
(where the rate is about 10 families per car) necessitates only about an additional 3,000
sq. meters parking area. Business, commercial areas such as an open market place and cir-
culation will increase the total land requirements by about 15%. Our approxinm te breakdown
of land uses of an inter-pole population of 6,000 persons or about 1,000 families is below:
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1AND USES WITHIN THE GROWTH POLE SYSTEM
Land Use Area Requirements (sq. mts.)
Residential Land Area 100,000
1 Primary School 10,000
Open area or play f ield 10,000
Commerc ial establishments
including an open market area 15,000
Parking for 1 car per 10 families 3,000
Religious, social and comunal
fac ilities 5,000
Circulation and reserved area 18,000
161,000 sq. mts.
These estimates demonstrate that the residential support areas are a significant percentage
of the total amount. We feel that a school and its associated play field are a reasonable
unit to accept as one inter-pole population. By including them in our total space estimates
we can be at least 90% accurate. Now that we have made an overall estimate of the required
inter-pole area, we must turn to the first locational problem, which sites in the city of
Bogota are available for growth pole development and what their dimensional limitations are.
Figure 5 illustrates some of the most likely sites for introducing growth poles. These
areas have not undergone appreciable development and do not have extensive service commit-
ments from the city. They are also the most likely sites to be taken by invaders if no
policies are introduced concerning their urbanization.
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Our survey of these sites indicated that the average distande up a slope perpendicular to
the contours was about 250 meters, as in the case of El Encanto. By accepting this dimen-
sional restriction in sites, we see that in order to create sufficient area for 6,000 resi-
dents (the school support population) about 600 to 800 meters distance is needed in a direc-
tion parallel to the contours. If the school and the larger reservations of land are placed
mid-way between the poles, this puts all inter-pole areas within the acceptable walking
distance to school of from 300 to 400 meters. (1)
The aerial photographs of El Encanto presented earlier are approximately 250 meters by
meters base to upper ridge and from pole to pole and provide an actual case example. If
we wish to estimate to what degree the growth pole has reduced the need for detailed plans
and initial capital, we pose the following generalizations: If the full inter-pole area
is developed, it will have required that the original plan have had reserved some 300 meters
of primary roadways or about 1800 sq. meters in area, and another 50,000 sq. meters for the
school, community facilities, market area and the play field. This is approximately 60,000
sq. meters of land reserved and planned for future use. The total site including both resi-
dential and support facilities is about 200,000 sq. meters. This means that the growth pole
results in a 60% to 75% reduction in initial infrastructure commitments. The two pole roads
and the transverse connector road are the ones requiring initial infrasturcture installation,
i.e., sewer, water and electricity-service. This doesn't mean that the other areas will not
eventually need services too. It does allow service installation to take place at a time
when there are enough persons to warrant their installation and in a structure that has re-
served space for them.
(1) Supramanzana standard, M.I.T. Department of Architecture, 1969.
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The overall benefit to the Growth Pole agency in providing full services only in spaced
intervals and not over the entire subdivision before lots are sold is to significantly
reduce the initial capital required to attract home builders.
4.420 RESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FACILITIES
As an integral part, the Growth Pole System includes all necessary municipal and community
facilities within the subdivision. We undertook the problem of community design standards
to see what historical preoccupations there have been in establishing them and what facili-
ties and space recommendations were made. We soon discovered that there was no agreement
among planning and public health agencies as to what was required; even worse, there ap-
peared to be no systematic way of obtaining standards either from case studies or empirical
experiments.
Our review of contemporary standards produced several overall conclusions; first that with
each change of urban scale increasing numbers of people demonstrate the need and the ability
to support various adjunct land uses. For example, at the block level involving from 100
to 500 persons, a minimum of commercial services is required. At this scale, specialized
community services such as fire and police protection or post offices are not warranted.
,However, at a particular community scale, each of these residential support facilities will
be required.
We also concluded that the private sector land uses such as residential and commercial
areas are the financial supporters of the public sector land uses like schools and health
clinics. This economic relationship is often overlooked by planners.
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Perhaps the most impressive consequence of residential support facilities are their space
requirements. For example a subdivision plan for 1000 families will have from one third to
one half the total subdivision area committed to non-housing uses. Not only do these
support facilities consume area, but they often have locational constraints that dictate
where they must be placed. In the El Encanto example of the Growth Pole we saw that walking
distances to the school played an important factor in the plan.
4.421 AREA AND FACILITY TYPES
Figures 6 and 7 list the most common facilities required in community development. Figure
6 provides an overall comparison of residential support facilities for 6000 and 50,000
persons. Since the Growth Pole System is directed towards 6000 persons we have broken the
overall facility requirements of Figure 6 into specific area and facility types, see
Figure 7.
Figure 6
BARRIO SECTOR
6000 Persons 50000 Persons
School Equipment
primary school x
secondary school x
Cultural Activities and Learning
Equipment
special functions, conference and
parties room X 164
Figure 6 (continued)
BARRIO SECTOR
6000 Persons 50000 Persons
manual training work shops x
library and reading room x
multifunctional space x
parrish church x
Commerc ial Equipment
corner store x
commercial center x
markets and supermarkets x
general commerce, weaving trade
Health and Social Assistance
Equipment
social action and child care
equipment
milk programs x
child care center x
kindergarten' x
health equipment
maternity center x
hospital
Green Zones and Sports Fields
private garden x
children's playground x
community park x
urban park x 165
Figure 6 (continued)
BARRIO SECTOR
6000 Persons 50000 Persons
Sports Equipment
sportsfield and gymnasium x
sports center x
stadium x
General Equipment
Municipal Administration
administration of barrio x
police station x
municipal administration x
branch office banks
firemen x
police headquarters x
administration and technical service x
maintenance and refuse collection x
Communications
branch post office x
mailbox and telephone x
postoffice and telegraph x
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Figure 7
COMMUNITY FACILITIES FOR A BARRIO OF 6000 PERSONS OR 1000 HOUSES
Area Constructed Open Area
Facility Type M2 /Person Total M2  M2 /Person Total M Total
Primary School .49 2,920 .90 5,400 8,320
Multi-Use Room .20 1,200 .20 1,200 2,400
Parrish Church .08 480 .12 720 1,200
Commercial .27 1,620 .23 1,380 3,000
Day Care Centers .17 1,020 .14 720 1,440
Kindergarten .16 960 .16 960 1,920
Community Parks 1.00 6,000
Sports Field 1.65 10,000 *10,000
Barrio Administration Office .03 180 .03 180 360
Post Office and Telephone
Exchange .06 360 .06 360 720
Totals 1.46 8,740 4.49 20,920 35,360
Source: Plazas, Jorge, Alternativas Para El Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota D.E.,
*Note: The sports field area has been increased from 6,000 sq. mts.
p. 95.
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4.500 DWELLING LOT ALTERNATIVES
Next to the residential support facilities, the sizing and proportioning of dwelling lots
determines the efficiency of the overall subdivision. Lot sizes and proportions determine
to a large extent the possible floor plans a person can build. Excessively narrow lots
result in house plans with long, space-consuming corridors. The area of the lot determines
if a second floor will be required and what the initial cost of the lot will be. Assuming
the area of the lot is adequate, the proportions greatly affect the efficiency of municipal
services to each lot. The narrower a lot gets, the more efficient are the utilities serving
that lot assuming the utilities front the lot on its narrcw end. A small savings per lot
represents great savings in overall barrio services.
The above relationships are further complicated when developing lots on steep slopes. There
is a direct relationship of lot proportions and orientation with respect to the slope con-
tours which greatly affect the development costs to the home owner.
4.510 EFFICIENCY OF SUBDIVISION LAYOUT
In an attempt to create an empirical measure of subdivision layout efficiency a technique
called R factor was developed under the direction of Prof. Horacio Caminos (MIT, Department
of Architecture, 1970). The R factor creates a mathematical relation between subdivision
services and their associated service areas. Although the technique is more universally
applicable than we present here, the R factor relates lineal utilities such as streets,
electrical and telephone lines, and water and sewer lines to the areas that these lines
serve, such as lots.
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In its general form the R value, or index of efficiency between the lineal utilities and
the lots, is expressed as a ratio:
Total Lineal Service Distance (meters)
Total Service Area (sq. meters)
From inspection we see that if the total lineal service distance is held constant and the
total service area associated with the lineal services is steadily increased, the result is
a lowering of the value of R. Therefore, lowering R values reflect an increasing of the
efficiency of lineal services to service areas. In short, more area, more lots, more people,
etc., can be served by a fixed lineal distance of utilities.
LOWER R VALUES INDICATE HIGHER PIAN EFFICIENCIES.
In order to simplify the use of the R technique, special tables have been prepared.
4.520 NUMERIC R TABLES
To apply the R technique to subdivision layouts, tables were generated relating lot areas,
lot proportions, the number of lot sides serviced and the block length. Although these
tables were specifically designed to evaluate street grids and sewer networks, both their
principles and actual numbers can be applied to any similar lot and utility line relation-
ships. The tables serve in a clerical capacity only. They perform the necessary arithmetic
and allow for a scanning of alternate possibilities.
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The numeric tables include lots whose area ranges from 25 sq'. meters to 800 sq. meters in
increments of 25 sq. meters. These tables represent the range of lot areas encountered in
the 16 case studies of Urban Dwelling Environments (2). These areas are considered repre-
sentative of most urban subdivision.
In order to simplify the problem of varying street widths, sidewalks, curbing, and possible
planting strips, the lot extends to the center of the street. When evaluating the following
lot:
Center of Street
: 2 meters
10 meters
10 meters
Figure 8
the lot becomes 10 meters by 47 meters.
(2) Caminos, Turner, and Steffian, Urban Dwelling Environments, MIT Press, 1969. 170
To express the subdivision efficiency only in terms of lot area, proportion and the number
of sides served by a utility is to ignore the fact that there are transverse streets or
street grids perpendicular to the one in front of the lot. Intuitively an infinitely long
block is more efficient than many short blocks. Short blocks introduce transverse streets
that increase the total lineal service lines for a given area. To acknowledge the streets
running transverse to the lots fronting the street, several of the more common transverse
spacings have been included. The numeric R charts include the most common spacings, 75.,
100, 125, 150, 175 and 200 meters.
The 16 case studies from Urban Dwelling Environments indicate, however, that there are two
broad categories of lot and utility relationships. They furthermore account for 90% of all
cases. These are "l Way Short" and "2 Way Short" schemes. The "1 Way Short" refers to a
lot that is served on only one of its short sides by a service line.
For the case of square lots this is an irrelevant differentiation; however, these cases.
are not typical. The "2 Way Short" refers to a lot that is served on two of its short sides,
usually a rectangular lot served by both an alley and fronting street. Figure 9 illustrates
typical site conditions for both "l Way Short" and "2 Way Short" cases.
2 Way Short 1 Way Short
Figure 9 171
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To use the numeric R tables, merely locate the appropriate lot area chart, (see Appendix
D). The lot area includes the adjusted width to include the transverse streets as well as
the adjusted lot depth to include the street area to the center line(s). Next identify the
lot proportions. This can be done by using any one of the known dimensions of the adjusted
lot or an approximation of the proportions. Read across to the transverse street spacing
column corresponding to the block length measured from center to center of the transverse
streets. These columns appear under the "1 Way Short" and "2 Way Short" headings; use which-
ever applies. In Appendix D we have located the efficiency R value for a 400 sq. meter lot,
proportions 1:5, "1 Way Short," and transverse spacing of 150 meters. The R value is 178.
4.530 GRAPHIC R CHARTS
In order to measure the relative improvements in efficiency brought about by changes in
lot proportions transverse street spacing a set of graphic R charts has been prepared to
accompany Figure 9. Figures 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 graphically illustrate lot areas
of 25, 50, 100, 200, 400 and 800 sq. meters respectively. These charts locate all R
values of the same value. Their contour is superimposed over a reference grid which relate
row wise varying lot proportions and column wise varying transverse spacings. At each grid
intersection two numbers appear. The upper right hand number is the R value for "1 Way
Short" cases; the lower left hand, the "2 Way Short" cases. Solid contour lines denote
"I Way Short" and dashed lines the "2 Way Short." For ease of reading, in every case pos-
sible contour intervals are 50 R units. In the 25 sq. meter and 50 sq. meter lots, contour
intervals in the lots of 1:1 proportions use a 1000 R unit increment. The rate of improve-
ment for these smaller lots is so pronounced that 50 R unit intervals would obscure the
graph.
172
1 WAY SI-CRT + 2 WAY SHORT R CHART FOR 25 SQUARE METER LUTS
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75 100 125 150 175 200
LOT PROPORTICNS
1133 1099 1079 1066 1057 1049
1:1______
2133 2099 2079 2066 2057
1:40 87 787 
,7737_6__ 757
1547 1514 1494 1480 -..... 1471 --- 1464
-- " 677 657.- 644 ---- ~634" 627
1:3 ....-----
1288 ,- 254 1234 -1221 1211 1204
63399 579 566 557 549
1:4 ....--_9
1133 ,,.-1099 1079 ....- 1066 1057 1049
580 547::5 5 27 513 504 497
1:5 ---__0___
1027 . 994 974 ....-961 95 944
5415084488.- 474 465 458
1:6__________
949 916 - 896 883 873 86
511 4 77,-" 4 57 4 44 435 427
1:7
889 855 835 822 813 . - 805
486 45 /' 433 420 410 403
1:8 
01
E40 807 787 773 764 .---- 75>
1:9.e466 433 -413 0 0 3)0 
383
1:9 _____
800 766 746 733 723 716
Figure 10 1
I WAY SHCRT + 2 WAY SHORT R CHART FUR 50 SOJAkE METER LJTS
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I WAY SHORT + 2 WAY SHORT R CHART FOR 100 SQJARE M4TER L)TS
TRANSVERSE STREET SPACING ( IN METERS
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I WAY SHORT + 2 WAY SHORT R CHART FOR 200 SQUARE METER LOTS
TRANSVERSE STREET SPACING ( (N METERS 1
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I WAY SHORT + 2 WAY SHORT R CHART FOR 400 SOUARE METFR LOTS
TRANSVEPSF STRFFT SPACING ( IN METFRS 1
75 100 125 150 175
LOT PROPORTIONS
1:61
633
1: 2
1: 3
1:4
1: 5
1:6
1:7
1:8
1 : 9
300
383 349 3?9
.246
Figure 14
233 2?3
307 2 9
194
38A
174
?00
161
152
144
238
1 3P
? 6
133
?16
177
200
1 WAY SHORT + 2 WAY SHOPT F CHART FOR POO SQU/\P[ VFTFR LJTS
TRANSVEPSE STiRET SPACING ( IN MAFTFPS )
75 100 129 150 175 200
LOT PROPnRTIONS
310 776 256 243 233 2?6
1:1_____ _
4 86 4 5 3 43 3 - -4 7 41 C
758 2 74 .0 204 1Q1 182 174
1:2 -o
383323629
1:3
337 304 294 270 ?61
1:4
310 762S623332f
1:5
21 2?4 204 4 1 1 82 1208
235 178 j2 168 129 15?
1:6 j f
24 224 27 261194
1426 1 / 16 133 123 116
266276 256: 243 233 ?26A
212179/I54 4513612
13 12 -42 12 129 112
1:8 6 - - - -- - - - - - -
277 2) 4 224 211 201> 194
19 16e 14 129 114 1 78
251i 217 197 184 174 167
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The graphic R charts illustrate the rate of change of the efficiency values. Where contour
lines appear closest together the R value changes fastest. In all cases the lowest R value
appears in the lower right hand corner. Narrow lots on the long blocks produce the lowest
R value.
The R graphic charts serve the subdivision designer in a unique way. It has already been
pointed out that the R values decrease (increase in efficiency) with longer blocks and narrow
lots; however, what other choices are there that net nearly the same R values with other
lot areas, proportions and transverse lot spacing? The graphic charts help to answer this
question. Take for example the 50 sq. meter lot, see Figure 11. Note that the "I Way
Short" contour lines are becoming asymptotic to the 75 meter transverse spacing axis. Con-
versely there is a region of convergence in the upper right corner. This indicates that
many more contours can be crossed for any change in lot proportions if the transverse spacing
can be 150 meters or more. Crossing contours in effect is increasing the layout efficiency.
One can see that for 75 meter transverse street spacing as much efficiency is gained as a
percentage changing the lot proportions from 1:1 to 1:2 than from 1:3 to 1:9. Small lots
from 25 to 200 sq. meters are particularly responsive to changes in proportions and trans-
verse street spacing. This is particularly noticeable When the 50 sq. meter lot is compared
to the 800 sq. meter lot chart, Figure 15 . Here the larger basic area of the lot makes it
inherently more efficient, so much so that with all the possible lot proportions and trans-
verse street spacing combinations, only 202 units for "1 Way Short" can be realized. (3)
It is interesting to note that when all R charts, either numeric or graphic, are compared,
the percentage of overall improvement is almost generally a constant 300% from the least to
(3) The R for 1:1 proportions at 75 meter transverse spacing is 310, at 1:9 and 200 meter
spaciag it is 108, giving an absolute change of 202 R units.
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the most efficient choice for any area lot. This comparison is within the "1 Way Short"
class. "2 Way Short" cases are by definition less efficient; however, they exhibit the same
300% value range described above.
REIATIVE IMPROVEMENTS FOR CHANGES IN LOT AREAS,
It has already been demonstrated that small lots are the most responsive to changes of
layout. Figure 16 has been prepared to quantify at what point the lot area, proportions,
and transverse street spacing are powerful regulators of efficiency. Figure 16 shows the
absolute change in R values possible by changing proportions, etc. The abscissa axis
denotes lot areas of 25, 50, 100, 200, 400, and 800 sq. meters. The ordinate axis con-
tains the range of absolute improvements in R values.
Referring to the "1 Way Short" graph of page 181, small lots, 200 meters and under,
slight variations in transverse spacing and/or lot proportions made substantial differences
in efficiency. For the 25 sq. meter lot 750 R units can be achieved. A 400 sq. meter lot
yields improvements of only 250 R units and the 800 sq. meter lot 202 R units. The graph,
p. 181, illustrates that with a steadily decreasing R value range changes in lot propor-
tions and transverse street spacing are only applicable to lots of less than 400 sq. meters.
The graph for "2 Way Short" cases indicates similar conclusions.
4.540 SUMMARY
In most subdivision designs, the area of the lot is fixed by economic restrictions of sale
value. The case studies indicate that lots were in the 100 to 300 meter range. Therefore,
the next most important consideration is the proportions and what restrictions they impose
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upon the dwelling unit and the efficiency of the infrastructure. When we look at the R
figure U for the 50 sq. meter lot and compare it to that of the 800 sq. meter lot figure
15 these factors become important. Note that for a 50 sq. meter lot, the maximum range of
R values for "I Way Short" is from 1133 at 1:1 proportions and 75 meter transverse connector
spacing to 383 at 1:9 and 200 meter spacing. The difference in R values is 750. For "2 Way
Short" it is even more--some 1417 R units. When we compare this to the same proportion and
transverse connector spacings for the 800 sq. meter lot, figure 15, we find ranges of 202
and 319 respectively. We have plotted the difference in R value for each of the tables
presented here, see figure 16. Note that for the 25, 50 and 100 sq. meter lots there is
considerable difference in R values from 1:1 proportions and 75 meter transverse connector
spacing to 1:9 and 200 meter spacings. These differences are plotted for "1 Way" and "2
Way Short" cases. From all of these analyses of lot sizes, proportions and connector spac-
ings, we conclude the following:
Lower R values indicate higher subdivision effic.iency and that for any given lot
area, 1:9 proportions and 200 meter transverse connector spacings are more effi-
cient by 300% than 1:1 and 75 meter combinations.
Larger sized lots, 500 sq. -meters or more, are more efficient (have lower R values)
than smaller sized lots.
That smaller sized lots, less than 200 sq. meters, undergo the greatest improve-
ments in efficiency by changes in lot proprotions and/or transverse connector
spacing. Figure 16 indicates the relative R improvements. This is particularly
important for the majority of low-income settlements occupying lots in this area
range.
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By inspection of the R value lines drawn on the tables 10 , 11, 12, 13 , 14,
and 15 , it is clear that small lots undergo the greatest improvements in efficiency
by changing their lot proportions. Changes in transverse connector spacing help but
are not nearly as influential.
2 way schemes are by nature twice as inefficient as "1 Way Short" schemes; however,
this difference is minimized by using large lots of at least 500 sq. meters or more.
4.550 LOT ORIENTATIONS ON SLOPED SITES
Thus far we have dealt with the problem of lot sizing and the geometrical constraints
placed upon them. In this section we will see that the variety of subdivisions is further
limited by slopes in terms of the amount of earth work involved in preparing a flat site.
Not all subdivisions are affected by these constraints because in the invasion houses at
Las Colinas, the whole problem was avoided by building houses on stilts.
4.551 PARALLEL VS. PERPENDICULAR
In considering what orientation relative to the contours that a lot should have to minimize
the cut and fill requirements, one rule universally applies: the least cut and fill required
to produce a level building site results from orientating the long axis of the lot parallel
to the contours. (Obviously in the case of square lots there is no difference) For example,
given a slope of 45% or about 25 degrees angle, a lot 8 meters by 15 meters would have to
re-locate 105 cubic meters of earth when the long axis of the lot is perpendicular to the
slope and only 56 cubic meters of fill when parallel. These differences become more pro-
nounced as the lots become longer with respect to their widths. The same slope requires for
a lot 8 meters by 30 meters 419 and 112 cubic meters for the same respective orientations as
the first example.
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We can further generalize on the effects of lot orientation relative to the contours by
stating that as a lot is rotated from having its long axis perpendicular to that of paral-
lel to the contours there is a continuous and almost lineal reduction on cut and fill re-
quirements. Since this rule applies to lots which have been rotated about their centroids,
see Figure 17, they produce at all times balanced out and fill situations. All earth work
takes place on the site itself by merely relocating to another portion of the lot.
4.560 BAIANCED CUT AND FILL VS. ALL CUT SCHEMES
There are two basic ways of locating a lot with respect to the slope. The first is by ro-
tating the lot about its centroid until a more or less optimal solution is arrived at.
Figure 17 illustrates this process. The second system is one in which the lot is always
in pumecut (see Figure 18 for examples). Although this technique is not the most economical
in terms of earth movement, it is by far the most common. This is due to two important
reasons. First, if a lot is in pure cut it presents a solid and uniform base to build upon.
This is not easy to do where balanced cut and fill are used. The filled areas have to be
compacted and sufficiently retained in order to create a uniform surface. At the expense of
more site work, pure cut solutions are better. The second reason for their popularity is
that in most squatter developments, -the streets are located first, and usually run parallel
to the contours. When the lots fronting the street and above it on the slope are prepared for
building permanent material houses their only choice (if they want their first floor to be
level with the street) is to prepare the lot in complete cut.-
The rule of locating the long axis of the lot parallel to the contours is still valid;
however, there is not such a uniform reduction in cut as lots are rotated as Figure 18
suggests by one corner through 90 degrees. What happens is that at the perpendicular lot
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slope orientation, or 0 degrees rotation, the next to greatest cut volume is incurred,
Figure 18 step 1. As the lot is rotated and corner 2 of the lot cuts further into the
slope, the greatest cut is incurred. At each successive rotation towards 90 degrees the
cut reduces to a minimum until at 90 degrees, or as our rule states, the least cut is
found.
Because of the rather laborious process of calculating the volumes for the two types of
lot rotation systems, balanced cut and fill and pure cut, we have prepared a series of
tables with volumes of earth movement already calculated. See Appendix E.
4.570 COMBINED EFFECTS OF DWELLING LOT CHOICES AND ORIENTATIONS
The previous two sections have presented the most important constraints placed upon sub-
division designs. There are additiona-1 constraints that further limit.the number of possible
designs for barrios.
The first of these combined problems deals with the order of barrio development. It has
been a common practice to locate pedestrian circulation routes on steep slopes in a direc-
tion parallel to the contours. This is done firstly because they are logical places for
commercial establishments to begin as the slopes do not affect the ease of walking along
the contou, and, second that their nearly horizontal runs make logical starting points for
sewer and water lines. This, however, makes for complications when the cut and fill re-
quirements are considered for the lots themselves. Reduced earthwork results when the long
axis of the lot is orientated parallel to the contours. This places fewer lots on any given
run of utility as the "1 Way" and "2 Way Long" cases indicated earlier.
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There is no steadfast method of resolving thi~ conflict, only that there need bp a joint
consideration given to the costs incurred in both infrastructure and the lot development
itself. Generally housing agencies have ignored the cost of developing the lot by saying
that these are non-monetary investments made by the owner himself and that their responsi-
bility ends with providing an inexpensive infrastructure. What has happened in some barrios
is that residents will not contribute to the installation of infrastructure until they at
least have a shelter. Orientations of lots that maximize the efficiency of utilities force
longer shelter development times because increased cut and fill make investments of non-
monetary resources come much later in barrio developmental sequence.
We have also noted that in cases where extreme slope conditions are undergoing development,
infrastructure is only serving one row of houses. Because of the steep slopes, development
directly downhill from the infrastructure takes several years. Las Colinas had this staging
problem throughout. The community must absorb the costs of infrastructure at a time when
it is only half capable of doing so.
There are additional restraints placed upon the location of lots with respect to services.
Steep slopes decrease the allowable depth of lots by limiting the angles at which drainage
pipes can be placed in the ground.
From the above discussion, it is clear that what appeared to be hard and steadfast rules
for efficient subdivision design merely resulted in rules for some aspects of subdivision
design and leaves the ultimate form to the particular site at hand.
The following conclusions result from the previous presentations of lot descriptions:
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Small lots undergo the greatest improvements in efficiency by changes in lot
proportions and/or transverse connector spacing. Table indicates that changes
result in a range of improvement two to three times greater than those over 200
sq. meters.
Small lots improve efficiency fastest by changes in their proportions, and from
going from "2 Way" to "I Way" schemes. Transverse connector spacing improves over-
all subdivision efficiency but at a rate much slower than changes in proportions.
Lots undergo the least cut and fill when their long axis is located parallel to the
contours. This is true regardless of whether or not the lot is leveled by balancing
cut and fill or by pure cuts in the slope.
Although they do not offer balanced distributions of fill and have considerably
higher earthwork requirements, lots that are developed in pure cut are the most
common.
Reductions in lot development time and cost necessitate that their long axis be
located parallel to the contours; this however, is in direct conflict with attempts
to serve more lots with any given amount of infrastructure. It turns out that these
two states must be resolved in the context of the barrio, where real costs can be
applied to each case and a balance arrived at.
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5.000 CONCLUSION
The Growth Pole System is in itself a tentative conclusion to a specific set of physical and
social requirements. By advocating its use we have relied heavily upon the natural energies
that people express for creating and influencing the form of their own living environment.
This approach recognizes that housing is just one of many media for improving the quality
of life. We have not relied on simplified solutions that substitute technological and
modernizing solutions for natural and longer term development processes. Furthermore our
approach has been to determine the requirements of the future by measuring the inadequacies
and potentials of the present.
The authors feel the surface of low income housing development in Colombia has only been
touched here. We feel the most important issue yet unattempted by the environmentalist is
the social costing of physical development. We do feel, however, that the increasing
concern for housing issues on an international basis is Oroviding the first experience to
initiate this work. This international conscience furthermore indicates a more universal
and basic response of men to collaborate in solving problems of growth and progress.
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APPENDIX A
Migration, Urbanization, and Marginality
by Ramiro Cardona Gutieres
Translation of Spanish text describing a possible correlation
between the potential for social change that migrants posses
with increasing levels of urban acculturation.
Director of Social Demographic Studies
Division of Population Studies
Colombia Association of Medical Faculty
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First
The possibility that the new immigrants have in converting themselves into real change agents
capable of taking a real attitude against the existing urban system is very remote, if one
takes into account that these individuals:
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a) are in a complete unstructured situation
b) are satisfying "urgent nee ds"
c) their greatest commitment continues to be with the country of "campo"
d) still they do not perceive the social pyramid because they are not located
at any strata nor do they aspire to pertain to any specific one
e) they have individual disorientations, they do not perceive their conflict
as shared.
Second
The immigrants begin to become potential change agents in an advanced time of this stage:
a) they have perceived in some manner the social pyramid and they have located
themselves in one of the strata
b) they begin the change of individual disorientation to collective disorientation.
They acquire some consciousness of class. It is possible that it is at this
stage that individuals invade, opening to a charismatic leader.
c) more commitment to urban values .than to rural values
Third
It is in this stage when the immigrants offer their greatest potential as agents of social
change:
a) their disorientation is definitely collective. They are.perfectly identified
with urban values. They are conscious of the few channels of access it is
worth pointing out, with the possibility of satisfying their aspirations with
existing means.
b) they have an awareness of the power that their numbers present
c) they have taken a collective action against the existing system and have had
success
d) they perceive the possibility of a greater collective action as a possible and
near fact. They detect how much they have to gain and how little they have to lose.
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Four
The individuals, now old immigrants, begin to lose the potential to which social change
refers:
a) they have invaded with success and have achieved some social mobility. They
have made a considerable investment and have identified more and more with the
social levels immediately above them.
b) if they perceive that there is much to gain, now they perceive that there is
something to lose. Thus the beginning of conservatism.
c) their system of standards and values now has purely urban characteristics.
Their commitment with the rural system is almost nothing, which means to say
that they will not accept returning to the cotntry (a greater aculturation and
a greater perspective in time).
Five
The same tendency as the fourth stage but more intense. Two hypotheses exist in relation
with the possibility that individuals that have invaded and have had success in the action
institutionalize its illegality as part of their process'of aculturation:
a) The first signal that this institutionalization of illegality exists and that
it is very certain that these individuals repeat new illegal acts to gain the
longed for mobility, stimulated by their past experiences. The second signal
that when theseindividuals have invaded with success and have gained some
social mobility, they begin to commit themselves to the existing social system,
because they do not try to go against it. Our observations in the field indicate
to us to accept the second hypothesis.
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APPENDIX B
An open letter to Senor Ramiro Cardona, Director of Socio-Demographic Studies at the Colombian
Association of Medical Faculty, Bogota from Pro-Vivienda, explaining their position in the
design of Barrio Policarpa. The letter is translated in context:
Centro Nacional Pro-Vivienda
Republic de Colombia
Personeria Juridica No. 001458 of 1961
Carrera 14 (Avenida Caracas) NO. 15-42 Telephone 432093
Post Office Box 4008 - Telegraph "Cenaprov"
Some Organizational Aspects of the Barrio Policarpa Salavarrieta
The Centro Nacional Pro-Vivienda and its Center No. 1 of the Barrio Policarpa, realizing
that the solution to the housing problem does not consist in the building of shacks, but in
a continued struggle to improve it continuously, until it is converted into a decent home
for the family, and that in order to be able to achieve that the active participation of
all the inhabitants of the barrio is indispensible, and the ability to look for solutions
to other problems inherent in the dwelling.
In agreement with the development of the program of Center No. 1 of Policarpa and to perform
its function, the barrio has been divided into 14 sectors, arranging with each one of these
sectors a commission that elects its own responsible treasurer, and secretary. These commis-
sions are responsible to the board of directors of the barrio and are those who are given
the task of taking the orientations of the board of directors to the barrio inhabitants,
as well as promote and watch that the decisions and tasks are done that were agreed upon in
the barrio assembly, also in the meetings of each commission the problems that appear are
discussed and decided upon, also that initiatives and propositions are studied to then
present them to the junta or the general assembly of the barrio. There is a person in each
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commission that is given the task of directing meetings, orienting and controlling the people
he is in charge of, to be able to carry out the projects or tasks given by the board of
directors or the general assembly of the commission.
Cultural Commission: it .is in charge of organizing and educating the children and adults
in: music, dance, singing, oratory, and theater. This committee is in charge of planning
with the board of directors the presentations of lectures, artists, movies, plays, etc. In
this work the committee has received scholarships to the district schools for the artists of
the barrio and has contracted the intellectuals, artists, theater groups of national prestige,
to elevate the cultural level in the barrio to the level of all the city's inhabitants.
Committee of Hygiene: this committee is in charge of watching out for the health of all
the residents and in order to do that, to get the collaboration of the Colombia Red Cross,
with the idea of their giving a course in first aid, besides forming a campaign for building
and operating a medical clinic, connected to various doctors that cooperate with the barrio
attending the patients in the barrio clinic.
Committee of Solidarity: is in charge of gathering and delivering the solidarity to the
members that fall ill, to those that have a member of their family die, to those that are
unfortunately jailed for causes related to the organization and the service of the barrio,
to help morally and economically the Pro-Vivienda movement, or workers that ask for help when
they suffer a tragedy or have an important problem.
Committee of Education: is in charge of organizing courses in the literary and the func-
tioning of the primary school, that gets the desks for the students and are used also in
the cultural house for other functions.
Committee of Sports: it is their goal to be in charge of promoting all the programs of
physical education and sports that are present and of interest. It has organized two male
teams of soccer and two female teams, three teams of "tejo," a cycling club and chess teams.
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Committee of Security: previously, each family worked two hours every two weeks within
each of the 14 sectors, now there exis-ts a permanent body for security and they are paid
monthly by the entire barrio. They are responsible for security: they watch for the secur-
ity of the barrio and all its inhabitants in the houses of the night against attack, robbery,
fire, and any unforeseen incidents of any of the residents. Also it is in charge of carrying
out in that time the rulings of the general assembly or the board of directors about the
functioning of bars and the vagrancy of minors. In the hours of the night, the committee has
the authority to solve any problem that appears and can demand the cooperation that might be
needed from any of the barrio members.
Committee of Maintenance: it is present at each assembly and presents how to improve the
streets and the houses, giving an orientation in the form of notes or a demonstration to each
one, to call to the attention to whom it may concern the condition of their dwelling in order
that they build or rebuild, paint or fix up the front of their houses.
Committee of Energy: is the only authority that can make connections, installations or re-
pairs of the power and in this way all the inhabitants will enjoy this service.
Committee of the Aqueduct: is another of the committees that has the sole power to extend
the network, make the necessary installations and repairs, and control the use of the water.
Thanks to this group now all the families have this vital service.
Committee of Sewage Systems: by the aid of various persons, their knowledge of this service
was presented the plans for the construction and the specialization of the personnel of the
commission to develop the sewage installations, perhaps the project of greatest importance
and development for our economic means. This committee is in charge of directing works;
making the ditches, as the technical part is pertinent to collecting as part of the tubes
and installations. Today a third of the barrio has this service and it is still being pro-
moted. The control and the direction is handled by the board of directors, the general
assembly, and the Centro Nacional Pro-Vivienda. The families of the barrio participate in
the implementation of some of the tasks lated out by this committee. How the projects are
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financed: the financing of these work fronts are achieved by the quotas that the inhabi-
tants of the barrio give, and all organized by the board of directors. All of these projects
and services are developed in a free and voluntary way.
How the Leaders are Trained: with the participation of the inhabitants in the different
committee or work fronts, a collective direction is achieved and the permanent overcoming
of the future greater tasks as direction of the Center and the school at the Centro Nacional
Pro-Vivienda. With these forms of evolution we have arrived at a greater stage of organiza-
tion, by all means and the mentality of the inhabitants is constituted in a front of progress
and social change.
Our concepts: Owing to the incapacity and the negligence of the system and also the desire
for progress and improvements of our organization in which we have achieved some of these
methods of organization to present and have now what is the Barrio PolicarpaSalvarrieta.
Against our proposals and because of the achievement of this fact we have been picked by the
Great Press and the reaction to build an "Independent Republic" and other indignities and
commonly affirm those who ignore that the causes of the so-called "marginal" barrios is the
product of the organization of necessity. Those who make us marginal are not ourselves but
the system that separates itself and puts itself at the margin of the social problem.
In agreement with our experience we realize perfectly that the law is not enough, the pro-
mises, the lectures, the proposals in order that the problems solve themselves. This is to
say that what is needed is facts, examples, actions and press.ure from the citizens in order
that all this be a reality. The solution of the housing problem does not consist in gaining
land title, there are those who have it but lack the house. There are others that don't
have it but have a house. There are those that have land but don't do anything to gain a
house, and there are those who don't have title and continue to work for a house. There are
laws to "solve" the housing problem, but they are not applied, for that reason we see no
solution and there are solutions for housing that have been achieved without laws.
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If we take things as they are, fixing the worst of the problems with the existing means,
with housing we push for social justice.
Report of the Executive National Committee
National Center for Housing
197
APPENDIX C
Case Study Data Structure
1. Physical determinants
a. Introduction
1) Physical location
2) Historical retrospect
b. Locality segment characteristics
1) Location in city
2) Site plan
c. Site analysis
1) Topography
a) Slope
b) Vegetation
c) Climate
d) Natural drainage
2) Barrio access
3) Directions of growth and expansion
4) Land uses
a) Residential
b) Circulation
c) Commercial
d) Community space
5) Circulation
a) Streets (automotive and pedestrian)
b) Paths
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6) Infrastructure
a) Light
b) Water
c) Sewage
d) Community space
e) Commnnication
d. Dwelling unit
1) Lot size
2) Constructed area
3) Open area
4) Area/person
5) Room types and sizes
6) Construction Materials
a) Roof
b) Floor
c) Walls and finishes
1. interior
2. exterior
7) Design and developer
8) Design modifications
9) Costs
a) Lot
b) Infrastructure
c) Construction Materials
1. Materials
2. Labor
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d) Payment systems
1. Initial quotas
2. Monthly quotas
3. Interest program
10) Sponsoring agencies
2. Social-political-economic determinants
a. Basic demography
1) Population
a) Age-sex
b) Total families
c) Densities
b. Community organizations
1) Inter-barrio
2) Intra-barrio
3) Barrio to municipality
4) Municipality to barrio
c. Economic processes
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APPENDIX D
Numeric R Charts for- Lot Areas 25-800 Sq. Meters
201
1 WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
AREA RATIO WIDTH UEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
-- - - - ------------------------------------------------------ +--------------------------------------------------------------
1 I25 1/ 1 5.CO 5.00 1 1133 1099 1079 1066 1057 1049 1 2133 2099 2079 2066 2057 204925 1/ 2 3.54 7.07 | 840 807 787 773 764 757 | 1547 1514 1494 1410 1471 146425 1/ 3 2.89 8.66 .710 677 657 644 634 627 1 1288 1254 1234 1221 1211 120425 1/ 4 2.50 10.00 1 633 599 579 566 557 549 I 1133 1099 1079 1066 1057 104925 1/ 5 2.24 11.18 I 580 547 527 513 504 497 I 1027 994 974 961 951 944.25 1/ 6 2.04 12.25 I 541 508 488 474 465 458 I 949 916 896 883 873 86625 1/ 7 1.89 13.23 1 511 477 457 444 435 427 I 889 855 835 822 813 80525 1/ 8 1.77 14.14 I 486 453 433 420 410 403 I 840 807 787 773 764 757
25 1/ S 1.67 15.00 I 466 433 413 400 390 383 I 800 766 746 733 723 716
1 WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
AREA RATIO WICTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200 15 100 125 150 175 200
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 1/ 1 7.07 7.07 840 807 787 773 764 757 1547 1514 1494 1480 1471 146450 1/ 2 5.00 10.00 1 633 599 579 566 557 549 1 1133 1099 1079 1066 1057 104950 1/ 3 4.C8 12.25 I 541 508 488 474 465 458 I 949 916 896 883 873 866
50 1/ 4 3.54 14.14 1 486 453 433 420 410 403 I 840 807 787 773 764 75750 1/ 5 3.16 15.81 I 449 416 396 382 373 366 I 765 732 712 699 689 682
50 1/ 6 2.69 17.32 1 422 388 368 355 345 338 I 710 677 657 644 634 627
50 1/ 7 2.67 18.71 I 400 367 347 333 324 317 1 667 634 614 601 591 584
50 1/ 8 2.50 20.00 1 383 349 329 316 307 299 I 633 599 579 566 557 549
50 1/ 9 2.36 21.21 I 369 335 315 302 292 285 1 604 571 551 538 528 521
1 WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
----------------------------------------------------------------- 4--------------------------------------------------------------
75 1/ 1 8.66 8.66 710 677 657 644 634 627 | 1288 1254 1234 1221 1211 1204
75 1/ 2 6.12 12.25 541 508 488 474 465 458 I 949 916 896 883 873 866
75 1/ 3 5.CO 15.00 1 466 433 413 399 390 383 1 799 766 746 733 723 716
75 1/ 4 4.33 17.32 1 422 388 368 355 345 338 I 710 677 657 644 634 627
75 1/ 5 3.87 19.36 I 391 358 338 324 315 308 6 49 616 596 533 573 566
75 1/ 6 3.54 21.21 1 369 335 315 302 292 285 I 604 571 551 538 528 521
75 1/ 7 3.27 22.91 I 351 318 298 284 275 268 I 569 536 516 503 493 486
75 1/ 8 3.C6 24.49 1 337 304 284 270 261 254 1 541 508 488 474 465 458
75 1/ G 2.89 25.98 1 325 292 272 259 249 242 I 518 484 464 451 442 434
AREA RATIC WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHUR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175
---------------------------------------------------------------------- +--------------------------------------------------------------
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
IC.CO
7.C7
5.77
5.CO
4.47
4.C8
3.78
3.54
3.33
10.00
14.14
17.32
20.00
22.36
24.49
26.46
28.28
30.00
633
486
422
383
356
337
322
310
300
599
453
388
349
323
304
288
276
266
579
433
368
329
303
284
268
256
246
566
420
355
316
290
270
255
243
233
557
410
345
307
280
261
246
233
223
549
403
338
299
273
254
238
226
216
1133
843
710
633
580
541
511
486
466
1099
807
677
599
547
508
477
453
433
1079
787
657
579
527
488
457
433
413
1066
773
644
566
513
474
444
420
400
1057
764
634
557
504
465
435
410
390
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150
1049
757
627
549
497
458
427
403
383
---------------- 4----------------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------
125
125
125
125
125
125,
125
125
125
11.18
7.91
6.45
5.59
5.00
4.56
4.23
3.95
3.73
11.18
15.81
19.36
22.36
25.00
27.39
29.58
31.62
33.54
580
449
391
356
333
315
302
291
282
547
416
358
323
299
282
269
258
249
527
396
338
303
279
262
249
238
229
513
382
324
290
266
249
235
224
215
504
373
315
280
257
239
226
215
206
497
366
308
273
249
232
219
208
199
1027
765
649
580
533
498
471
449
431
994
732
616
547
499
465
438
416
398
974
712
596
527
479
445
418
396
378
961
699
583
513
4066
431
404
382
364
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 10
944
682
566
497
449
415
338
366
348
0 125 150 175 200
---- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +----------------
541 508 488
422 388 368
369 335 315
337 304 284
315 282 262
299 266 246
287 254 234
277 244 224
269 236 216
474
355
302
270
249
233
220
211
202
465
345
292
261
239
223
211
201
193
458
338
285
254
232
216
204
194
186
949
710
604
541
498
466
441
422
405
916
677
571
508
465
433
408
388
372
896
657
551
488
445
413
388
368
352
883 873 866
644 634 627
538 528 521
474
431
399
375
355
3393
465
422
390
365
345
329
458
415
383
358
338
322
200
175 200
951
689
573
504
457
422
395
373
355
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
12.25
E.66
7.07
6.12
5.48
5.00
4.63
4.33
4.08
12.25
17.32
21.21
24.49
27.39
30.00
32.40
34.64
36.74
AREA RATIC WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHURT
75 100 125 15) 175
-4.-- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - ---
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
13.23
9.35
1.64
6.61
5.92
5.40
5.00
4.68
4.41
13.23
13.71
22.91
26.46
29.58
32.40
35.00
37.42
39.69
511
400
351
322
302
287
276
266
259
477
367
318
288
269
254
242
233
225
457
347
298
268
249
234
222
213
205
444
333
284
255
235
220
209
200
192
435
324
275
246
226
211
199
190
183
427
317
268
238
219
204
192
183
175
889
667
569
511
471
441
419
400
385
855
634
536
477
438
408
385
367
351
835
614
516
457
418
388
365
347
331
822
601
503
444
404
375
352
333
318
813
591
493
435
395
365
342
324
309
AREA RATIC WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 1
----------------------- 4-------------------------------------
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
14.14
10.C0
8.16
7.C7
6.32
5.77
5.35
5.00
4.71
14.14
20.00
24.49
28.28
31.62
34.64
37.42
40.00
42.43
486
383
337
310
291
277
266
258
251
453
349
304
276
258
244
233
224
217
433
329
284
256
238
224
213
204
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2 WAY SHORT
50 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
-+----------------------------------------------------------
420
316
270
243
224
211
200
191
184
410
307
261
233
215
201
190
182
174
403
299
254
226
208
194
183
174
167
840
633
541
486
449
422
400
383
369
807
599
508
453
416
338
367
349
335
787
579
488
433
396
368
347
329
315
773
566
474
420
382
355
333
316
302
764
557
465
410
373
345
324
307
292
757
549
458
403
366
338
317
299
285
AREA RATIC WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHURT
75 100 125 150 175
---------------- 4---------------------------------------------4--------- -----------------------------------------------------
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
225
15.00
10.61
8.66
7.50
6.71
6.12
5.67
5.30
5.00
15.00
21.21
25.98
30.00
33.54
36.74
39.69
42.43
45.00
466
369
325
299
282
269
259
251
244
433
335
292
266
249
236
225
217
211
413
315
272
246
229
216
205
197
191
399
302
259
233
215
202
192
184
177
390
292
249
223
206
193
183
174
168
383
285
242
216
199
186
175
167
161
799
604
518
466
431
405
385
369
355
766
571
484
433
398
372
351
335
322
746
551
464
413
378
352
331
315
302
733
538
451
399
364
338
318
302
288
723
528
442
390
355
329
309
292
279
716
521
434
383
348
322
301
285
272
200
805
584
486
427
388
358
335
317
301
200
---------------------------------
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
I WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 203
--- - ---------------- +------------------------------------------------------------. 
- -- - - - - - -- -- - - - -- -
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
15.81
11.18
'.13
7.91
7.C7
6.45
5.98
5.59
5.27
15.81
22.36
27.39
31.62
35.36
38.73
41.83
44.72
47.43
449
356
315
291
274
262
252
245
238
416
323
282
258
241
229
219
211
205
396
303
262
238
221
209
199
191
185
382
290
249
224
208
195
186
178
172
373
280
239
215
198
186
176
168
162
366
273
232
208
191
179
169
161
155
2 WAY SHJRT
75 100 125
765
580
498
449
416
391
372
356
344
732
547
465
416
382
358
339
323
310
712
527
445
396
362
338
319
303
290
150 175
699
513
431
382
349
324
305
290
277
689
504
422
373
339
315
296
280
267
AREA RATIC W IDTH DEPTH
275
275
275
275
275
-275
275
275
275
16.58
11.73
C.57
8.29
7.42
6.77
6.27
5.86
5.53
16.58
23.45
28.72
33.17
37.08
40.62
43.87
46.90
49.75
1 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150
----------------------------------
434
346
307
284
268
256
247
239
233
401
313
274
250
234
223
213
206
200
381
293
254
230
214
203
193
186
180
368
279
240
217
201
189
180
173
167
175 200
358
270
231
207
191
180
171
163
157
351
263
224
200
184
173
163
156
150
682
497
415
366
332,
308
289
273
260
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
736
559
481
434
403
379
361
346
334
703
526
448
401
369
346
327
313
301
683
506
428
381
349
326
307
293
281
669
493
414
368
336
312
294
279
267
660
483
405
358
326
303
285
270
258
653
476
398
351
319
296
277
263
251
AREA RATIO
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
WIDTH DEPTH
17.32
12.25
10.00
8.66
7.75
7.07
6.55
6.12
5.77
17.32
24.49
30.00
34.64
38.73
42.43
45.83
48.99
51.96
1 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
.---------------------------------------------------.--
422
337
299
277
262
251
242
235
229
388
304
266
244
229
217
209
202
196
368
284
246
224
209
197
189
182
176
355
270
233
211
195
184
175
168
162
345
261
223
201
186
174
166
159
153
338
254
216
194
179
167
159
152
146
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125
710
541
466
422
391
369
351
337
325
677
508
433
388
358
335
318
304
292
657
488
413
368
338
315
298
284
272
150 175
644
474
399
355
324
302
234
210
259
634
465
390
345
315
292
275
261
249
200
200
627
458
383
338
308
285
268
254
242
AREA RATIC WICTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175
--- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- +--------------------------------------------------------------
325
325
325
325
325
325
325
325
325
1e.C3
12.75
IC.41
9.01
8.C6
7.36
6.81
6.37
6.01
18.03
25.50
31.22
36.06
40.31
44.16
47.70
50.99
54.08
410
329
293
272
257
246
238
231
225
377
296
260
238
224
213
204
198
192
357
276
240
218
204
193
184
178
172
344
262
226
205
190
179
171
164
159
334
253
217
195
181
170
161
155
149
327
246
210
188
174
163
154
148
142
688
525
453
410
381
359
342
329
318
654
492
420
377
348
326
309
296
284
634
472
400
357
328
306
289
276
264
621
458
386
344
314
293
276
262
251
611
449
377
334
305
283
266
253
242
AREA RATIC WICTH DEPTH
350
350
350
350
350
350
350
350
350
18.71
13.23
IC.80
9.35
8.37
7.64
7.C7
6.61
6*24
18.71
26.46
32.40
37.42
41.83
45.83
49.50
52.92
56.12
1 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
--------------------------------------------------------------
400
322
287
266
252
242
234
227
222
367
288
254
233
219
209
201
194
189
347
268
234.
213
199
189
181
174
169
333
255
220
200
186
175
167
161
155
324
246
211
190
176
166
158
151
146
317
238
204
183
169
159
151
144
139
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125
667
511
441
400
372
351
335
322
311
634
477
408
367
339
318
302
288
278
614
457
388
347
31-9
298
282
268
258
150 175 200
601
444
375
333
305
234
268
255
244
591
435
365
324
296
275
259
246
235
584
427
358
317
289
268
252
238
228
AREA RATIC WICTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY
75 100
SHORT
125 150 175 200
---------------------- 4----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
375
1S,.36
13.69
11.18
9.68
8.66
7.1 I
7.32
6.85
6.45
19.36
27.39
33.54
38.73
43.30
47.43
51.23
54.77
58.09
391
315
282
262
248
238
230
224
219
358
282
249
229
215
205
197
191
186
338
262
229
209
195
185
177
171
166
324
249
215
195
182
172
164
157
152
315
239
206
186
172
162
154
148
143
308
232
199
179
165
155
147
141
136
649
498
431
391
364
344
328
315
305
616
465
398
358
330
310
295
282
272
596
445
378
338
310
290
275
262
252
583
431
364
324
297
277
261
249
238
573
422
355
315
288
267
252
239
229
566
415
348
308
280
260
245
232
222
200
604
442
370
327
298
276
259
246
234
AREA RATIC WIDTH DEPTH
I WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175
---------------- 4---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
2C. Co
14.14
11.55
10.co
8.94
E.16
7.56
7. C7
6.67
20.00
28.28
34.64
40.00
44.72
48.99
52.92
56.57
60.00
383
310
277
258
245
235
227
221
216
349
276
244
224
211
202
194
188
183
329
256
224
204
191
182
174
168
163
316
243
211
191
178
168
161
155
150
307
233
201
182
168
159
151
145
140
299
226
194
174
161
152
144
138
133
633
486
422
383
356
337
322
310
300
599
453
388
349
323
304
288
276
266
579
433
368
329
303
284
268
256
246
566
420
355
316
290
270
255
243
233
557
10
345
307
280
261
246
233
223
AREA RATIC WICTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
425
425
425
425
425
425
425
425
425
20.62
14.58
11.90
10.31
9.22
8.42
7.79
7.29
6.87
20.62
29.15
35.71
41.23
46.10
50.50
54.54
58.31
61.85
375
304
273
254
241
232
225
219
214
342
271
240
221
208
199
191
185
180
322
251
220
201
188
179
171
165
160
309
238
206
187
175
165
158
152
147
299
228
197
178
165
156
148
142
137
292
221
190
171
158
149
141
135
130
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125
618
476
413
375
350
331
316
304
295
585
442
380
342
316
298
283
271
261
5 65
422
360
322
296
278
263
251
241
150 175
551
409
346
309
283
264
250
238
228
542
400
337
299
274
255
240
228
218
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
--- - ---------------- 4------------------------------------------------------------- - -- - - - -- -- -- -- --- -
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175
369 335 315 302 292 285 | 604
299 266 246 233 223 216 I 466
269 236 216 202 193 186 1 405
251 217 197 184 174 167 I 369
238 205 185 172 162 155 I 344
229 196 176 162 153 146 I 325
222 189 169 155 146 139 1 311
216 183 163 149 140 133 I 299
211 178 158 145 135 128 I 290
200
549
403
338
299
273.
254
238
226
216
200
535
392
330
292
266
248
233
221
211
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
21.21
15.00
12.25
1c.61
9.49
8.66
8.02
7.50
7.C7
21.21
30.00
36.74
42.43
47.43
51.96
56.12
60.00
63.64
200
571
433
372
335
310
292
278
266
257
551
413
352
315
290
272
258
246
237
538
399
338
302
277
259
244
233
223
528
390
329
292
267
249
235
223
?14
521
383
322
285
26C
242
228
216
207
AREA RATIC
475
475
475
475
475
475
475
475
475
WICTH DEPTH
21.79
15.41
12.58
1C.90
9.75
8.90
8.24
7.71
7.26
21.79
30.82
37.75
43.59
48.73
53.39
57.66
61.64
65.38
1 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
362
295
265
248
235
226
220
214
209
329
262
232
214
202
193
186
181
176
3C9
242
212
194
182
173
166
161
156
296
228
199
181
169
160
153
147
143
286
219
189
171
159
150
143
138
133
279
212
182
164
152
143
136
131
126
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125
592
457
398
362
338
320
306
295
286
558
424
364
329
305
287
273
262
252
538
404
344
309
285
267
253
242
232
150 175
525
391
331
296
271
253
240
228
219
515
381
322
286
262
244
230
219
210
AREA RATIC WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
----------------------------------------------------------------------- +--------------------------------------------------------------
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
22.36
15.81
12.91
11.18
1c.C0
9.13
8.45
7.91
7.45
22.36
31.62
38.73
44.72
50.00
54.77
59.16
63.25
67. 08
356
291
262
245
233
224
217
212
207
323
258
229
211
199
191
184
179
174
303
238
209
191
179
171
164
159
154
290
224
195
178
166
157
151
145
141
280
215
186
168
157
148
141
136
131
273
208
179
161
149
141
134
129
124
580
449
391
356
333
315
302
291
282
547
416
358
323
299
282
269
258
249
527
396
338
303
279
262
249
238
229
513
332
324
290
266
249
235
224
215
504
373
315
280
257
239
226
215
206
497
366
308
273
249
232
219
208
199
AREA RATIO
525
525
525
525
525
525
525
525
525
I WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
WIDTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
--------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22.91
16.20
13.23
11.46
10.25
9.35
8.66
8.10
7.64
22.91
32.40
39.69
45.83
51.23
56. 12
60.62
64.81
68.74
351
287
259
242
230
222
215
210
206
318
254
225
209
197
189
182
177
172
298
234
205
189
177
169
162
157
152
284
220
192
175
164
155
149
143
139
275
211
183
166
154
146
139
134
129
268
204
175
159
147
139
132
127
122
569
441
385
351
328
311
298
287
278
536 516 503
408 388 375
351 331 318
318 298 284
295 275 261
278 258 244
264 244 231
254 234 220
245 225 212
493
365
309
275
252
235
222
211
2C2
486
358
301
268
245
228
214
204
195
200
508
374
314
279
255
237
223
212
202
-------------------------------
AREA RATIG WIDTH DEPTH
I WAY SHO
75 100 125
------------------------ +--------------------------------
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
23.45
16.58
13.54
11.73
10.49
S.57
e.86
8.29
7.82
23.45
33.17
40.62
46.90
52.44
57.45
62.05
66.33
70.36
346
284
256
239
228
220
213
208
204
313
250
223
206
195
197
180
175
171
293
230
203
186
175
167
160
155
151
150 175 200 75 100 125. 150 175 200
------------------------------------------------------------
279
217
189
173
162
153
147
142
137
270
207
180
163
152
144
137
132
128
263
200
173
156
145
137
130
125
121
559
434
379
346
324
307
294
284
275
526
401
346
313
290
274
261
250
242
506
381
326
293
270
254
241
230
222
493
368
312
279
257
240
227
217
208
483
358
303
270
247
231
218
207
199
476
351
296
263
240.
224
211
200
192
AREA RATIC WIGTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
575
575
575
575
575
575
575
575
575
23.98
16.96
13.84
11.99
1C.72
9.79
9.C6
E.48
7.99
23.98
33.91
41.53
47.96
53.62
58.74
63.44
67.82
71.94
341
280
253
237
226
218
212
207
202
308
247
220
204
193
185
178
173
169
288
227
200,
184
173
165
158
153
149
275
214
187
170
159
151
145
140
136
265
204
177
161
150
142
135
130
126
258
197
170
154
143
135
128
123
119
550
428
374
341
319
303
290
280
272
517
394
340
308
286
270
257
247
239
497
374
320
288
266
250
237
227
219
483
361
307
275
253
236
224
214
205
474
352
297
265
243
227
214
204
196
467
344
290
258
236
220
207
197
189
1 WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
- - -- - 4-----------------------------------------------------4---------------------------------------------------------------
337 304 284 270 261
277 244 224 211 201
251 217 197 184 174
235 202 182 168 159
224 191 171 157 148
216 183 163 149 140
210 177 157 143 134
205 172 152 138 129
201 168 148 134 125
254
194
167
152
141
133
127
122
118
541 508 488 474 465 458
422
369
337
315
299
287
277
269
388
335
304
282
266
254
244
236
368
315
284
262
246
234
224
216
355
302
270
249
233
220
211
202
345
292
261
239
223
211
201
193
338
285
254
232
216
204
194
186
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
1/ 1
1/ 2
1/ 3
1/ 4
1/ 5
1/ 6
1/ 7
1/ 8
1/ 9
24.49
17.32
14.14
12.25
1C.95
1c.c0
9.26
8.66
e.16
24.49
34.64
42.43
48.99
54.77
60.00
64.81
69.28
73.48
2 WAY SHORTRT
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
625
25.00
17.68
14.43
12.50
11.18
10.21
9.45
8.84
8.33
25.00
35.36
43.30
50.00
55. 9C
61.24
66.14
70.71
75.00
333
274
248
233
222
214
208
204
199
299
241
215
199
189
181
175
170
166
279 266 257
221 208 198
195 182 172
179 166 157
169 156 146
161 148 138
155 142 132
150 137 127
146 133 123
249
191
165
149
139
131
125
120
116
533
416
364
333
312
296
284
274
266
499
382
330
299
278
263
251
241
233
479
362
310
279
258
243
231
221
213
466
349
297
266
245
229
217
208
199
457
339
288
257
236
220
208
198
190
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125
---------------------------------------------------------------------- +--------------------------------------------------------------
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
25.50
18.03
14.72
12.75
11.40
10.41
9.64
9.C
e.50
25.50
36.06
44.16
50.99
57.01
62.45
67.45
72.11
76.49
329
272
246
231
221
213
207
202
198
296
238
213
198
187
180
174
169
165
276
218
193
178
167
160
154
149
145
262
205
179
164
154
146
140
136
132
253
195
170
155
144
137
131
126
122
246
188
163
148
137
130
124
119
115
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
1 WAY SHOR
75 100 125 150 175 200
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175
---- - ---------------- 6------------------------------------------------------------- ---- - -- -- -- - -- -- -- -
675
675
675
675
675
675
675
675
675
25. 8
18.37
15. CO
12.99
11.62
1C. 1
9.82
9.19
e.66
25.98
36.74
45.00
51.96
58.09
63.64
68.74
73.48
77.94
325
269
244
229
219
211
206
201
197
292
236
211
196
186
178
172
168
164
272 259 249 242 I
216 202 193 186 I
191 177 168 161 I
176 162 153 146 I
166 152 143 136 I
158 145 135 128 |
152 139 129 122 I
148 134 125 113 1
144 130 121 114 I
518
405
355
325
305
290
278
269
261
484
372
322
292
272
257
245
236
228
464
352
302
272
252
237
225
216
208
451
338
288
259
238
223
212
202
194
442
329
279
249
229
214
202
193
185
200
449
332
280
249
228,
213
201
191
183
150 175 2CC
525
410
359
329
308
293
281
272
264
492
377
326
296
275
260
248
238
230
472
357
306
276
255
240
228
218
210
458
344
293
262
242
226
214
205
197
449
334
283
253
232
217
205
195
187
442
327
276
246
225
210
198
188
180
200
434
322
272
242
222
207
195
186
178
I WAY SHORT
AREA RATIC WICTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200
--- ------------- +--------------------------------------------------------------
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
700
26.46
1E.71
15.28
13.23
11.83
IC .80
IC.00
9.35
8.82
26.46
37.42
45.83
52.92
59.16
64.81
70.00
74.83
79.37
322
266
242
227
217
210
204
200
196
288
233
209
194
184
177
171
166
162
268
213
189
174
164
157
151
146
142
255
200
175
161
151
143
138
133
129
246
190
166
151
141
134
128
123
120
238
183
159
144
134
127
121
116
112
1 WAY SHORT
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200
--- ------------ 4------------------------------------------------------------
725
725
725
725
725
725
725
725
725
26.93
19.04
15.55
13.46
12.04
iC .99
10.18
9.52
8.98
26.93
38.08
46.64
53.85
60.21
65.95
71.24
76.16
80.78
319
264
240
226
216
209
203
198
195
285
231
207
192
183
175
170
165
161
265
211
187
172
163
155
150
145
141
252
197
173
159
149
142
136
132
128
242
188
164
149
140
132
127
122
119
235
181
157
142
133
125
120
115
111
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
511
400
351
322
302
287
276
266
259
477
367
318
288
269
254
242
233
225
457
347
298
268
249
234
222
213
205
4,+4
333
234
255
235
220
209
200
192
435
324
275
246
226
211
199
190
183
427
317
268
238
219
204
192
183
175
2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200
4-------------------------------------------------
50 4
395
347
319
299
284
273
264
257
471
362
314
285
266
251
240
231
223
451
342
294
265
246
231
220
211
203
438
329
231
252
232
218
207
197
190
428
319
271
242
223
208
197
188
180
421
312
264
235
216
201
190
181
173
1 WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
----------- ------------------------------------------------------ 4---------------------------------------------------------------
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
27.39
19.36
15.81
13.69
12.25
11.18
10.35
9.68
9. 13
27.39
38.73
47.43
54.77
61.24
67.08
72.46
77.46
82.16
315
262
238
224
214
207
202
197
194
282
229
205
191
181
174
169
164
160
262
209
185
171
161
154
149
144
140
249
195
172
157
148
141
135
131
127
239
186
162
148
138
131
126
121
118
232
179
155
141
131
124
119
114
110
498
391
344
315
296
282
271
262
255
465
358
310
282
263
249
238
229
221
445
338
290
262
243
229
218
209
201
431
324
277
249
229
215
204
195
138
422
315
267
239
220
206
195
186
178
415
308
260
232
213
199
198
179
171
1 WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
AREA RATIO WICTH DEPTH 75 100 125 150 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
------------------------- 4.--------------------------------------------4.---------------------------------------------------------------
775
775
775
775
775
775
775
775
775
27.84
19.69
16.07
13.92
12.45
11.37
IC.52
9.84
9.28
27.84
39.37
48.22
55.68
62.25
68.19
73.65
78.74
83.52
312
260
237
223
213
206
201
196
193
279
227
203
189
180
173
167
163
159
259
207
183
169
160
153
147
143
139
246
193
170
156
146
139
134
130
126
236
184
160
146
137
130
125
120
117
229
177
153
139
130
123
117
113
109
492
387-
340
312
293
279
269
260
253
459
354
307
279
260
246
235
227
219
439
334
287
259
240
226
215
207
199
425
320
274
246
227
213
202
193
186
416
311
264
236
217
203
192
184
176
409
304
257
229
210.
196
185
177
169
AREA RATIO WIDTH DEPTH
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
28.28
20.00
f. 33
14.14
12.65
11.55
10.69
ic.co
9.43
28.28
40.00
48.99
56.57
63.25
69.28
74.83
80.00
84.85
1 WAY SHORT 2 WAY SHORT
75 100 125 150 175 200 75 100 125 150 175 200
+---------------------------------------------------------4.------------------
310
258
235
221
212
205
200
195
192
276
224
202
188
179
172
166
162
158
256
204
182
168
159
152
146
142
138
243
191
168
155
145
138
133
129
125
233
182
159
145
136
129
123
119
116
226
174
152
138
129
122
116
112
108
486
383
337
310
291
277
266
258
251
453
349
304
276
258
244
233
224
217
433
329
284
256
238
224
213
204
197
420
316
270
243
224
211
200
191
134
410
307
261
233
215
201
190
182
174
403
299
254
226
208
194
183
174
167
APPENDIX E
CUT AND FILL CHARTS FOR LOTS ROTATED ABOUT THEIR CENTROID AND CORNER
202
SLOPE ANGLE FOR LOT CUT OR FILL VOLUMES = 5.00
------------------------ +----------------.----+----------------.-----+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------
VOLUMES OF CUT ANn FILL RFGUIRED AT 0 30 60 AND 90 DEGREES (LOTS ROTATE ABOUT CENTROID)
LOT WIDTH
LOT DEPTH +---------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------
I 3 I 4 1 5 1 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 1 10 I 11 1 12 I
4-----------.-------------------------------- -------------------------------------- 4----------------4----------------4-------------- -------------------------------- 4
5 I 1 11 1 11 1 11 2 21 2 21 2 21 2 31 3 31 3 41 3 51
I 1 01 1 11 1 11 2 21 2 31 3 31 4 41 5 51 6 71 7 81
4-------------4----------------4--------------------------.-------.------------------------4--------------------------------------------------------------------
6 I I 11 2 11 2 21 2 21 3 31 3 31 4 41 4 51 4 -51 5 61
1 1i 1 11 2 21 2 21 3 31 4 41 5 51 6 71 7 81 8 91
4------------------.------------------------------------- --- 4------------4-------------------------------4-------------- -4------------------------------4
7 I 2 11 2 21 3 21 3- 31 4 41 4 41 5 51 5 61 6 71 6 71
I 1 11 1 11 2 21 3 31 4 41 5 51 6 61 7 81 8 91 10 111
4 --------- 4--------4--------4---------------4----------------4.---------------------------------4----------------4.-------------- -4---------------4---------------4
8 I 2 21 3 31 3 31 4 41 5 51 6 51 6 61 7 71 8 81 A 91
I 1 11 2 I1 2 21 3 31 4 41 5 61 7 71 A 91 10 111 11 131
4 --------- 4--------4----4--------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
9 -1 3 21 4 31 4 41 5 51 6 61 7 71 8 81 9 91 10 101 11 111
I 1 11 2 21 3 71 4 41 5 51 6 61 8 81 9 101 11 121 13 141
4.---------.------4 -------- 4----------------4------4-------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
10 1 3 31 4 41 5 51 7 61 8 71 9 81 10 91 11 11 12 121 13 131
2 11 3 21 3 31 4 41 6 51 7 71 9 Q1 10 111 12 131 15 161
4--------------4--------4--------.----------------4.---------------4----------------.---------------4-------------- -4---------------------------------------------4
11 1 4 31 5 51 7 61 8 71 9 81 11 101 12 i1 13 131 15 141 16 161
I 2 i 3 21 4 31 5 41 6 61 8 81 10 101 12 121 14 151 16 171
- 4-------.------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4.4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4
12 I 5 41 6 61 8 71 9 81 11 101 13 121 14 131 16 151 17 171 19 181
SI 3 11 4 21 5 31 6 51 7 61 9 81 11 11 13 131 15 1-61 18 191
4-------------4--------4--------.----------------4----------------4---------------4----------------4------------- --------------- -4---------------4---------------4
13 1 6 si 7 61 9 81 11 101 13 121 15 131 17 151 18 171 20 19) 22 211
I 3 i 4 21 5 41 7 51 8 71 10 91 12 121 14 141 17 171 20 201
- 4---------.--------4----------------.----------------4----------------+----------------4-------4----------------+----------------------------------
14 I 6 61 9 81 11 9) 13 ill 15 131 17 151 19 181 21 ?01 24 2?1 26 241
1 3 11 5 21 6 41 8 61 9 71 12 101 13 121 16 151 19 191 22 221
4--------------------------------4--------4--------4---------------4.---------------4----------------4-------------- --.---------------------------- 4---------------4
15 I 7 61 10 91 12 111 15 131 17 151 20 181 22 201 25 231 27 251 30 281
S 4 11 5 31 7 41 9 61 11 81 13 101 15 131 18 161 20 201 24 241
4.------------.--------.-------4----------------4----------------4------4----------------------------------------------------4-----------------1----------------
I 16 1 8 71 11 101 14 121 17 151 20 171 22 201 25 231 28 251 31 281 34 311
1 4 21 6 31 8 41 10 61 12 91 14 1l1 17 141 19 171 22 211 26 - 251
-----------.---------------------------- 4.---------------4.--------------4--------------------------------4-------------- -4---------------4---------------
17 I 9 8- 13 i1 16 141 19 171 22 201 25 231 28 261 32 291 35 321 38 351
I 5 21 7 31 9 51 11 71 13 91 16 121 18 151 21 191 24 221 28 771
4---------------------------------4--------4-------------------------------------------------------------------------4-------------- -4---------------4---------------
18 I 11 91 14 121 18 161 21 191 25 721 28 251 32 291 35 321 39 351 42 391
1 5 21 7 31 10 51 12 71 14 101 17 131 20 161 23 201 26 241 30 28)
4------------4--------4------------4----------------4------------------4------------ ---- 4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
19 I 12 101 16 14) 20 171 24 211 28 241 32 281 36 321 39 351 43 39) 47 431
I 6 21 8 31 11 51 13 71 16 101 19 131 2? 171 26 211 29 251 33 301
4--------------4----------------------------------------.--------.---------------4----------------4-------------- -4---------------------------------------------4
70 I 13 i1 17 151 22 191 26 231 31 ?71 39 311 39 351 44 39) 48 431 5? 481
I 7 21 9 31 1? 51 14 8I 17 111 21 141 24 181 2A 221 37 261 35 311
4---------------+---------------4.--------.--------.---------------4.---------------4----------------4-------------- -4---------------------------------------------4
71 I 14 131 19 171 24 211 29 251 34 301 39 341 43 391 49 431 53 481 SR 9?1
I 7 21 10 41 13 61 16 81 19 ill 22 151 26 IQ1 30 231 34 81 3c) 33)
4---------------4--------4 -----.------------------------------------------------------------------ +-------------- -4--------------+-----------------------------
?7 16 141 21 181 26 231 3? 281 37 331 42 371 48 421 93 471 8 ,21 63 r71
1 8 7 i 41 14 61 17 91 21 171 24 151 28 141 37 241 1 7Q1 42 351
SlOPE ANGLE FOR LOT CUT OR FILL VOLUMES = 20.00
------------ -- ----------------------------------------
4----------------4----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------
VOLUMES OF CUT AND FILL REGUIPRED AT 0 30 60 AND 90 DEGREES (LOTS ROTATED AROUT CENTPOTD)
LOT WIDTH
LOT DEPTH +------------+----------------- -------------------------- +----------+----------+----------+----------------------
1 3 1 4 I 5 I 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 1 10 1 11 1 1? I
----- 4........-4----------.-- -------------- 4----------- ----------------- ----------------- 4-------------- -4---------------4---------------4
5 I 3 31 5 41 6 61 7 71 8 91 9 101 10 121 11 141 13 161 14 19I
I. 1 2 21 4 41 5 61 8 81 10 111 13 151 16 181 20 231 24 281 29 331
-------- ----------- 4- ------ 4--------------4--------------------------------- - ------------------------- -4---------------4---------------4
6 1 5 41 7 61 8 81 10 101 11 121 13 141 15 161 16 191 18 211 20 241
1 3 21 5 41 7 71 9 101 12 131 16 171 20 221 24 271 29 331 35 391
------------------------ .- ------------------- 4-----------------4---------------------------------4-------------- -4------------------------ ------- 4
7 I 7 61 9 81 11 101 13 131 16 151 18 181 20 211 22 241 25 271 27 311
I 4 31 6 51 8 81 11 111 15 161 19 201 24 261 29 321 35 391 41 461
4.---------.-------.----------4---------+----------------4---------4----------------4----------------4----------------------------------4----------------
a I 9 8I 12 101 15 131 17 161 20 191 23 231 26 261 29 301 32 341 35 381
1 5 31 7 61 10 91 13 131 17 181 22 231 28 291 33 361 40 441 47 521
4-----------------------4- - - ------ --- --.------ ---- 4--------------------------------- - 4-------------4--------------4----------------4.
9 I 11 101 15 131 18 171 22 201 26 241 29 281 33 321 37 371 41 411 44 461
1 6 41 9 71 12 101 16 151 20 201 26 261 32 331 38 411 46 501 54 591
4.-----------+----4----------------4-------------4----------------4----------------4---------------------4-----------------------------------------
10 I 14 121 18 161 23 201 27 251 32 291 36 341 41 391 45 441 50 501 55 551
I 7 41 11 71 14 111 18 161 23 221 29 291 36 371 43 451 52 551 61 651
4----------.----- 4 ----------------- 4----------------4---------4----------------4----------------4--------------------------------------------------
11 1 17 141 22 191 28 241 33 301 39 351 44 411 50 461 55 531 61 591 66 651
1 9 SI 13 81 17 131 22 181 27 251 33 321 40 411 49 501 58 611 68 721
4-------------4--------4----------------+-------4.---------------+-------------- -.--------------- 4-------------- -4---------------+-----------------------------
12 I 20 171 26 231 33 291 39 351 46 411 52 481 59 551 65 621 72 691 79 761
I 11 51 15 91 19 141 25 201 30 271 37 351 45 441 54 551 64 661 75 791
4------------4--------4..-----------4---------- ----- 4----------------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4-----------------1----------------
13 1 23 201 31 271 38 341 46 411 54 481 61 561 69 641 77 721 85 801 92 881
1 12 SI 17 91 22 151 28 211 35 291 42 381 50 481 60 591 71 721 8? 851
4------------ - ----------- 4----------------------4------------4--------- 4--------- ----.------------- 4-------------- -4---------------4---------------4
14 I 27 231 36 311 45 391 53 471 62 561 71 641 80 731 89 821 98 911 107 1011
I 14 61 19 101 25 161 32 231 39 311 48 411 56 521 66 641 78 771 90 921
4 --------- 4- --.------ 4-----4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
15 I 31 271 41 361 51 451 61 541 72 641 82 741 92 831 102 941 113 1041 123 1151
I 16 61 22 Ill 29 171 36 251 44 331 53 441 62 551 73 681 85 831 99 9RI
4--------------.------4----------------. 4--------4----------------------------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
16 1 35 301 47 411 58 511 70 621 81 721 93 831 105 941 116 1061 128 1181 140 1301
I 18 71 25 121 32 181 40 261 49 361 59 471 70 591 8o 731 93 881 107 1051
4.------------.------------4-------------4------ ---------- 4----------------------4----- ----------- 4------------------------------------------ ------4.4
17 I ' 39 -341 53 461 66 581 79 691 92 821 105 941 118 1061 131 1191 145 1321 158 1451
1 20 71 28 121 36 191 45 281 54 381 65 491 77 631 87 771 101 941 116 1111
4---------------4--------4--------4----------------4.---------------4.--------------4--------------------------------4-------------- -4---------------4---------------4
18 I 44 381 59 511 74 651 88 781 103 911 118 ICsi 133 1191 147 1331 162 1471 177 1621
1 23 71 31 131 40 201 50 291 60 401 71 521 84 661 98 821 110 991 126 1181
4-------------------------------------------------------------------4.---------------4----------------4-------------- -4---------------------------------------------4
19 I 49 431 66 571 82 721 98 871 115 1011 131 1171 148 1321 164 1471 181 1631 197 1791
1 25 81 34 141 44 221 55 311 66 421 78 551 92 701 106 861 119 1051 136 1241
4.------------.--------.--------.---------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
20 1 55 471 73 631 91 801 109 961 127 .1121 146 1291 164 1461 182 1631 200 1801 21P 1981
I 28 81 38 151 49 231 60 331 72 451 85 581 100 741 115 911 132 1101 146 1311
4----------------4--------4--------.----------------4.---------------4------------4--------------4------------------------------------------------.---------------
I 21. 1 60 521 80 701 100 881 120 1051 140 1241 160 1421 180 1601 201 1791 721 1981 241 2171
1 31 91 42 151 53 241 66 341 79 471 93 611 108 771 175 951 142 1161 16? 1381
4--------------------------------.------------------------------------------------4--------------------------------4-------------- -4---------------4---------------4
22 I 66 571 88 771 110 961 13? 1161 154 1351 176 1551 198 1761 220 1961 24? 2171 264 2381
1 34 91 46 161 58 251 72 361 86 491 101 641 117 811 134 1001 153 1211 174 1441
SLOPE ANGLE FOR LOT CUT OR FILL VOLUMES = 40.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +--------------+----------------+---------------------------------
VOLUMES OF CUT AND FILL REGUIRED AT 0 30 60 AND 90 DEGRFFS (LOTS ROTATED ABOUT CENTROID)
LOT WIDTH
LOT DEPTH ------------------ ------------------------- +--------------------------------+----------+----------------------+
1 3 1 4 1 5 9 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 1 10 1 11 1 12 1
4 -----------------------------------------------.--------.-------------- 4--------------- ----------------- +-------------- --------------------------------4
5 9 8 71 10 101 13 131 16 161 18 201 21 241 24 271 26 321 29 381 31 441
9 5 SI 8 81 12 131 17 191 23 261 30 341 38 421 46 529 56 631 66 751
------------------------ 4-----------~- -- 4-------------4-------4----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------4----------------
6 1 11 109 15 141 19 181 23 221 26 271 30 321 34 371 38 431 42 491 45 561
9 7 61 11 101 16 161 22 231 29 311 37 401 46 511 56 631 68 761 80 919
------------------- *-------------- --- ------- 4-- ------ 4----*------------------------------4-----------------4---------------4---------------
7 1 15 141 21 199 26 249 31 291 36 351 41 411 46 481 51 559 56 639 6? 721
1 9 71 14 129 19 189 26 269 34 ' 361 44 471 54 599 67 739 80 8991 94 1061
4------------4--------4------4---------------4---------------4---------4----------------4----------------4----------------+----------------+----------------
8 20 189 27 241 34 311 40 371 47 451 54 521 60 601 67 691 74 781 80 881
1 12 89 17 131 23 211 31 301 40 411 51 549 63 681 77 841 92 1011 109 1211
4.-------------4----------------4--------- +---4--------------- 4-----4----------------4.----------------+----------------4----------------
9 9 - 25 221 34 301 42 381 51 471 59 551 68 651 76 741 85 851 93 951 102 1071
1 14 89 21 151 28 249 36 341 47 461 59 601 73 761 88 941 105 1141 124 1361
4------------4-------------4.4.4-------------4----------------4--------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
10 1 31 289 42 371 52 471 63 571 73 681 84 781 94 901 105 1021 115 1151 126 1281
1 17 91 25 171 33 261 42 381 54 -511 67 671 83 851 100 1051 119 1271 140 1511
4 --------- 4--------4----------------4----------------4----------------4------------------4-----4----------------4----------------4----------------
11 1 38 331 51 451 63 561 76 681 89 811 101 941 114 1071 127 1211 140 1361 152 1511
9 21 101 29 181 39 291 50 421 61 561 76 741 93 931 112 1159 133 1409 156 1661
---------------------------------- 4 - ------------ 4--------- ---- 4------------- ----------------- 4-------------- ----------------- 4---------------+
12 1 45 409 60 531 75 671 91 811 106 961 121 1111 136 1261 151 1421 166 1591 181 1761
1 24 111 34 209 45 311 57 451 70 621 86 801 104 1021 125 1?61 148 1521 173 8191
4----------------4----4--------------4----------------4-------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
13 1 53 461 71 621 89 789 106 951 124 1111 142 1291 159 1461 177 1659 195 1841 213 2031
1 28 121 39 221 51 341 65 491 81 671 96 871 116 1101 138 1361 163 1651 190 1961
4.------------.---------------4----------------4----------------4-------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
14 1 62 541 82 721 103 919 123 1099 144 1291 164 1481 185 1691 205 1891 226 2111 247 2331
I 32 131 45 231 58 371 74 531 91 721 111 941 129 1199 153 1471 179 1781 208 2111
4.------------.--------4-----4----------------4.----------------4----------------4-----4---------------- 4.----------------4----------------+----------------
15 1 71 621 94 831 118 1041 141 1251 165 1471 189 1701 212 1921 236 2161 259 2401 283 2651
9 37 141 51 251 66 391 83 571 102 779 123 1019 142 1271 168 1571 196 1909 227 226
4- ------ 4--------4 - -------------- 4----------------.----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4---------- ------ 4----------------
9 16 9 80 701 107 941 134 1181 161 1421 188 1671 215 1921 241 2181 268 2441 2Q5 2711 322 2999
1 42 151 57 279 74 421 93 601 113 821 136 1071 161 1361 184 1681 214 2039 247 2411
4-----------4--------.-------------4---------------------------- --- 4----------- --- 4-------------------------------4-------------- -4--------------------------:----+
9 17 1 91 791 121 1061 151 1331 182 1601 212 1881 242 2161 273 2451 303 2741 333 3041 363 3351
I 47 161 64 291 83 451 103 649 125 879 150 1149 177 1449 201 1781 233 2161 268 2571
4------------4-----------------------4--------.-------.----------------.-------------- ----------------- 4-------------- -4------------------------------4
18 102 891 136 1191 170 1491 204 1791 238 2109 272 2421 306 2749 340 3061 374 3391 408 3731
1 53 171 72 301 92 479 114 681 138 921 165 1211 194 1531 225 1899 253 ?289 290 2721
4.----------------- .---------4----------------4. 4- ---- --------------- ----------------- 4-------------- -4---------------.-----------------------------4
9 19 1 114 999 151 1321 189 1661 227 1999 265 2341 303 2691 341 3049 378 3401 416 3761 454 4131
1 58 181 80 321 102 501 126 721 152 981 180 1271 211 1611 245 1999 274 7411 313 2871
4-------------4--------4--------4----------------+--------------4---------------4------------ ---- 4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
I 70 1 126 1091 168 1461 210 1831 252 2211 293 2591 335 2971 377 3361 419 3751 461 4151 503 4561
1 65 199 88 341 112 521 138 751 166 1031 197 1349 230 1701 265 2109 304 2541 337 3C21
4------------4--------4----------4----------------4------------ ---- 4----------------4------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
21 1 139 1211 185 1611 231 2021 277 2431 324 2851 370 3271 416 3691 46? 4131 508 4561 555 5011
I 71 201 96 351 123 551 151 799 181 1081 214 1411 249 1781 287 2201 328 2661 373 3171
4--------------4---------------------------------------.--------.--------------4--------------------------------4-------------- -4------------------------------4
22 1 152 1321 203 1771 254 2211 304 2671 355 3121 406 35891 457 4051 507 4521 558 4991 60q 5489
1 78 219 105 371 134 5891 165 831 197 1131 732 1481 26Q 1871 310 2119 353 2799 400 337
SLOPF ANGLE FOR LOT CUT OR FILL VOLUMES = 5.00
------------ 4--------4--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+----------------+---------------------------------
VOLUMES OF CUT REQUIRED AT 0 30 60 AND 90 DEGREES (LOTS ROTATED AROUT ONE CCPNER)
I LOT WIDTH
LOT DEPTH +------------ -- ---------------------- u----------------------------------------- --------------
I 3 I 4 I 5 1 6 I 7 1 8 1 9 1 10 I 11 1 12 1
--------------------- ---------------------- 4--------------4-----------------4-------------- - -- - -- - -- - -- - --------------- -4------------------------------
5 I 3 41 4 61 5 71 7 101 8 121 9 15, 10 171 11 201 12 241 13 271
I 3 21 5 31 7 51 10 81 13 111 16 141 20 181 24 221 29 261 34 311
--------------------- 4-----------4---------------4-------------4----------------4----------4----------------4----------------4----------------4
6 I 5 51 6 81 8 101 9 131 11 161 13 191 14 231 16 271 17. 311 19 351
I 4 21 7 41 10 71 13 91 17 131 21 171 25 211 31 261 36 321 42 381
4.------------.------.-...-------------..----4----4--- -------------------------------------------- 4- ---------------
7 I 6 71 9 101 11 131 13 171 15 201 17 251 19 291 21 341 24 391 26 441
I 6 31 9 51 12 81 16 111 20 151 26 201 31 251 37 311 44 371 51 441
------------ 4----------------4--------------4----------------4------------ ---- 4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
8 I 8 91 11 121 14 161 17 211 20 261 22 311 25 361 28 421 31 481 34 541
7 31 10 61 15 91 19 131 25 171 31 221 37 281 44 351 52 421 60 .501
4-------------4--------4-------...----------------------------------4.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 1 11 111 14 151 18 201 21 251 25 311 28 371 32 441 35 501 39 581 42 651
8 41 13 61 17 101 23 141 29 191 36 251 44 321 52 391 61 481 70 571
4------------4--------4-------------4---------------4----------------4----------------4-----4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
10 I 13 131 17 191 22 241 26 311 31 371 35 441 39 521 44 601 48 681 52 7711 10 41 15 71 20 ill 27 161 34 211 42 281 50 351 60 441 70 531 81 631
4.------------.--------.------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4-------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
11 I 16 161 21 221 26 291 32 361 37 441 42 521 48 611 53 701 58 791 63 901
1 12 41 17 81 24 121 31 171 39 241 48 311 58 391 68 481 79 581 92 691
4--------------------------4 -.--------------- 4..-------- --- 4-------------4---------------.---------------4-------------- -4---------------4--------------*4
12 1 19 191 25 261 31 341 38 421 44 511 50 601 57 701 63 811 69 921 76 1031
1 14 51 20 81 27 131 35 191 44 261 54 341 65 431 77 521 90 631 103 761
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 4---------------4----------------4-------------- -4---------------4---------------
13 I 22 221 30 301 37 391 44 491 52 591 59 691 67 811 74 921 81 1051 89 1181
I 16 51 23 91 31 141 40 201 50 281 61 361 73 461 86 571 100 691 115 821
4------------4----------------- --------------------------- 4--------- -+- 4.-- ------------.----------- -4--------------------------------------------
14 I 26 251 34 351 43 451 51 561 60 671 69 791 77 921 86 1051 94 1191 103 1331
1 18 61 26 101 35 151 45 221 56 301 68 391 82 501 96 611 Ill 741 128 881
4------------4--------4---------------.---------------.4.---------------4----------- ---------------- 4----------------4---------------------------------4---------------
15 I 30 291 39 391 49 511 59 631 69 761 79 891 89 1031 98 1181 108 1331 118 1491
1 20 61 29 101 39 161 50 241 62 321 76 421 90 531 106 661 123 791 141 941
4-------------4--------4--------.----------------4.----------------.---------------4--------------------------------4-------------- -4---------------4---------------
16 I 34 321 45 441 56 571 67 711 78 851 90 1001 101 1161 112 1321 123 1491 134 1671
1 22 61 32 ill 43 171 55 251 69 341 84 451 9q 571 117 701 135 851 154 1011
----------- 4----------------+---------4----------------4 .4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
17 I 38 -361 51 501 63 641 76 791 88 951 101 1111 114 1291 126 1471 139 1651 152 1851
I 25 71 36 121 48 191 61 271 76 361 92 481 109 601 128 741 147 90, 169 1071
4----------------------.------4--------------------------------------------------4---------------4------------------------------- -4----------------------------------
18 I 42 401 57 551 71 711 85 881 99 1051 113 1231 127 1421 142 1621 156 1831 170 2041
I 27 71 39 131 52 201 67 281 83 391 100 501 119 641 139 791 160 951 183 1131
4---------------4---------------------------------------------4---------------4----------------4-------------- 
-4---------------------------------------------
19 47 451 63 611 79 791 95 971 110 1161 126 1361 142 1571 158 1781 174 2011 189 22411 30 71 43 131 57 211 73 301 90 411 109 531 129 671 151 831 174 1011 14P 1201
4.------------.--------.--------.---------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
20 1 52 491 70 681 87 871 105 1071 122 1271 140 1491 157 1721 175 1951 192 2201 21C 2451I 33 81 47 141 63 221 80 311 98 431 118 561 140 711 161 871 188 1061 214 1261
4---------------.---------------------------------------.--------.---------------4----------------4-------------- 
----------------------------------------------- 4
21 I 58 541 77 741 96 951 116 1171 135 1391 154 1631 174 1871 193 2131 212 2391 231 2661
I 36 A1 51 151 68 231 86 331 106 451 128 591 151 741 176 921 202 1111 230 1321
4---------------.---------------------------------------.--------.---------------4----------------4-------------- 
-4---------------------------------------------4
22 1 63 59, 85 811 106 1041 127 1271 148 1521 169 1771 190 2041 212 2311 233 2601 254 28911 39 91 56 151 74 241 93 351 115 471 138 621 163 781 189 061 217 1161 247 1391
SLOPF ANGLE FOR LOT CUT OR FILL VOLUMES = 20.00
-------------------------------------- 
-- 4-------------4--------------- ----------------- 4-------------- --------------------------------
VOLUMES OF CUT REQUIRED AT 0 30 60 AND 90 DEGRFFS (LOTS ROTATFD ABCUT ONF CCRNER)
LOT WIDTH
I t.OT DEPTH +-------------------------------------+-------+-----------------+------------------------------- ---------------- +
3 1 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 1 8 I 9 I 10 1 11 1 12 1
-4---------------4---------------- 4 *.----------------- . ----------------- +----------------4----------------
I 5 I 14 161 '18 231 23 311 27 401 32 501 36 611 41 721 45 851 50 981 55 1131
1 14 81 22 151 31 231 42 331 55 451 69 58 84 741 101 911 120 1101 141 1311
4-----------4---- ------- -- 4---------- ---------- *  -------- ----------- --- -------------------------- 4---------------
6 1 20 221 26 311 33 421 39 541 46 661 52 801 59 951 65 1111 72 .1281 79 1471
I 18 101 28 171 40 271 54 391 69 531 87 701 106 881 127 1C91 150 1321 175 1571
4.-------------------4-------4---- --- 4---- -------- ~----.----.----4--------.--------.
I 7 I 27 291 36 411 45 551 53- 691 62 851 71 1021 80 1211 89 1411 98 1621 107 1841
I 23 111 35 201 50 371 66 461 85 621 106 811 129 1031 155 1271 182 1541 212 1831
4------.---- ----- ---- 4------------------- ------ - - ----------- +-------- ----------------- 4---------------
I 8 1 35 371 47 521 58 691 70 871 81 1061 93 1271 105 1501 116 1741 128 1991 140 2261
1 29 131 43 231 61 361 80 521 102 711 127 931 154 1181 184 1461 217 1761 251 210.1
-- ---- ---- --- - -  --- ---- -- -------- 
-- ----- -- - ----------- *4-------- -* 4----------+-----------------------------+
9 - I 44 461 59 641 74 841 88 1061 103 1291 118 1541 133 1811 147 2091 162 2391 177 2711
1 35 151 52 261 72 411 95 591 121 801 150 1051 181 1331 215 1641 253 1981 293 2361
4--------------4---------------- 4------------- --------------------- -- ---------------- 4.----------------+----------------4----------------
10 1 55 551 73 781 91 1011 109 1271 127 1551 146 1841 164 2151 182 2481 200 2831 218 3201
1 41 161 62 291 85 451 111 651 141 891 174 1161 209 1471 248 1821 291 2201 336 2621
4-------------------.--------------------- -------------- 4---------------------- ------------------------- ----------------- 4---------------
11 I 66 661 88 921 110 1201 132 1501 154 1821 176 2161 198 2531 220 2911 242 3311 264 3731
1 49 181 72 321 98 501 128 721 162 981 199 1281 239 1621 283 2001 331 2421 382 2881
4---------------4.------------------------------------------------+---------------4--------------------------------+-------------- ----------------- 4---------------4
1 12 I 79 781 105 1081 131 1411 157 1751 183 2121 210 2511 236 2931 262 3361 288 3821 314 4291
1 56 201 83 351 113 551 147 791 184 1071 226 1401 271 1771 320 2181 373 2641 429 3141
4.------------.----4---------------. 4------ --------- 4---------- ------ 4------------- --- 4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
I 13 1 92 911 123 1251 154 1631 184 2021 215 2441 246 2891 277 3351 307 3841 338 4361 369 4901
I 65 711 94 381 128 591 166 851 208 1161 254 1511 304 1921 358 2361 417 2861 479 3411
*--------+--------.-----------4----------------4----------------4---------4----------------4.-------------4----------------4----------------+----------------
I 14 I 107 1041 143 1441 178 1861 214 2311 250 2791 285 3281 321 3811 356 4361 392 4941 42P 5541
I 73 231 107 411 144 641 186 921 233 1251 284 1631 339 2061 399 2551 463 3081 531 3671
---------------- +--------------4--------------------------------- ------------ --- 4---------------4----------------+-------------- -4---------------4---------------4
s15 123 1191 164 1641 205 2111 246 2621 286 3151 327 3711 368 4291 409 4911 450 5551 491 6221
1 83 251 120 441 161 681 208 981 259 1341 315 1751 376 2211 441 2731 511 3301 586 3931
4.------------.-----------------------4----------------4----------------4---------4-------4---- ------------ 4----------------4----------------+----------------
I 16 1 140 1341 186 1851 233 2381 279 2941 326 3541 373 4161 419 4811 466 5491 512 6201 559 6931
1 93 261 133 471 179 731 230 1051 286 1431 348 1861 414 2361 485 2911 561 3521 642 4191
-------------------------------------- 
-----------.-------- ----------------- 4----------------4-------------- -4---------------4---------- ----- +
I 17 1 158 1501 210 2071 263 2661 315 3291 368 3941 421 4631 473 5351 526 6101 578 6881 631 7691
1 103 281 148 491 198 771 254 1111 315 1521 382 1981 453 2501 931 3091 613 3741 701 4451
4-------------4--------4--------4----------------4-------------4----------------4---- ------------ 4----------------4----------------+----------------4----------------
1 18 1 177 1681 236 2301 295 2961 354 3651 413 4371 471 5131 530 5921 589 6741 648 7591 707 8481
1 114 291 163 521 218 821 279 1181 345 1601 417 2101 495 2651 578 3271 667 3961 762 4711
4------------4--------4--------4---------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
19 1 197 1861 263 2551 328 3281 394 4031 460 4831 525 5651 591 6521 657 7411 72? 8351 788 9311
1 125 311 179 551 239 861 305 1241 376 1691 454 2211 538 2801 628 3461 723 41el 825 4981
4---------------4----------------.---------------------------------4.---------------4----------------4-------------- -4---------------------------------------------4
I 20 1 218 2051 291 2811 364 3611 437 4441 509 5301 582 6201 659 7141 728 8121 800 9131 873 10181
1 137 331 196 581 261 911 332 1311 409 1781 493 2331 583 2951 67q 3641 781 4401 890 5241
4.------------.--------.--------.---------------4----------------4----------------4----------------+----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
I 21 1 241 2261 321 3081 401 3951 481 4861 561 5801 642 6781 7?? 7801 802 8861 882 9951 963 11091
1 150 341 213 611 283 961 360 1381 443 1871 531 2441 629 3091 732 3821 841 4621 958 5901
4------------4-----------4----------------4----------------4----------------4-------------------------------------------------------------------------
I 22 I 264 2471 352 3371 440 4311 528 5291 616 6321 704 7381 792 8481 880 9621 968 10811 1056 12031
I 163 361 232 641 307 1001 389 1441 478 1961 574 2561 677 3241 787 4001 904 4841 1077 5761
SLOPE ANGLE FOR LOT CUT OR FILL VOLUMFS = 40.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +----------------+-------------- ---------------- +-----------------------------
VOLUMES OF CUT REQUIRED AT 0 30 60 AND 90 DEGREES (LOTS ROTATED ABOUT ONF CCPNEP)
LOT WIDTH
LOT DEPTH +------------------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------
3 1 4 1 5 I 6 1 7 1 8 I 9 1 10 1 11 1 12 I
4-- --------- +------------------+---------------4-----------------4----------------4----------------4-----4----------- ----- 4----------------+----------------
5 1 31 371 42 531 52 721 63 92, 73 1151 84 1401 94 1671 105 1961 115 2271 126 2601
1 32 191 50 341 72 521 97 751 126 1031 158 1341 194 1701 234 2101 ?77 2541 324 3021
4.---------------------------------- -- -- -4 ---------4.----------- --- 4--------------4----------------4-------------- ----------------- 4---------------4
6 I 45 511 60 721 75 971 91 1241 106 1531 121 1851 136 2201 151 2561 166 2961 181 3381
I 42 231 65 401 92 631 124 911 160 1231 200 1611 244 2041 293 2521 347 3041 404 3621
-----------------------.---- 4----------+----------- -- +------------------------------ - -------------------- ----- +-----------------------------+
I 7 1 62 671 82 951 103 1261 .123 1601 144 1961 164 2361 185 2791 205 3251 226 3731 247 4251
I 54 261 82 471 115 731 153 1061 196 1441 245 1881 298 2381 357 7931 421 3551 489 4231
4-------------4--------4 -.---------------- 4----------------4---------------4----------------4-------------4----------------4-------------------------------
8 I 80 851 107 1201 134 1581 161 2001 188 2451 215 2931 241 3451 268 4001 295 4591 322 5201
1 66 301 100 541 140 841 185 1211 236 1641 293 2151 356 2721 425 3351 499 4061 579 4831
4.----------- ---- ------- . 4.------------4-------- ---------------------------------- 4-------------- ---------------------------------------------
I 9 I 102 1051 136 1481 170 1941 204 2441 238 2981 272 3561 306 4171 340 4831 374 5521 408 6251
1 80 341 120 601 167 941 220 1361 279 1851 345 2411 418 3061 497 3771 5A2 4571 674 5431
4--------------4----------------------------------------4--------4--------------4--------------------------------+-------------- -4------------------------------
10 1 126 1281 168 1791 210 2341 252 2931 293 3571 335 4251 377 4971 419 5731 461 6531 503 7381
1 96 381 142 671 196 1051 256 1511 325 2051 400 2681 483 3401 573 4191 670 5071 774 6041
4.----- - -.----.---------- 4----------------4----------------4----------------4-----4----------------+----------------4----------------4----------------
11 1 152 1531 203 2131 254 2771 304 3471 355 4211 406 4991 457 5821 507 6701 558 7621 609 8591
1 112 421 165 741 227 1151 296 1661 373 2261 459 2951 552 3741 653 4611 762 5581 879 6641
4--------- -4--------4--------.---------------------------------------------------4----------------4-------------- -4--------------------------------------------
12 1 181 1791 241 2491 302 3241 362 4041 423 4891 483 5791 543 6741 604 7741 664 8791 724 990
1 130 451 190 811 260 1261 338 1811 425 2471 520 3221 625 4081 738 5031 859 6091 990 7241
4.----------4--------4--4---------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4-------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
I 13 1 213 2091 283 2891 354 3751 425 4661 496 5631 567 6651 638 7731 709 8861 779 10051 850 11291
1 149 491 217 871 295 1361 382 1961 479 2671 586 3491 701 4411 826 5451 961 6601 1105 7851
4---------------.--------4--------4--------------------------------.---------------4----------------4-------------- -4---------------------------------------------4
I 14 1 247 2401 329 3321 411 4291 493 5331 575 6421 657 7571 740 8781 822 10051 904 11381 986 12771
I 169 531 246 941 333 1471 430 2111 537 2881 654 3761 782 4751 919 5871 1067 7101 1225 8451
4.------------.--------.---------------4.---------------4.------------.-------- ----------------------- 4-------------- -4---------------.-----------------------------4
Sis 1 283 2731 377 3771 472 4871 566 6031 660 7261 755 8551 849 9901 943 11311 1038 12791 1132 14331
1 191 571 276 1011 372 1571 479 2261 597 3081 726 4031 866 5091 1016 6291 1178 7611 1350 9061
4-------------4--------4-------------4-------------4.-.---------------4------- --------- 4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------
I 16 1 322 3091 429 4251 537 5491 644 6781 751 8151 859 9581 966 11081 1073 12651 1181 14281 1288 15981
1 213 601 308 1071 414 1681 531 2421 660 3291 801 4291 954 5431 1118 6711 1743 8121 1481 9661
4.-------------4------------ -4.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4------- ---------
I 17 I 363 - 3471 485 4771 606 6141 727 7581 848 9091 969 10681 1090 12331 1212 14061 1333 15851 1454 17721
1 237 641 341 1141 457 1781 586 2571 727 3491 RO 4561 1045 5771 1221 7131 1413 8621 1616 10261
4---------------.---------------4--------.--------.--------------4---------------4--------------------------------4-------------- -4---------------4----------------
I 18 I 408 3871 543 5311 679 6831 815 8421 951 10081 1087 11831 1223 13641 1358 15941 1494 17511 1630 19551
1 263 681 376 1211 503 1891 643 2721 796 3701 962 4831 1141 6111 1333 7551 1538 9131 1756 10871
4---------------4--------4--------.----------------4.---------------4.---------------4----------------4-------------- -4--------------------------------------------4
I 19 I 454 4291 605 5881 757 7551 908 9301 1059 11131 1211 13031 1362 15021 1513 17091 1665 19241 1816 21461
1 289 721 413 1271 551 1991 702 2871 868 3901 1047 r101 1240 6451 1447 7971 1667 9641 1902 11471
4--------------4----------------------------------------4--------4--------------4--------------------------------4-------------- --.-------------- 4----------------
I 70 1 503 4731 671 6481 838 8311 1006 10221 1174 12221 1342 14301 1500 16471 1677 18721 1845 21051 2012 23461
I 317 751 452 1341 601 2101 765 3021 943 4111 1136 5371 1343 6791 1565 8391 1801 10151 2052 12081
4-------------4--------4-------------4------------------------------------------------4----------------4-------------- -4---------------.-----------------------------4
71 1 555 5201 740 7111 924 9111 1109 11191 1294 13371 1479 15631 1664 17981 1849 20411 2034 72n4 2219 25551
I 346 791 492 1411 653 2201 829 3171 1021 4311 1229 5641 1450 7131 1687 8811 1940 10691 2207 126A1
4---------------4--------4--------4----------------4----------------4----------------4----------------4-------------- ---------------- +-----------------------------4
22 1 609 5691 812 7771 1015 9941 1217 12201 1420 14561 1623 17011 1?6 19551 2020 ?2181 2232 24911 2435 27731
1 376 831 534 1481 707 7311 896 3321 1102 4571 1321 5901 1560 7471 1813 0221 ?083 11161 ?36q 132RI
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